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Race and Pan-Asianism reactions against the White 
superiority network -attempted racial solidarity 
and its failure 
 
Saho Matsumoto-Best* 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This article focuses on the racial aspect of Pan-Asianism and argues that 
Pan-Asianism movements were radicalized as a reaction against the White 
superiority network which was created by excluding Japanese and other 
Asian immigrants from the British White Dominions and United States. 
Particularly for a country like Australia, it was important to form national 
solidarity under the name of White superiority in order to fill the gap 
between Anglo-Saxons and Celts (Irish), which appeared following the Easter 
Uprising in 1916. The Australian Prime Minister, Billy Hughes, was thus 
responsible for rejecting the racial equality clause presented by Japanese 
government during the Paris Peace conference of 1919. Since the Triple 
Intervention of 1895, the 'Yellow Peril' outcry during and after the 
Russo-Japanese War, the rejection of the racial equality clause, the dissolving 
of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1922, and ultimately the anti-Japanese 
immigration laws passed by the United States government in 1924 and the 
Canadian government in 1928, Japan felt racially humiliated and started to 
seek racial solidarity with other Asian peoples under the name of 
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Pan-Asianism. It took another ten years to form an overtly pan-Asianism 
foreign policy namely the 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.' For the 
British Empire this White superiority policy was a problem as India was the 
most important colony and the Indian soldiers were the largest number to be 
mobilized during the First World War. Joseph Chamberlain, the British 
colonial secretary, suggested using the Natal law, an English-language 
writing test, in order to exclude any coloured people (including the Indian 
people) from Australia, thus pretending that Australia was not racist country. 
Jan Smuts, the South African political leader, also stepped in after Gandhi 
was racially assaulted during his period in South Africa and formed a pact 
setting a quota for the admission of Indian immigrants. Lionel Curtis and 
Philip Kerr, the prominent members of the Round Table, which advocated 
turning the British Imperial ruling body into more democratic 
Commonwealth organization, were behind the adoption of the Diarchy ruling 
system in India by giving limited autonomy to India. All of these British 
race-conscious policies worked in a way in order to counter Japanese 
pan-Asianism racial solidarity with India. Although Subhas Chandra Bose 
led the Indian National Army and collaborated with the Japanese Army in 
order to fight against the British Empire and the United States, the Japanese 
did not sincerely believe in racial solidarity with the Indians but wanted to 
take advantage of them. Japan's mistreatment of Indian POW and its brutal 
behaviour towards the other Asian people was soon revealed and the illusion 
of Asian race brotherhood and racial Pan-Asianism started to fade away. The 
Japanese were originally reluctant to be a part of the Asian race as they saw 
this identity as consigning themselves to a position of inferiority. Japan 
therefore treated other Asians as inferior and attempted to place itself on top 
of the Asian hierarchy under the name of Greater Easter Asian Co-Prosperity 
Sphere. Britain was in a way far more conscious and cautious about racial 
questions, and thus attempted to mediate between the White Dominions' 
White superiority policy and the Indians. Britain and British Empire were 
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therefore well prepared to fight the race war while Japan had a great chance 
to win the race war but it failed. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The origins of Pan-Asianismas a concept is a matter of debate but probably 
began in Japan around the time of the Meiji Restoration in the 
mid-nineteenth century. Moreover, it was not an entirely unique phenomenon 
for Japan, for similarly in the case of Germany and Russia we can see the 
Pan-Germanic and Pan-Slavic movements respectively as basing themselves 
on perceived racial groups. These nationalistic racial ideas were an 
important ideology for both forming a national state and justifying imperial 
expansionist policies. There are quite a few works written on the subject of 
Pan-Asianism, but those that focus on race seem mainly to concentrate on 
intellectual history, including studies of thinkers such as Soho Tokutomi, 
Shigetaka Shiga, Koukichi Taguchi, Tokiti Tarui, Jyugo Sugiura, Tenshin 
Okakura and Fumimaro Konoe.1 There are works written by some historians 
such as Kimitada Miwa and Cemil Aydin2, dealing with the Asian race as a 
brotherhood, but they do not address how the racial issue influenced the 
development of Pan-Asianism during its different phases. In this essay an 
attempt is made to address race from a more concrete approach. In other 
words, it looks at how the racial question, as a reaction against the White 
nations, influenced Japan’s foreign policy, and how the latter attempted to 
mobilize other Asian peoples during the Second World War to fight against 
the British Empire. 
There are mainly two categories of works regarding the racial aspects of 
                                                   
1 S. Yamamoto, Shisokadai to Asia [Asia and Its ideological Theme], Tokyo 2001. 
2  K. Miwa,“Pan-Asianism in modern Japan: nationalism, regionalism and 
universalism”, Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History, Colonialism, 
Regionalism and Borders, ed. S. Saaler, London 2007, 21-33. 
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pan-Asianism: the former has treated the Second World War as a race war, 
and the latter has dealt with the immigration issue. One of the former works, 
Gerald Horne’s Race War: White Supremacy and the Japanese Attack on the 
British Empire, is significant and designed to be controversial.3 However, by 
exaggerating the extent to which the Japanese army was welcomed all over 
Asia during the initial campaigns in the Pacific War, it gives a misleading 
impression. The latter issue of immigration is important as a means of 
identifying the racial issue as a concrete element in international relations. 
However, in most of the existing literature it has been treated as a matter of 
domestic policy. The immigration issue though, as Lake and Reynolds have 
demonstrated, is inherently transnational in scope and should be approached 
from a more international stance. 4  For example, the anti-Japanese 
immigration legislation that the US Congress passed in 1924 was one of the 
elements which contributed to damaging diplomatic relations between Japan 
and the United States in the interwar period.5 
In addition, while there are many works written on this topic regarding 
relations between the United States and Japan, there is not enough research 
on how this issue affected the ties between the British Empire and Japan. 
Considering the fact that Japan attempted to conquer a large part of British 
Empire under the name of pan-Asianism this is a surprising oversight; 
                                                   
3 G. Horne, Race War! White Supremacy and the Japanese Attack on the British 
Empire, New York 2004. 
4 M. Lake and H. Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line, White Men’s 
Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality, Cambridge 
2008. 
5 On the American anti-Japanese immigration legislation in 1924 and Japan-US 
diplomatic relations, see as follows. I. Hirobe, Japanese Pride, American 
Prejudice Modifying the Exclusion Clause of the 1924 Immigration Act, 
Stanford University Press2001; T. Minohara, Hainichi Imin-ho to Nichibei 
Kankei[Anti-Japanese Immigration Legislation, Japanese-US Diplomatic 
Friction over an Immigration Issue], Tokyo 2002; T. Minohara, California Shu 
to Hhainich imin-ho, Imin mondai wo meguru Nichibe Masatsu[California 
State and anti-Japanese immigration legislation, Japanese-US diplomatic 
friction over an immigration issue], Yuhikaku 2006. 
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indeed, it could be said that Anglo-Japanese relations over race are more 
important than American-Japan relations. Recently a significant work has 
been produced by Masataka Matsuura on pan-Asianism and the Japanese 
Empire including the Indian element.6 It argues that Japanese-Indian trade 
networks played an important role in mobilizing anti-British Indians into the 
Pan-Asian movement, but again this work does not address racial issue 
directly. 
One reason why Japanese scholars have avoided work on the racial aspects 
of Pan-Asianism is due to the belief that the Japanese people did not want to 
be seen as part of the Asian race because they ironically thought that the 
Asians were an inferior race to the Whites. All Japan’s efforts since the Meiji 
Restoration were to establish a Western style of modernization in order to get 
rid of the unequal treaties. Moreover, the establishment of the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance gave the illusion that Japan had become an equal 
partner with the most powerful Western nation and thus had become almost 
a part of the White race. There is a work written during the Russo-Japanese 
War by Taguchi Koukichi entitled Ha Ouka Ron (Counter Yellow Peril), and 
one of the chapters argues that the Japanese belonged to the Aryan race.7 
However, after the end of the Russo-Japanese War there was even more of a 
Yellow Peril outcry in the West and the Japanese government was forced to 
counter these claims. Thus it could be said that the idea of Japanese racial 
identity being a part of the Asian race was formed as a reaction against the 
White race’s attack, such as the ‘yellow peril’ outcry, and thus it is equally 
important to examine how White racial solidarity and its superiority was 
formulated. 
This chapter attempts to take the argument further by investigating the 
                                                   
6 M. Matsuura, Daitoa senso ha naze okitanoka, Han Asia-shugi No Seiji-Keizai 
shi, [Why was Daitoa War? Political and Economic History of Pan-Asiansim], 
Nagoya 2010. 
7 K. Taguchi, K, 1904, Ha Oka Ron [Counter Yellow Peril], Kiezai zashi sha 1904, 
39. 
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development of the racial element of Pan-Asianism in response to the White 
superiority network that linked the British White dominions. In other words, 
it argues that Pan-Asianism could not have been radicalized or even clearly 
formed without Western racism against the Japanese and other Asian races. 
Therefore race and racism played a vital role for the development of 
Pan-Asianism. Moreover, it even contributed to the Japanese government’s 
moving towards a Pan-Asianism foreign policy. It also examines how Britain 
reacted against the White dominions’ racial policies and subsequently 
undermined the Japanese claim of racial discrimination that underpinned its 
Pan-Asianism. 
It therefore challenges the idea that there was a duel between the Asian 
racial group and the White racial group by showing that the situation was 
not simple as one might assume because neither side was monolithic. In the 
end it turned into a process in which the Japanese empire tried to use racial 
rhetoric in order to politicize the other Asian races while Britain mobilized 
the white as well as non-white races to fight back in order to protect the 
British Empire. The essay thus also addresses whether the Pacific War was a 
race war or not. 
 
 
Pan-Asianism after the Yellow Peril outcry 
 
Pan-Asianism had existed within Japanese intellectual circle since the 
1870s and 1880s, when it emerged as a reaction against the government’s 
pro-Western foreign policy. It is often associated with right-wing radical 
nationalism, but, as an edited collection by Sven Saaler and Victor 
Koschmann entitled Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History, has shown, 
Pan-Asianism was in fact a very complex phenomenon which many different 
people espoused for very different reasons. It was, for example, an ideology 
that was created as much by liberals such as Fukuzawa Yukichi as it was by 
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right-wing activists, such as Mitsuru Toyama and Yasuya Uchida.8 The first 
pan-Asian organization to be established was the Toa Kai in 1880. It had 
about 400 members in the 1880s but although vocal in its judgments on 
Japan’s foreign policy it had little impact. Indeed, by the time the 
Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1894, pan-Asian activism appeared to have 
largely died out. It only revived by the German emperor’s ‘Yellow Peril’ claim 
and the Triple Invention after the Sino-Japanese War. It was thus seems to 
have been simulated by the appearance in the West of the ‘Yellow Peril’. 
As mentioned in the introduction, the Japanese government was initially 
reluctant to admit that Japan was a part of the Asian or ‘Yellow’ race. 
However after the Russo-Japanese War broke out and the ‘Yellow peril’ outcry 
occurred in Europe and the United States, the Japanese government quickly 
stepped in by sending missions to America, Kentaro Kaneko, and Britain and 
Europe, Kencho Suematsu, in order to counter the anti-Yellow race claims.9 
Some Japanese intellectuals reacted differently to this evidence of Western 
racial hostility. They already felt that Japan had been humiliated by the 
Triple Intervention and started to lean towards Ajia-shugi (Pan-Asianism) as 
a reaction against the Yellow Peril outcry in the West. Just after the 
Sino-Japanese War, Dr. Arinaga, a Japanese scholar of international law, 
started to preach the cause of ‘Asia for the Asians’, and in 1898 Konoe 
Atsumaro asserted that Japan should protect the other ‘yellow races’ by 
encouraging an alliance between the Asian countries.10  Moreover, he acted 
                                                   
8 S. Saaler, S, 2007, Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History, Colonialism, 
regionalism and borders, London 2007, 1-18. 
9 M. Matsumura, M, 1980, Nitiro Senso to Kaneko Kentaro, Kouhou Gaiko no 
Kenkyu[Russo-Japanese war and Kentaro Kaneko, a research on Public 
Diplomacy], Harashobo 1980; idem, Portsmouth Heno Michi, Okaron to Europe 
No SuematsuKencho[A road to Portsmouth, Yellow Peril and Kencho 
Suematsu in Europe], Harashobo 1987. 
10 A. Nagao,‘Tou A gaiko no jyuudai monndai (Important question of East Asia 
diplomacy) in Gaikou Jiho[Diplomacy Gazette] 1:6, 1898, 29-30; Konoe 
Atsumaro, “Alliance of the same race-necessity of research on China (Sina)”, 
Taiyo[Sun], 1 Jan. 1898. 
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on his words later in the year by forming the Toa Dobunkai (East Asian 
Cultural Association), an organization that sought to sponsor Chinese 
students in Japan and to open Japanese schools in China. There was also an 
awareness that cultural societies such as the Toa Dobunkai might be able to 
play a useful role in reaching Chinese opinion and thus encouraging 
resistance towards Russian aggression. The Japanese foreign ministry thus 
offered in secret to fund the Toa Dobunkai’s activities.11 
 
 
Creating the White superiority network 
 
Because of the Anglo-Japanese alliance the British government was always 
very cautious about the ‘Yellow Peril’ outcry and attempted to distance itself 
from such racially discriminatory statements. Not only the government but 
also the press, such as The Times, were very careful about the Yellow Peril. 
However a problem arrived from its White Dominions such as Australia and 
Canada. For example in the Contemporary Review of August 1904an 
Australian, Richard Crouch, in an article entitled ‘An Australian view of the 
War’, took an anti-Japanese racial view. Commenting on his fear of the 
implications for Australia of a Japanese victory over Russia, he announced, 
‘It is because the victory of a coloured race over a white people would bring 
closer this danger that our interest as a Commonwealth impel us to desire a 
Russian victory.’12 
The exclusion of the coloured race immigrants from the Dominions started 
after the gold rushes of the mid-nineteenth century which had led to an 
                                                   
11  Kuroki Morifumi, “The Asianism of the Koa-Kai and the AjiaKyokai: 
reconsidering the ambiguity of Asianism”, in Pan-Asianism in Modern 
Japanese History, Colonialism, regionalism and borders, ed. S. Saaler, London 
2007, 50-51. 
12 Richard Crouch, “An Australian view of the War”, Contemporary Review, Aug. 
1904. 
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influx of Chinese immigrants. In Australia gold was discovered in the 1850s 
in Victoria and NSW and it experienced an anti-Chinese riot as early as 1854. 
The state government therefore started restricting the entry of Chinese and 
by 1861 the Australian states had also passed legislation to prohibit the 
naturalization of those of Chinese race. By 1889 these laws had come to cover 
the whole of the Australian state including the Northern Territory and the 
islands in the Pacific.13 The exclusion of Japanese immigration from the 
British White dominions and the US started about twenty years later after 
that of the Chinese. The motive for this was different; toward the Chinese it 
was almost entirely to do with labour market competition with the white 
workers, while toward the Japanese it was also to do with the security threat 
from Japan as a nation. For example, the Japanese people who were staying 
in Australia were perceived to be representatives of a Japanese nation which 
could threaten the Australian security position in the Pacific. One irony in 
Australia was that the image it had of Japanese workers overlapped with its 
view of Japan as a nation which had successfully modernized its economy as 
well as developing military forces by following the Western model.14 In 
particular Australia felt that it faced a security threat around the time of the 
First World War as British transferred its naval units from the Pacific to 
European waters due to the German threat. Australia cried out about its 
fragile security situation, but as far as Britain was concerned Japan could 
defend Australia following the lines of Anglo-Japanese alliance. The 
Australians, though, could not trust the Japanese as they were seen as a 
‘Yellow peril’ who would not defend them, but instead were likely to attack 
the White country. The Australian fear of Japan and Japanese immigrants in 
their country was epitomized by the very anti-Japanese politician, Billy 
                                                   
13 A.T. Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia, the Background to Exclusion, 
1889-1923, Melbourne 1967, 70-71. 
14  The National Archives (TNA), Kew, CO (Colonial Office)179/198, Natal 
Legislative Assembly, 25 March 1897, Sessional Papers, Fifth Session, First 
Parliament Enclosure.  
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Hughes, who came to power as Prime Minister in 1915. Once the First World 
War broke out, Japan occupied the former German territories in the Pacific 
islands, and Australia felt even more alarmed as   Japan edged towards the 
northern part of the continent.15 
Australia was not unique in identifying Japanese immigration with the 
Japan nation, even those in North America whose security position was far 
more secure, seemed to embrace a similar perception. Particularly California 
and British Columbia, where most Japanese immigrants were resident, 
started introducing strict anti-Japanese measures after the Russo-Japanese 
War. Australia, California and British Columbia, the territories facing the 
Pacific, thus seemed to share a similar fear of Japanese potential expansion 
in the Pacific Ocean, far more than Britain and the central governments of 
the US and Canada.16 
This kind of anti-Japanese sentiment had its roots, as is well known, in the 
book by Charles Pearson, National Life and Character: a Forecast, which was 
published at the beginning of 1893, and which created a great impact in the 
British White dominions as well as the United States. His book, as Lake and 
Reynolds have demonstrated, influenced important political figures such as 
Theodore Roosevelt and the Australian politician, William ‘Billy’ Hughes.17 
Indeed, around this time a number of publications about the superiority of 
the White race were published within the English-speaking world and these 
publications were easily circulated either across the Atlantic or the Pacific. 
Additionally several journals in English created an intellectual public sphere 
in which ideas about white unity were spread between the English-speaking 
                                                   
15 D. Goldsworthy, ed., Facing North, a century of Australian Engagement with 
Asia, Volume 1, 1901 to the 1970s, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
Melbourne 2001, 50 
16 P. Roy, A White Man’s province: British Politicians and Chinese and Japanese 
immigrants, 1858-1914, Vancouver 1989, 202. 
17 M. Lake, Mand H. Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line, White Men’s 
Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality, Cambridge 2008, 
49-50. 
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countries, such as US, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South 
Africa. 
It could be said that Australia had even stronger racial ideas and 
allegiance to white racial identity than the United States. One of the reasons 
for this was to do with its geographical position, as it felt itself to be 
surrounded by the coloured races, and as possessing a fragile defense status. 
In addition, however, it is also worth noting the strong presence of an Irish 
population. 
The importance of the Irish in creating a heightened sense of white identity 
has already attracted the interest of historians of ‘whiteness’ in the United 
States. For example, David Roediger in his book, The Wages of Whiteness: 
Race and the Making of the American Working Class, has described how 
Irish immigrants sought to claim a role for themselves in American life and 
to protect their jobs by emphasizing that as whites they deserved equality 
with the Anglo-Saxon elite. This, in turn, led them to look down on 
African-Americans and new Asian immigrants.18 In Australia the situation 
was much the same. The Irish Australians possessed an important position 
within the trade union movement and thus within the Labour Party. 
However, their vocal opposition to the political elite could cause trouble for 
the unity of the newly formed country as it raised the potential of a division 
between Anglo-Saxons and Celts. An example of this problem can be seen in 
the fact that the Australian Prime Minister, Billy Hughes, who introduced 
conscription during the First World War, had to leave the Labour Party 
because of this policy. In part, this was because conscription was against the 
Labour party’s ideology, but, what is more, the Irish deeply resented the 
forced mobilization of soldiers by the British government, particularly as this 
coincided with the time of the Easter Uprising of 1916 which was brutally 
suppressed by Britain. The Australian Irish were about 25% of the whole 
                                                   
18 D. Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American 
Working Class, London 2007, 36. 
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population of Australia, and, moreover, constituted 80% of the urban 
working-class population of the country. Thus conscription became an issue 
of great political controversy in which the Catholic bishops, including the 
influential Archbishop Daniel Mannix of Melbourne, were also involved.19 
Moreover, in New Zealand the editor of a Catholic journal, who was also 
against conscription during the First World War, was arrested and 
imprisoned until the end of the conflict. We can therefore see a clear division 
within the White people -Anglo-Saxons versus Celtics- Protestants versus 
Catholics. 
Accordingly, it was important to use the rhetoric of racial solidarity in 
order to repair any cracks between the different White racial groups. As such, 
by the time of the end of First World War racial ‘Whiteness’ had become one 
of the important ideologies for nation-building in Australia and New Zealand. 
Moreover, the difficult victory and the heroic struggles of the Anzac Corps 
also contributed to the evolution of ‘Whiteness’. A similar argument in favour 
of White racial solidarity was also used in South Africa in order to avoid 
divisions between the British and the Afrikaners. Indeed, the White 
superiority policy was the only way to unify the white population by 
segregating the coloured races, the blacks and the Asians. 
We can therefore see that a strong White superiority network was formed 
between the British White Dominions of Australia, New Zealand and South 
Africa, and Canada. Now it is necessary to examine how the White 
superiority ideology was put into practice in the form of immigration policy. 
Although Britain understood the White Dominions’ colonial nationalism and 
their racial policy, it also believed that it was not to offend the coloured 
subjects of the British Empire. 
The British colonial secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, therefore suggested 
using the Natal law, which involved an English writing test rather than 
                                                   
19 M. Clark, History of Australia[Australia No Rekishi], trans. Mihoko Takeuchi, 
Tokyo 1978,244-247 
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automatically excluding any coloured people. The Natal law was originally 
invented by Natal in South Africa in 1894. It was based on, and used for the 
same purpose, as American legislation, namely to exclude illiterate black 
people from the franchise. Chamberlain thought that it was a good 
innovation as it was not directly offensive against Japanese or Indians who 
Britain did not desire to offend. 
In 1901 Australia introduced an immigration law along line of the Natal 
act to exclude any coloured race and ensure the survival of White Australia. 
Tadasu Hayashi, the Japanese minister to London, complained about 
Australian immigration policy on the basis that it attempted to exclude 
Japanese people. However these complaints had little impact on the 
Australian attitude. Australia had full autonomy since 1901, and its leaders 
argued that immigration policy was an internal not external matter and that 
Britain did not have the right to intervene. 20  Hayashi and Japanese 
government had ill feeling towards Australian policies, however nothing 
could be changed in spite of the existence of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. 
In the case of Canada, things were different. While British Columbia was 
opposed to Japanese immigration, the Canadian government in 1905 decided 
to sign a commercial treaty with Japan and accepted Tokyo’s assurance that 
this would not lead to a wave of immigrants. This promise was, however, 
demonstrated to be valueless as the number of immigrants soon began to rise, 
which led in turn to the Vancouver riot of September 1907. The Vancouver 
riots shocked Japan. Newspapers in Japan reported the incident with 
sensational headlines, calling it "the most deplorable demonstration" and "a 
tragic incident unprecedented in the history of western Canada," and 
claiming that the "humiliation accompanying the damage caused by it was 
                                                   
20  National Archive of Australia, Canberra, Japanese Consulate File, 
Department of External Affairs, 01/203/01, 1901-1902, Include Hayashi’s letter 
to Lansdowne, 4 July 1901, A6661/1, 422122, Immigration of Japanese  
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beyond words."21 
California had a similar experience. In 1906the state legislative introduced 
anti-Japanese immigration legislation such as separating the Japanese 
children from a local school. In 1907 there was anti-Japanese rioting in 
California, and afterwards Japanese were excluded from the right of 
purchasing land. Events in California influenced British Colombia, and the 
anti-Japanese riot in Vancouver should be seen as a chain-reaction. The 
Japanese government subsequently intervened to introduce a gentleman’s 
agreement on immigration policy both with Canada and the United States, 
but the Japanese public felt that this was racial humiliation. 
 
 
Japan’s reactions to White superiority networks 
 
From the Japanese point of view, although Mitsukawa Kametaro, a 
Japanese right-winger, had argued that the Triple Intervention was a racial 
humiliation for Japan22, most Japanese intellectuals such as Taguchi were 
doubtful about the arguments for Asian racial solidarity, as they believed 
that the Japanese were not a yellow race but rather almost white. The 
immigration dispute of the 1900s, however, began to raise questions about 
whether the West would even treat Japan as an equal. Moreover in the 
afterward of the Russo-Japanese war many Asian nationalists began to look 
Japan for leadership. 
In 1910, there were already a number of Indian revolutionaries in Tokyo, 
and their activities were linked with the Japanese Pan-Asianist, Okawa 
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Shumei. 23  Around this time Tokyo became the centre of not only the 
Pan-Asianists from India, but also attracted radicals from other parts of Asia 
and even Pan-Islamic thinkers. There were a series of meetings in which 
representatives of the Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asianist movement gathered and 
attempted to create global cooperation. Ibrahim, a Turkish revolutionary, and 
Mitsuru Toyama, Tsuyoshi Inukai and Yasuya Uchida, all prominent 
Japanese Pan-Asianists, formed the Asia Gi Kai (Association for the Defence 
of Asia) and enhanced contacts with Konoe’s Toa Dobunkaias well as two 
other major ultra-nationalist organizations, the Kokuryukai and the 
Genyosha.24 
However, the First World War was one of the turning points as Japan’s 
Twenty-One Demands against China caused a strong anti-Japanese 
movement in that country and the possibility of racial solidarity between the 
Japanese and Chinese was eliminated, Japan therefore had to turn its eyes 
towards other Asian countries. During the First World War, in 1915, there 
was an Indian army mutiny in Singapore, and the Japanese government 
co-operated with Britain to suppress the riots but at the same time Japan 
became more conscious about the Indian element of Pan-Asianism.25 Indeed, 
when the right wing gave asylum to an Indian revolutionary, Rash Behari 
Bose, the Japanese government turned a blind eye to his presence even after 
pressure from Britain. 
All these proceedings were closely observed and monitored by British 
intelligence in India as well as in Japan.26 The British were concerned about 
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Japanese pan-Asianism and its close links with the Indian anti-British 
nationalism. A number of hostile and alarming reports were produced on the 
Japanese Pan-Asian organizations and their activities towards the end of the 
War. Japan was supposed to be allied with Britain, but instead it became 
rather un-trustworthy in British eyes. 
In part this was the legacy of Aritomo Yamagata, one of the founding 
fathers of modern Japan. In 1914 when he had retired from mainstream 
politics but was still an influential figure, he made a warning about the 
possibilities of a world-wide racial struggle: 
 
Recent international trends indicate that racial rivalry has yearly become 
more intense. It is a striking fact that the Turkish and Balkan wars of the past 
and the Austrian-Serbian and Russo-German wars of the present all had their 
origins in racial rivalry and hatred. Furthermore, the exclusion of Japanese in 
the state of California in the US, and the discrimination against Indians in 
British Africa are also manifestation of the racial problem. As a consequence, 
the possible further intensification of the rivalry between the white and colored 
peoples leading to an eventual clash cannot be completely ruled out. When the 
present great war in Europe is over and order restored, politically and 
economically, nations will again turn to advantages and rights they might 
again in the Far East. Then, the rivalry between the white and colored peoples 
will intensify, and perhaps it will be a time when the white races will all unite 
to oppose the colored people.27 
 
Yamagata’s view was shared by other Japanese political leaders, and thus 
Japan followed a foreign policy of avoiding any racial disturbances with the 
European powers, while Japan and the Western Powers, particularly Britain, 
                                                                                                                                   
sedition in Japan. 
27 Hackett, R, 1971, Yamagata Aritomo in the rise of Modern Japan, 1838-1922, 
Mess: Cambridge, 1971, 270. 
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became more conscious about the racial issue. For Britain it would be 
worrying as its relations with India, the Middle East and Egypt, were tied up 
with race. Yamagata pointed out on 10 August 1914: 
 
The present war in Europe that began as a Balkan problem had its origin in 
a Slavic-German racial struggle that spread to include the racial rivalry 
between the Anglo-Saxon and Latin peoples. Already Indians with British 
citizenship cannot land in Canada.28 
 
It was the Japanese pan-Asianists who realized that the Indian element in 
pan-Asianism could be important, particularly if Japan could mobilize the 
Indians as far as they were unhappy about the British White dominions’ 
racism against them. The linkage between the Japanese Pan-Asianist and 
the Indian merchant communities in Japan made them realize that the 
Indian merchant diaspora network stretched all the way from Japan, Asia, 
India, Middle East to Africa. Pan-Asianism could take advantages from such 
a global network to propaganda in order to expand its appeal.29 
Tokutomi Soho, one of the prominent and influential Pan-Asianists in the 
period, stated after the war that Japan must take up the “Yellow man’s 
burden” referring to Kipling’s famous phrase “White man’s burden”, as the 
leader of Asian civilization including not only the ‘Yellow race’ countries, like 
Korea, China and southeast Asia, but also India, Persia, Arabia, Egypt and 
Turkey. His emphasis was on the fact that, while Japan had never dreamt to 
confront the White Races, the other Asian countries were begging Japan to be 
their leader and it should therefore take responsibility by showing its 
example as a civilized modern national state.30 Initially he asserted the need 
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for cooperation between the West and East by contending that Japan could 
mediate between the White and non-White races, but if the other Asian 
countries expected Japan to be the liberator from the White men’s 
colonialism Japan should become the ruler of Asia and confront the Western 
Powers’ interests. 
In analyzing the racial aspect of pan-Asianism, it is also impossible to 
avoid mentioning the Racial Equality Clause which was proposed by 
Japanese government during the Paris Peace conference of 1919. It is known 
that the rejection of the racial equality clause caused Japan great 
disappointment and even humiliation, and eventually contributed to the 
radicalization of the pan-Asianism movement in Japan. However, it is not so 
well known that it was Billy Hughes who pressurized the British to vote 
against it. Britain was in a dilemma in terms of the racial question as the 
British Empire contained so many non-white contingents, and the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance was still valid. However Hughes threatened Lloyd 
George by arguing that while Australia would reluctantly compromise on the 
islands in the Pacific, it would not on the racial quality clause. He also 
emotionally blackmailed the British Prime Minister by reminding him of the 
large number of Anzac lives had been sacrificed at Gallipoli thanks to 
Britain’s military mistakes.31  In the end Lloyd George had to veto the 
Japanese racial clause. Thus it was the Australian prime minister’s triumph 
that made the Japanese suggestion a dead letter. 
After the First World War Japan also felt insulted by the treaties singed at 
the Washington conference of 1921-22, which were to some almost like a 
second Triple Intervention. In particular Japan thought that the abolition of 
the Anglo-Japanese treaty was to do with an American conspiracy, and that 
Britain did little to resist Washington’s suggestion for Anglo-Saxon cultural 
and racial solidarity. 
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Furthermore the anti-Japanese immigration law in the United States in 
1924 and then a similar episode in Canada in 1928, caused a White peril 
outcry and the further radicalization of Pan-Asianism in racial terms. Such 
clearly racially discriminative immigration act against the Japanese could 
only push the latter towards becoming more distant from the West and closer 
to Asia. Indeed, the 1924 act led the whole nation into a state of outrage 
which was symbolized by a day of national humiliation and some arguing 
that this again was a second and even worse version of the Triple 
intervention of 1895. The problem within Japan was that it was a great and 
humiliating disappointment for liberal political figures, such as Nitobe, who 
were already losing influence in the Diet, and that instead, more radical 
right-wing political movements could gain support as a reaction against the 
United States, Canada and Australia’s racial humiliation of Japan. 
One middle-aged man from the former samurai class committed ritual 
Harakiri next door to the American embassy in Tokyo in 1924, with a letter of 
protest on his chest addressed to the President of the United States. 
Tokutomi regarded this incident as a great opportunity to increase his 
influence, and in his newspaper, Kokumin No Tomo, he published this act 
asserting “this is the day when Japan’s foreign policy swings away from the 
West to the East, disentangling itself from the United States in order to clasp 
hands with its Asian brothers.”32 Tokutomi, who once had attempted to 
cooperate with West, abandoned this idea completely and claimed that a 
racial war could break out between the ‘Yellow peril’ and the ‘White peril’, 
and that Japan should take the leadership of the ‘Yellow people’s’ to fight 
against the evil White Americans and British White Dominions. 
Mitsukawa argued in his writings on the black race, that in the house of 
black Americans in the US, there were portraits of Nobuaki Makino as well 
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as of Abraham Lincoln.33 Outside of Japan, for India, Turkey, Egypt, the 
Middle East and South- East Asia the settlement of the Paris Peace 
conference brought even more unsatisfactory consequences in spite of the 
great expectations raised by Wilsonian ideas of national self-determination. 
This naturally radicalized their nationalism which was now even more eager 
to link-up with the Pan-Asian and Pan-Islam movements. The Japanese 
Pan-Asianists responded keenly to their Asian brothers’ appeals. In the 
Japanese political world there were increasing numbers of political figures 
who became sympathetic with Pan-Asianism, such as Okuma and Inukai, 
prime ministers rather than simply intellectuals.34 However, in spite of all 
these elements, domestic as well as external, the Japanese government still 
did not adopt any foreign policy based on Pan-Asianism up until the late 
1930’s. 
It was only when in 1937 Konoe Fumimaro became Prime Minister and 
attempted to build a united front among Japanese nationalists, that 
Pan-Asiansim was put into practice. Under the name of the Greater East 
Asia Co-Prosperity sphere it was held that the Asian race should come 
together. A state mobilization law was introduced in 1938 in order to 
consolidate national resources at home in support of the war effort, and in 
1939 Ishiwara Kanji formed the East Asia League (Toa Renmei) in 1939 to 
institutionalize Japan’s hopes for forming an East Asia based upon ethnic 
nationalism. The East Asian League became an institution to oppose British 
imperialism and to liberate Asia from its rule. The League devoted itself to 
the co-existence of all of the ethnic nations of Greater East Asia. India was 
welcome to join and the Philippines and Burma were guaranteed the honor of 
independence. This might have been attractive for these Asian countries if it 
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and his discourse)”, Takusyoku Daigaku Hyakunen shi[A Hundred Year 
History of Takusyoku University], I, 91-106. 
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could be shown that the various ethnic groups of Asia could co-exist.35 
However in reality, but also in theory, the concept of a Minzoku Chitsujo, a 
hierarchical ordering of the various ethnic groups, was revealed, with Japan 
at the top of the hierarchy and others forced into a position of subordination; 
horizontal or even semi-equal relations were unthinkable. Even in 
Manchuria, when Shigemitsu Mamoru intended to give some power to the 
last Chinese emperor, the Japanese army blocked this idea. Thus the term 
"Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" and the racial brotherhood of the 
East Asia League became largely used for the Japanese control of occupied 
countries during World War II, in which puppet governments manipulated 
local populations and economies for the benefit of Imperial Japan. 
 
 
Britain mediates between the Asian and the White race 
 
In terms of its own racial policy Britain was confronted with a big dilemma, 
for the White dominions asserted the need for a White racial superiority 
policy which excluded any coloured race, even the Indians. However, if you 
look at the actual number of people who were mobilized for the First World 
War the Indians were top of the list, contributing three times more than the 
Anzacs. In other words, the British Empire could not be defended without the 
Indians. This was true both for during the war as well as in time of peace, 
and thus the British Empire could not be sustained if Britain mistreated the 
coloured race as the White Dominions’ policy implied. It was the British 
government which realized this dilemma and thus it attempted to act as a 
mediator between the Whites and the coloured races. The Anglo-Japanese 
alliance was in a way useful for Britain’s colour-blind policy, as it crossed the 
racial divide. However, after its abolition Britain faced a serious question 
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about how to avoid a race war which it could potentially lose against the 
Japanese who were in a far more advantageous position to mobilize the 
Indian under the name of the Asian racial solidarity. 
Jan Smuts, the South African military and political leader, who was 
conscious and cautious about race, was a keen supporter of the White 
superiority policy, but was also concerned about imperial solidarity at the 
same time. It was Smuts who negotiated with Gandhi over Indian 
immigration to the South Africa and made a reluctant compromise on his 
racial policy by accepting a very limited amount of reciprocal immigration.36 
This policy was also followed by Canada. In reality, hardly any Indians 
managed to enter South Africa and Canada in the inter-war period, but the 
mere fact that some were allowed meant that lip service was paid to the 
British Empire’s colour-blind policy and an attempt was made, above all, to 
prevent the Indians from being seduced by the Japanese racial claim to be 
Asian brothers. 
It is worth noting that Smuts was close to the people involved in the Round 
Table, although he was not a member himself. The Round Table movement 
was originally started in South Africa by the followers of Alfred Milner. In 
1910 they had returned to Britain in Oxford and had founded a journal called 
the Round Table. Their activities focused on the need for closer cooperation 
between Britain and the Dominions. They originally pushed for federation, 
but, after coming to understand the desire of the Dominions for independence, 
they adapted their ideas to push for the creation of a British Commonwealth. 
It could therefore be said that the Round Table attempted to turn the 
hierarchical imperial system into a more democratic organization, in which 
Britain positioned itself to act as a mediator rather than a dictator. This 
change in attitude was not, however, limited to the Dominions, for the main 
players in the Round Table, such as Lionel Curtis and Philip Kerr (later Lord 
Lothian) realized that if the empire was to evolve into a Commonwealth then 
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a degree of self-government had to be given to the colonies.37 
Curtis, who had been to Australia, was invited to stay in India in 1916-19 
to advice unofficially on the constitutional reform in India. This was partly to 
do with the question of Indian immigration to the White Dominions, as this 
was one of the major concerns for the Viceroy of India, Lord Chelmsford, 
1916-21, who had previously been a Governor in Australia (Queensland and 
then NSW) between 1905 and 1913.38 Curtis insisted that the Indians should 
be able to visit or work in the White Dominion but would have no right of 
permanent domicile, and this idea was partly adopted as the White 
Dominions’ immigration policy. 
Moreover towards the end of the First World War Curtis’ idea of Indian 
Dyarchy helped the Secretary of State for India, Sir Edwin Montagu, to 
undertake reform of the Indian constitution, in other words, the way which 
Britain ruled India after the First World War. This resulted in the India Act 
of 1919.  Meanwhile, the Round Table journal managed to influence other 
publications to accept that reform in India was urgently necessary. 39 
Moreover, it is interesting to note that around the same time Milner as 
Colonial Secretary was forced to accept, when Egypt erupted into revolution 
in 1919, that Britain must accede to Egyptian demands to be independent. 
Additionally, it is no surprise that Smuts contributed to the founding of the 
League of Nations and that he viewed it as an attempt to expand on the ideas 
that underpinned the Commonwealth. 
  The sensitivity of Kerr to the importance of a colour-blind policy is evident 
in an article of the Round Table from September 1921 on the future of the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance in which he argued that ‘to sever ties with Japan 
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would render another world war more likely and such a conflict would be of a 
racial character, based on “colour”.40 
The influence of the Round Table continued to be felt into the inter-war 
period as the idea of the Commonwealth began to attract more supporters. In 
addition, Lothian in the early 1930s played an important role in pushing for 
the reforms that would lead to the 1935 Government of India Act which 
paved the way for the creation of provincial assemblies. Lothian was 
appointed a member of the Indian Franchise Committee in order to expand 
the number of Indian votes, and it was partly put in practice by allowing 
them a restricted franchise. As Lothian was also against racism against the 
Indians he argued that India should be treated in the same way as the White 
Dominions.41 
In terms of the racial question, Britain therefore, under the influence of 
thinkers such as Curtis and Kerr, accepted the need to conciliate nationalist 
sentiment in the non-white colonies. Naturally, this did not go far enough to 
please figures such as Gandhi and Nehru, but it did at least demonstrate that 
Britain was not completely opposed to change and thus potentially opened 
the way to eventual independence. By doing so, it blunted the appeal of 
Japan whose record of behavior in Korea and China did not suggest that it 
was very different from the Europeans. Thus in 1942, when faced with 
Japanese victories in Asia, many Indians instead of turning to Japan for 
leadership, tried to use the crisis as an opportunity to press Britain for 
Dominion status. 
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Conclusion 
 
So was the Pacific War a race war? It is a matter of great debate and it is 
very difficult to prove that the Japanese government actually adopted a 
foreign policy based on Pan-Asianism racial ideology. However, as 
demonstrated above, it is clear that both sides, the Japanese and British 
Empires, were extremely conscious about racial policy. 
After the Pacific War broke out, the Indian National Army led by Subhas 
Chandra Bose collaborated with the Japanese army and fought against 
Britain and the United States in 1941 and 42. It was a rare occasion when 
Japan formed a policy basing on racial solidarity, however the Japanese did 
it not do this because they sincerely believed in racial solidarity with the 
Indians but rather because the Indian anti-British revolutionaries were seen 
to be useful. Japan’s mistreatment of Indian POWs and its brutal behavior 
towards the other Asian races was soon revealed and the illusion of Asian 
race solidarity and brotherhood started to fade away, as Japan regarded 
other Asians as inferior races and attempted to place itself on top of the Asian 
hierarchy under the name of Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. 
Britain was far more conscious and cautious about race and racial policy 
than Japan, and as we have seen attempted to mediate between the White 
Dominion’s white superiority policy and the Indians. Britain adopted a kind 
of class system in India by politicizing the Indian elite rather than 
considering the White Dominions’ racial policy. Thanks to pan-Asianism and 
its racial claim Britain was very much warned and well prepared in advance 
to fight the race war while Japan was offered a great opportunity to win the 
race but it failed because the British empire was far more race conscious than 
the Japanese empire. 
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Abstract 
In the analysis of social welfare in British history, it has become common to 
consider the mutually complementary relationship between state and 
non-state actors. While many studies have concentrated on this relationship 
in the UK, this focus should be extended overseas to the British Empire. 
After the First World War, colonial welfare emerged as an agenda in British 
imperial policy, reflected in such legislation as the Colonial Development and 
Welfare Act and in the creation of the Colonial Office Colonial Social Welfare 
Advisory Committee. While the roles played in colonies by non-state actors 
such as missionaries have been considered, especially in nineteenth-century 
British imperial history, this has yet to be explored after the Second World 
War when the decolonization process was in motion. 
This paper describes a set of activities in colonial social welfare undertaken 
by British non-governmental agencies after World War Two, using the 
example of a women’s voluntary organization, the National Federation of 
Women’s Institutes (NFWI). Although usually considered domestic, their 
activities were not confined to the UK. Cooperating closely with the 
government and other voluntary groups, the NFWI offered hospitality to 
people from the colonies and provided support to create similar organizations 
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there. The ‘domesticity’ of the NFWI was compatible with its equally 
important principle, internationalism. 
After the Second World War, the NFWI redefined its role to accommodate 
the new post-war reality. Duplicating old notions of a ‘civilising mission’, the 
NFWI saw its new role as leading colonial people to become decent members 
of self-governing civil society and preparing them for future independence. 
Indeed, the NFWI’s main international activity in this period included 
teaching colonial people how to administrate women’s voluntary 
organizations, an activity shared both by the Colonial Office and UNESCO. 
In 1950, reacting to an UNESCO paper stressing the need to start women’s 
organizations in ‘backward countries’, the NFWI began to consider sending 
organizers to found Women’s Institutes (WI) in colonies. This was 
implemented in 1952, when Lady Templer, wife of the High Commissioner in 
Malaya, asked the NFWI to help to start WIs there. The NFWI sent 
organizers to Malaya, and Malayan WIs were formed. However, the WI 
movement in Malaya does not appear to have succeeded in becoming a truly 
indigenous voluntary grassroots movement. While the NFWI had received 
trainees from Malaya, in 1957, when the Federation of Malaya became 
independent, the future of the Malayan WI was not bright. 
Nevertheless, the project in Malaya influenced the redefinition of the 
British NFWI’s international role. In response to the ‘success’ in Malaya, in 
1954 the NFWI Annual General Meeting resolved that international 
understanding and friendship should be one of their objects, adopting the 
slogan ‘think internationally’. In the 1960s the NFWI was involved in 
international work to assist in the economic and social development of poor 
countries, including colonies and ex-colonies. 
 
Key words: colonial welfare, women, decolonization, international activities, 
non-governmental organization 
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Introduction 
 
Recently, with increasing recognition of the limitations of state welfare, it 
has become impossible to think about social welfare without taking into 
account the roles played by non-governmental voluntary actors. This is also 
true in the historical analysis of Britain. Especially since the 1990s, the 
historical collaboration between the state and voluntary agencies in modern 
and contemporary Britain has been well recognized. 1  Even William 
Beveridge, who wrote the blueprint of the British post-war ‘welfare state’, 
expected the continued importance of the voluntary element.2 After 1945, 
voluntary organizations still remained partners of the state, filling gaps in 
welfare provisioning.3  
Another indispensable facet in the analysis of modern British history, 
especially after the First World War, is social welfare in the empire. As J.E. 
Lewis maintained regarding colonial Africa, with international pressure for 
colonial governments to take responsibility for social conditions within 
colonies growing, and with the new principle of state intervention emerging 
at home, ‘the metropolitan forms of social engineering and its corresponding 
bureaucratic manifestation were applied to colonial issues’.4  A series of 
legislative acts to promote the development of colonial welfare epitomise this 
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situation, regardless of their efficacy: these include the Colonial Development 
and Welfare Act of 1940 and the creation of the Colonial Social Welfare 
Advisory Committee in the Colonial Office. Importantly, as this paper will 
demonstrate through an example of a women’s group based at home, in the 
imperial arena as well as in the metropole, it was usual that voluntary 
organizations had closely cooperated for the betterment of social welfare not 
only with the state, but also such international organizations as the United 
Nations. Thus, the analysis of the role played by non- governmental agencies 
outside the UK is also important in considering the history of social welfare. 
Especially after the Second World War, when the relationship between the 
metropole and the colonies was changing under the increasing pressure for 
independence, social welfare, together with development, defined the 
relationship between metropole and colonies – or, after their independence, 
the relationship between an ex-colonial power and newly emerged third 
world countries.  
While Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and voluntary agencies 
have begun to garner scholarly attention,5 their influence beyond Britain 
remains to be studied. Furthermore, Christian missionaries, the non-state 
agents whose activities in the colonial social field were most visible, have 
attracted much attention in nineteenth century British imperial history, 
while the role played by non-state actors and their relation to both state and 
colonial peoples in the decolonization process remains to be explored.6 Such 
studies would be important in considering the unequal relationship between 
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the western, rich, modern, and sometimes humanitarian volunteers and 
those who were offered help, often living in the ex-colonial ‘third world’. 
This paper describes some of the activities undertaken by British 
non-government agencies relating to colonial social welfare after the Second 
World War, and especially in the 1950s, by taking as an example a women’s 
organization based in the metropole, the Women’s Institute (WI), and its 
national federated organization, the National Federation of Women’s 
Institutes (NFWI). Although this ‘Jam and Jerusalem’ organization is usually 
regarded as domestic, based mainly in rural districts of England and Wales, 
and as perpetuating ‘traditional’ English national identity,7 this paper will 
show that its members were widely involved in activities for people coming 
from abroad and living within the empire. Cooperating closely with the 
Colonial Office, the Foreign Office, the United Nations, and other voluntary 
groups, its members offered hospitality and taught the ‘British lifestyle’ to 
visitors from abroad, often from within the empire. They offered English 
lessons to refugees and immigrants, and travelled abroad to spread the WI 
movement. The ‘domesticity’ of WI was compatible with its equally important 
principle: internationalism.  
NFWI was one of many voluntary groups (women’s or otherwise) that acted 
in the British Empire and for the colonial people. NFWI documents show 
close cooperation with other voluntary groups. For example, the YMCA and 
the Victoria League were also involved in hospitalising and training students 
or guests from the empire, although NFWI tend to be singled out when 
discussing work in rural areas. At the same time, NFWI and its educational 
institution, the Denman College (founded in 1948), offered lectures on 
                                                   
7 Maggie Andrews, ‘‘For home and country’: Feminism and Englishness in the 
Women’s Institutes Movement, 1930–1960’, in Richard Weight and Abigail 
Beach eds., The Right to Belong: Citizenship and National Identity in Britain, 
1930–1960, London 1998, 116–135. The membership of the NFWI has been 
limited to WIs in England, Wales and the Islands (Isles of Man, etc.). Scotland 
and Northern Ireland have separate organizations: the Scottish Women’s Rural 
Institutes and the Federation of Women’s Institutes of Northern Ireland. 
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colonies or international events to the Women’s Corona Society. Christian 
missionaries should not be ignored, and some research about their activities 
during decolonization has been already done. It will eventually be necessary 
to outline the cooperative web between the various groups as well as their 
relationships with the government. However, doing so is beyond the scope of 
my research at this stage. This paper will therefore only cast a ray of light on 
part of the whole picture.       
NFWI is worth attention for the following reasons. While NFWI was 
merely one of many voluntary groups that were involved in welfare works, it 
was especially prevalent in British society, with more than 400,000 members 
during the 1940s to the 1970s.8 Thus, NFWI was often mobilized by the 
government, and it voluntarily cooperated to supplement government welfare, 
mainly for women and children, and to help in domestic affairs, especially 
after the Second World War. Especially remarkable were the support 
activities for ‘outsiders’, whose welfare tends to be left out of official 
infrastructure. NFWI was involved in support activities for a range of 
refugees, foreign workers, and international students in twentieth-century 
Britain, often at the request of the government.9 NFWI was one of multiple 
women’s organizations mobilized, and they were usually invited to join an 
official co-ordinating committee for voluntary organizations. Nonetheless, it 
has been regarded as one of the most important organizations to cooperate 
with the government, making NFWI a representative example of a 
complementary relationship between state and non-state actors. Especially 
in the case of Malaya in the 1950s, which this paper will discuss at length, 
the formation of WI was regarded as an effective measure in building a stable 
                                                   
8 Although the NFWI’s membership has decreased since the 1980s, it still has 
212,526 members as of 2014. See the NFWI homepage at 
http://www.thewi.org.uk/about-the-wi. 
9 For an example from the 1940s, see Hiromi Mizokami, ‘Teaching British Life 
Style: the Role of Women’s Groups in Resettling Foreign Workers during the 
Attlee Yeas’, The East Asian Journal of British History, Vol. 2, March, 2012, 
81–107.  
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community under British imperial control.   
NFWI, a domestic grassroots secular women’s organization founded in the 
twentieth century, merits attention not only in relation to domestic but also 
imperial women’s history. Of course, not all of the voluntary groups that 
acted in the colonial arena were women’s organizations. Even in the case of 
Malaya, male organizations such as Rotary International were also active, 
and their role requires further study.10 However, women often tend to be 
assigned a special gendered role in social welfare. In the British Empire, 
white women were involved in teaching modern, western home-care, and 
hygienic concepts to colonized women, and in emancipating ‘oppressed’ 
women in the colonies. This was true of NFWI. In women’s history, the 
relationship between white women and people in the colonies has been 
studied since Margaret Strobel and Vron Ware raised the issue at the 
beginning of the 1990s.11 Since then, many studies have addressed white 
Victorian women involved in the empire as missionaries, wives, and lady 
travellers. Much remains to be explored on this topic, especially after the 
1950s. This is important because gender has often been tangled up with the 
hierarchical concept of modernization, which has had a lasting influence even 
in the post-colonial era.12  
While NFWI tended to be ignored, even in women’s history, because of its 
non-feminist and conservative characteristics, recently researchers including 
                                                   
10 T. N. Harper, The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya, Cambridge 1999, 
224–227. 
11  Margaret Strobel, European Women and the Second British Empire, 
Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1991; Vron Ware, Beyond the Pale: White 
Women, Racism and History, London 1992. As early as the 1980s, Hazel V. 
Carby criticised white feminists for their ignorance and disregard of the 
situation of black women. See Hazel V. Carby, ‘White Women Listen! Black 
Feminism and the Boundaries of Sisterhood’ in Centre for Contemporary 
Cultural Studies, The Empire Strikes Back: Race and Racism in 70s Britain, 
London 1982, 212–235.  
12 Barbara Bush points out that the colonial discourse relating to gender and 
domesticity has affected gendered aid and development projects in the third 
world. See Philipp Levine, Gender and Empire, Oxford 2004, Chapter 4. 
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Maggie Andrews, Linda Perriton, and Caitriona Beaumont have begun to 
re-evaluate the role that such ‘mainstream’ women’s organizations played in 
improving the lives of indigenous women and educating women as citizens in 
the post-suffrage era.13 For example, Beaumont points out that mainstream 
women’s organizations that positively recognized women’s roles as wives and 
mothers, including NFWI, eventually succeeded in securing those women’s 
interests that are closely linked with family life. Andrews even redefined 
NFWI as a ‘feminist organization’, as it made an effort to improve the 
situation for women within existing gender norms. However, these studies 
still concentrate on activities at home, and on white women, although 
Andrews briefly mentions the ‘colour-blind’ attitudes of WI members toward 
post-war immigrants from the Commonwealth. While not all the WI 
members were internationally minded, as this paper show, the British WI 
has been far from a merely domestic organization.   
 
 
The WI as a ‘grassroots’ organization at home 
 
Contrary to the domestic image suggested even by the name of the NFWI 
magazine, Home & Country, the WI did not originate in Britain but rather in 
Canada, where the first WI was founded in 1897. The movement was 
introduced to Britain by Mrs Watt, who had been a member of a WI in 
Canada and came to England to promote the movement. Mr Nugent Harris, 
the Secretary of the Agricultural Organisation Society (AOS), who had been 
hoping to involve more women in the AOS, showed interest in the WI 
                                                   
13 Maggie Andrews, The Acceptable Face of Feminism: the Women’s Institutes as 
a Social Movement, London 1997; Linda Perriton, ‘The education of women for 
citizenship: the National Federation of Women’s Institutes and the British 
Federation of Business and Professional Women 1930–1959’, Gender and 
Education, Vol. 21, No. 1, December, 2009, 81–95; Caitriona Beaumont, 
‘Citizens not feminists: the boundary negotiated between citizenship and 
feminism by mainstream women’s organisations in England, 1928–39’, 
Women’s History Review, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2000, 411–429.  
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movement. He drew Mrs Watt into the AOS to set up WIs in British rural 
areas. In 1915, in the midst of the First World War, the first British WI 
meeting was held in Llanfairpwll on Anglesey in North Wales. In spite of the 
English-centric image evoked by their anthem ‘Jerusalem’, the birth of the 
British WI in Wales has been well recognized within WI. The NFWI paid 
considerable attention to the cultural particularity of Wales.14  
Moreover, as discussed in the next section in detail, internationalism has 
been one of the essential principles of WI. As leaflets by the NFWI repeatedly 
emphasize, ‘since 1935, the NFWI has been a constituent member of 
Association of Countrywomen of the World (ACWW), a unique world-wide 
organization of more than seven million countrywomen, furthering mutual 
assistance, education and understanding. Every WI member automatically 
becomes a member of ACWW’.15 Various WIs offered hospitality to visitors 
from overseas, and many members enjoyed the opportunity to go abroad, 
often to spread the WI movement. Even before the 1950s, when representing 
their own country, the WI showed the spirit of hospitality to various kinds of 
‘visitors’ to the UK – from Spanish refugees in the 1930s to Allied troops 
during the Second World War. Immediately after the war, WI members 
helped Poles and European Volunteer Workers to resettle in the UK by 
teaching English and assisting in camps. While the misunderstanding that 
Poles were fascists aroused opposition to their resettlement among some 
rank-and-file members, the NFWI made an effort to persuade members to 
welcome these ‘unfortunate’ foreigners by circulating corrected information 
about them.16 The NFWI also forged close ties with other international 
organizations, including the League of Nations before the Second World War. 
                                                   
14 For example, Home & Country, January 1950, 13. 
15 See NFWI leaflets held in WL (Women’s Library at LSE), 5FWI/G/1/3/2/1, Box 
242. 
16 WL, 5FWI/A/1/1/21 Box 19, minutes of Executive Committee, 28 November 
1946; Home and Country, January 1947, 9; WL, 5FWI/A/1/1/21 Box 19, 
minutes of Executive Committee, 27 November 1947. 
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Members have long been encouraged to ‘think internationally’, especially 
since 1954, when the NFWI enthusiastically resolved ‘[t]o promote 
international friendship and understanding’. 17  From its early days, the 
NFWI has made an effort to offer its members lectures on imperial and 
international subjects by arranging for speakers.18  
At the same time, it should be remembered that the NFWI was born in the 
midst of the patriotic mood during the First World War. As mentioned, the WI 
movement in Britain was created under the umbrella of the AOS, which 
received aid from the government to promote cooperation in agriculture. The 
initial purpose of the WI movement in Britain was to revitalize rural 
communities and to encourage women to become involved in producing food 
during the war. The NFWI had a close link with the Women’s Land Army. 
According to the explanation offered in Home & Country, the cooperation 
between the NFWI and the Women’s Land Army was encouraged by the 
Board of Trade, the Board of Agriculture, and the AOS. Their goal was to 
make WI useful for national efforts by linking women who were doing war 
work in country districts, and especially members of the newly formed 
Women’s Land Army.19 The NFWI cooperated with the government’s war 
effort and its members ‘spoke of duty and patriotism’.20  
However, by the mid-1920s, the NFWI had become an independent, 
self-financing organization, making it a grassroots, ‘mainstream’ women’s 
group.21  Its membership numbers increased rapidly in the 1920s, from 
55,000 in 1919 to 250,000 in 1925, which might have enabled it to support 
itself financially. Nevertheless, the WI remained to be patriotic in its nature. 
Rather, in the inter-war years, the NFWI continued to nurture the notion of 
                                                   
17 WL, 5FWI/ G/1/3/2/1, Box 242, Be World Wise with the WIs,1964. 
18 Home & Country, August 1936, 435. 
19 Home & Country, June 1980, 298. 
20 Andrews, The Acceptable Face of Feminism, 32. 
21 Ibid, p. 25. 
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Englishness, representing family, home, and the English countryside.22 As 
Maggie Andrew argues, starting especially in the 1930s, the WIs were closely 
associated with the construction of traditional notions of Englishness, 
treating villages and rural homes as the heart of England.23 In 1923, William 
Blake’s ‘Jerusalem’ was adopted as the WI’s anthem, to be sung at each 
meeting. Even after the Second World War, this tendency survived, as 
epitomized by a competition held in Home & Country in 1961. The call for the 
competition, titled ‘An English national costume’, encouraged readers to send 
in their designs for a ‘national costume suitable for an English woman’.24 
Though English national character, or Englishness, has often been linked 
with masculinity, as epitomised by the gentleman, there is another 
representation of Englishness epitomised by ‘home’, family, and lifestyle, 
where women, mainly as housewives, played key roles in nurturing national 
identity.25 This was the domain of WI members. The national characteristics 
represented by women tended to be firmly linked to home and family. Women 
have long been treated as ‘second class citizens’, as revealed by such 
examples as arguments over ‘equal pay’ and the lack of independent 
nationality for wives before the British Nationality Act of 1948. However, it is 
obviously too naïve to suppose that femininity could escape the fetters of 
nation in modern Britain. Virginia Woolf ’s famous statement that ‘women 
have no country’ would be too idealistic to fit with the reality of most women, 
                                                   
22 Andrews, ibid, 31-32  
23 Andrews, ‘For home and country’. 
24  Home & Country, February 1961, ‘Competition: An English National 
Costume’. 
25 For the masculinity of Englishness, see Marcus Collins, ‘The fall of the English 
gentleman: the national character in decline, c.1918–1970’, Historical Research, 
Vol. 75, No. 187, February 2002, 90–111. To the contrary, Alison Lights points 
out the emergence of a domestic, feminized version of national identity in the 
inter-war years when the WI developed rapidly, although Collins dismisses her 
argument using Virginia Woolf as an example. See Alison Lights, Forever 
England: Femininity, Literature and Conservatism between the Wars, London 
1991. 
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if not an illusion. In the case of the WI, the ideal of Woolf might be best 
presented as its internationalism by advocating female friendship across 
borders, but this has been easily compatible with activities that aimed to 
foster the notion of Englishness. In considering the WI’s international work 
and specifically that undertaken in the colonies, we must therefore take into 
account these national characteristics of the WI.    
According to Andrews, the WI expanded during the decades when British 
women became enfranchised, it served as a training centre for citizenship for 
rural women who had newly won the right to vote. In spite of its present 
conservative image, in its early days the WI embraced some ‘liberal’ attitudes, 
and in some respects it challenged existing gender roles. The NFWI was 
linked to suffragist and suffragette organizations, as well as to other 
significant feminist campaigns and groups. Some WI members were also 
members of feminist groups. 26  In each WI, members were offered 
opportunities to learn about politics and international affairs, and were 
encouraged to state their own opinion, debate with each other, and take 
charge of administration.   
As Helen McCarthy argues, like Rotary International, the British Legion, 
and the League of Nations Union, which also expanded during the inter-war 
years, the NFWI was one of the grassroots, inclusive, nationally based civic 
organizations born as a new form of democratic participation after the 
achievement of universal suffrage in 1918. In common with these 
organizations, the NFWI emphasized its ‘secular’ and ‘non-party’ character in 
order to incorporate all rural women regardless of class, religion, and political 
affiliation.27 While the general ‘secular’ and ‘non-party’ principles of the 
NFWI have never assured absolute neutrality, they have effectively regulated 
the NFWI. In the 1970s, when the problem of Commonwealth immigration 
                                                   
26 Andrews, The Acceptable Face of Feminism, 27–28. 
27 Helen McCarthy, ‘Parties, Voluntary Associations, and Democratic Politics in 
Interwar Britain’, Historical Journal, Vol. 50, No.4, 2007, 891–912. 
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became impossible to ignore, even for rural WIs, the WI rule was amended at 
the Annual General Meeting to clarify that the non-sectarian and non-party 
political rule ‘shall not be so interpreted as to prevent Women’s Institutes 
from concerning themselves with matters of political and religious 
significance, provided the view and rights of minorities are respected and 
provided the movement is never used for party political or sectarian 
purposes’.28 It seems that individual WI members also respected these as 
essential principles of their organization. For example, a letter from a reader 
printed in Home & Country in 1990 displays a strong distaste for the 
intrusion of religious or political aspects into their activities. ‘We have always 
understood the WI is non-political, non-religious, and non-racial [sic]. Politics, 
religion and racism should be left outside the door of every WI gathering as 
they are now, and we hope will always be.’29  
With this inclusiveness, the NFWI has tried to remain democratic. 
However, the NFWI could not evade existing social hierarchies. It depended 
considerably on women from the upper and middle classes to serve as 
national executives and local leaders. It was not until 1961 that the NFWI 
had a non-titled chairman.30 There were differences in opinion between 
middle class and working class members, as well as between the aristocratic 
executives of the NFWI and the ‘ordinary’ members in each local institute. In 
Home & Country, we can see dissension between the editor on the side of the 
NFWI executives and ‘ordinary’ members. For example, in 1933, a reader of 
Home & Country strongly protested against the editor’s characterization of 
rural life as boring and underdeveloped. Her words vividly reveal the gulf: 
‘Step down from your office stool, dear Editor, and really come among us. 
That first page of yours could be such a joy, such an inspiration. But just as it 
is we are rather inclined to shake our heads and sigh she does not quite 
                                                   
28 NFWI Annual Report for the Year 1971, 5. 
29 Home & Country, October 1990, 66. 
30 Andrews, ibid, 21 
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understand’.31  
Still, democracy has been respected as a basic principle of the WI 
movement among its members. Because citizenship education for 
countrywomen was one of the main purposes of the WI movement, WI 
members were encouraged to join discussions and to be in charge of 
something relating to the administration of their WIs. The structure of WI 
organizations themselves was supposed to be democratic, and each local WI 
was run by a committee elected by secret ballot. Although the democratic 
system within both the NFWI and individual WIs did not run smoothly, 
readers’ letters to Home & Country show how much they valued democracy 
as a basic principle of their organization as well as their country. Some letters 
protested against ‘undemocratic’ aspects of the NFWI.32  
In the next section we will see how this organization – domestic, patriotic, 
and diverse in its membership – was involved in activities overseas and for 
people within the empire.   
 
 
International or imperial?  
NFWI international activities after WW2 
 
As was mentioned above, the national character of the WI and the NFWI 
has frequently been remarked upon. However, the perspective of the world 
expressed in Home & Country before 1945 was imperial as well as domestic 
in nature. It contained a lot of information about the empire and the colonies. 
The activities of WIs in India and their relationship with British WIs were 
specially reported.33 An article about ‘Women Institutes overseas’ describes 
WIs in other countries in terms not of an international but of an imperial 
network. 
                                                   
31 Home & Country, October 1933, 526. 
32 For example, see Home & Country, ‘our un-British constitution’, July 1944, 
110–111; ‘True democracy’ March 1955, 109; April 1955, 151; July 1955, 267. 
33 Home & Country, January 1929, 5–6; February 1929, 59; June 1929, 287–288. 
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In all the countries I have visited during the last twenty months – Ceylon, 
Australia, New Zealand and South Africa – I felt that real progress is being 
made. I first stayed with Mrs. De Mely, Treasurer of the Women’s Institutes of 
Ceylon. Here much good work is being done, mostly by the educated 
Synghalese people for the peasant women, helping them in the malaria 
epidemic to learn, by the charts and speakers they send out, the necessity of 
milk for their children etc… New Zealand has over 900 Women’s Institutes. It 
is very cheering news I get of them, all doing helpful work. In South Africa, the 
same story. Throughout Natal, the Transvaal, Cape Province, and Zululand, 
where I did Institute tours, everywhere I found splendid women meeting 
together trying to plan out how best they can help their many problems.34 
 
While some articles including ‘Fact about India’35 and ‘The West Indies’36 
intended to educate readers about the empire, others including ‘Women 
Empire-Builders in South Africa’ and ‘Empire-Builders in Australia’ proudly 
praised women who contributed to the consolidation of the British Empire.37 
After the Second World War, this imperial character remained, but it was 
gradually modified to accommodate the new post-war reality. In November 
1947, the NFWI held a two-day conference on Colonial Empire at Chatham 
House, inviting ten students from colonies. According to the report, 135 
members from 43 Country Federations and sixteen other visitors also 
attended the conference.38 Speakers for the conference included ‘Sir Bernard 
Bourdillon (late Chief Secretary of Ceylon, ex-Governor of Nigeria, and 
                                                   
34 Home & Country, April 1937, 175. 
35 Home & Country, April 1941, 79; May 1941, 102.  
36 Home & Country, December 1943, 183-184. 
37 Home & Country, June 1928, 270–271; July 1928, 340–342 
38 Thirty-first Annual Report of the NFWI, 1947, 9. According to the minutes of 
the NFWI International Sub-Committee, conference attendance was confined 
to members who would speak to the Institutes, about which the Middlesex 
members raised a question. See WL, 5FWI/ D/2/1/1, Box 146, minutes of 
International Sub-Committee, 23 September 1947.  
42 East Asian Journal of British History, Vol. 4 (2014)  
 
member of the Colonial and Economic and Development Council), Miss 
Harford (member of the Social Welfare Advisory Committee of the Colonial 
Office), Sir William McLean (member of the Advisory Committee on 
Education in the Colonies 1932–8, and previously of the Egyptian and Sudan 
Civil Service), and Sir Frank Stockdale (Advisor on Development Planning at 
the Colonial Office and with long experience of West Indian 
administration)’. 39  In 1948, an article published in Home & Country 
reporting on this conference appealed its readers as follows: 
 
To many Institutes members – and other people – we can take the mere fact 
of the existence of this vast network of 36 countries containing 63 million 
people in widely different stages of development, all moving slowly towards the 
ultimate goal of self-government. Our relations with them are passing 
gradually from trusteeship to partnership, and it is felt important that 
progress should be at a pace slightly ahead of, rather than slightly behind, the 
capacity of the Colonial peoples… and what can the Institutes give? The 
Colonial students present were evidently intensely interested, they welcomed 
every chance of studying Institute work, and only asked for more. To them the 
Institute member can offer hospitality (through the Victoria League or the 
National Federation), and the opportunity to see more of our way of life, to the 
Institutes tentatively starting overseas a helping hand wherever contact can 
be made.40   
 
As this quote shows, with the relationship between metropole and colonies 
‘transforming from trusteeship to partnership’, the executives of the NFWI 
believed new roles had emerged. Duplicating old notions of a ‘civilising 
mission’, the WI, as a women’s voluntary organization, was now meant to 
lead colonial people to become decent members of self-governing civil society. 
Indeed, the main international activities carried out by the NFWI in the 
1940s and 1950s consisted of providing hospitality visitors and students from 
                                                   
39 Home & Country, January 1948, 4. 
40 Ibid. 
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abroad (many of them from colonies) and teaching them how to administrate 
women’s organizations. Some WI members went abroad to spread the WI 
movement and to help individuals form similar groups in their home 
countries.  
Importantly, these international activities were conducted in collaboration 
with both state and non-state institutions. For example, the following article 
printed in Home & Country in 1954 demonstrates that some requests to offer 
hospitality to overseas guests and international students came from the 
British Council and the Colonial Office, and were carried out in collaboration 
with other voluntary organizations. Also, NFWI offered courses and lectures 
on the colonial empire for other women’s groups such as the Corona Club 
through Denman College.  
     
Now a great deal is undertaken at the request of the Colonial Office and the 
British Council in introducing foreign and colonial students in this country to 
our activities in the Institutes and at Denman College. We are represented on 
the Advisory Committee on Social Development at the Colonial Office and are 
frequently asked to arrange tours for foreign and colonial students in our 
counties, or to speak at colonial courses run by the Y.W.C.A., or even to run, for 
the first time in 1953, a special small course at Denman College for the Corona 
Club, a society of wives of officials and colonial students who are anxious to 
start voluntary organizations like our own when they return to the Colonies. 
How often nowadays does one meet a colonial student attending a course at 
Denman College!41 
      
The NFWI appointed representatives for various institutions. For instance, 
in 1952, apart from the ACWW, the NFWI sent representatives to 
organizations including the Equal Pay for Equal Work Committee, the 
National Council of Social Service, and the Women’s Voluntary Service 
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Advisory Committee.42 In the 1940s and 1950s, the relationship between the 
NFWI and the Colonial Office seems to have been especially close. 
Representatives from the NFWI attended committees and sub-committees on 
colonial welfare and colonial women that were held at the Colonial Office, 
and the NFWI representative was a member of the Colonial Social Welfare 
Advisory Committee, formed by the Colonial Office in 1942. Many of the 
discussions on colonial welfare in the NFWI International Sub-Committee 
were undertaken following requests or recommendations from Colonial Office 
committees.43 According to the NFWI Annual Report for the Year 1953, ‘the 
International Sub-committee has worked in close touch with the Colonial 
Office in matters dealing with the welfare and instruction of Colonial 
Students’ in the UK, and ‘the NFWI is represented on a sub-committee of the 
Advisory Committee on Social Development in the Colonies’.44 This indicates 
what the Colonial Office expected from the NFWI: filling gaps in social 
welfare in colonies, especially for women, as well as for colonial students at 
home. The NFWI itself acknowledged this, as its Annual Report for the Year 
1958 revealed. ‘A number of these visitors are from Colonial territories and 
their visits are of course the result of the policy of the Colonial Office, so it is 
very appropriate that institutes should be represented on a Colonial Office 
Committee concerned with the education and welfare of these visitors’.45 One 
of the most appealing colonial welfare projects conducted by the NFWI in the 
1950s was the formation of WIs in Malaya. In the next section, I will focus on 
the issue. 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
42 NFWI Annual Report for the Year 1952, 50–51. 
43 See the files of the International Sub-Committee, WL, 5FWI/A/1/1. 
44 NFWI Annual Report for the Year 1953, 17. 
45 NFWI Annual Report for the Year 1958, 19. 
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Colonial welfare and the NFWI  
– an example in Malaya 
 
 As early as 1950, a paper from United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) came before the Colonial Social Welfare 
Advisory Committee stressing the ‘great need’ to start women’s organizations 
in the ‘backward countries’. In the paper, WI was specially mentioned. 
Resulting from discussions at a working party especially appointed for this 
purpose by the Colonial Office, and in which a representative from the NFWI 
was invited to serve, the NFWI began to consider their possible involvement. 
In the discussion of the International Sub-Committee on 11 July 1950, it was 
pointed out that ‘it seemed possible that a suggestion might be made that 
organizers went out to start Women’s Institutes as it was recognized to be 
unwise for such a scheme to be in the hands of Government Officials’.46  
Thus, the possibility of NFWI involvement in the formation of WIs in 
colonies had already been considered at the beginning of the 1950s, in 
collaboration with the Colonial Office. Cooperating with other women’s 
non-governmental groups, the NFWI took on the role of encouraging the 
organization of colonial women. In the same committee, it was further 
suggested that ‘in order to be in a position to give advice W.I. members who 
had experience of life in the colonies might be invited to come together for a 
discussion’.47 Three months later, during the International Sub-Committee 
meeting on 10 October 1950, a general discussion was held on ‘whether the 
pattern of Women’s Institutes was suitable for these backward areas with 
mixed populations’. As a result, the following three points were raised when 
considering forming WI in colonies: 
 
a) [T]he teaching of practical skills as an essential starting point 
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47 Ibid. 
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b) [T]he W.I. pattern could be of great value but needed adaptation to suit 
individual circumstances 
c) [I]t was better that any move towards W.I.s or similar groups should be 
made by the people themselves rather than by officials or outside 
organisations48  
  
Since 1950, the NFWI generally cooperated with the Colonial Office, and 
especially the Colonial Social Welfare Advisory Committee, to provide advice 
and hospitality to colonial students in the UK for training, without getting 
involved in starting WIs in colonies directly. However, in July 1952 a sudden 
request came to the NFWI. Lady Templer, wife of the British high 
commissioner in Malaya, wrote to the NFWI to request it send a training 
organizer to Malaya to start WIs there. Costs including living expenses, basic 
pay, clothing allowance, and round-trip travel would be borne by the Malayan 
government, not the NFWI.49  
Since 1948, a state of emergency had been imposed on people in Malaya, 
where a communist guerrilla insurgency opposing British rule had spread, 
and the newly appointed High Commissioner for Malaya, Sir Gerald Templer, 
used psychological, social, and propagandistic means in conjunction with 
military action in order to draw popular attention away from the insurgents. 
In order to contain the insurgency and to keep Malaya under British control, 
as well as to combat related delinquency, he sought to develop a unified, 
stable, and multi-ethnic community in Malaya, a pluralistic society composed 
of Malays, Chinese, and Indians. Women and the youth were expected to play 
important roles in the process. Thus, to the British, forming WIs in Malaya 
was a part of colonial policy in the decolonization era than a social welfare aid 
for ‘deprived areas’. Indeed, as T. N. Harper maintained regarding the 
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situation in Malaya after the Second World War, social welfare became one of 
the important tools of colonial administration. Immediately after the Second 
World War, the Malayan government had tried to transplant British-style 
trade unionism. While many indigenous voluntary organizations and local 
women’s organizations were involved in social activities, especially since the 
inter-war years, the British still wanted to take the initiative on social 
welfare in their late colonial state in Malaya.50 Introducing the British WI 
movement in Malaya was one of such attempts.  
There are few studies on WIs in Malaya,51 and it is beyond the scope of this 
paper to examine to what extent WIs in Malaya actually bettered the lives of 
indigenous women or maintained British control over local society. Harper 
points out that the WI movement in Malaya involved a first generation of 
Malay female administrators, some of whom were trained in social welfare in 
the UK, and many who were English-educated.52 Using NFWI documents, 
this section describes how the NFWI engaged in this project and what the 
formation of WIs in Malaya meant for the NFWI rather than for people in 
Malaya. 
At the request of Lady Temper, in a private session among executives of the 
NFWI, the selection of candidates to send to Malaya from NFWI 
Headquarters staff began in July 1952. From five short-listed women, the 
selection committee narrowed down their choice to two women: Miss 
Margaret Herbertson and Miss Viola Williams.53 NFWI documents do not 
suggest that these women were long-established NFWI executives, nor titled 
ladies, which makes finding biographical information difficult. However, it is 
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certain that both had a higher-educational background and some 
international experience. According to an introduction in Home & Country, 
Herbertson was born in Germany and brought up abroad: ‘During the war, 
she served in Special Operations in the Middle East and Italy, as Intelligence 
Officer and Education Officer. After demobilization, she went to Oxford and 
took an Honours Degree in History and a Diploma in Public and Social 
Administration. She also spent some months in a Boy’s Approved School, a 
Children’s Residential Home and a Magistrate’s Court and on Family Case 
Work’. She joined the NFWI as Public Questions General Organizer in 
October 195054 and it was not long before she attracted attention from NFWI 
executives as an outstanding woman. As early as in a private session of the 
NFWI Organisation Sub-Committee in 1951, ‘it was noted that Miss 
Herbertson had made a very good impression in the counties, and that both 
the matter of her talks and the manner in which she gave them were greatly 
appreciated’. Thus the Sub-Committee agreed that she should be given 
practical experience of formations and Annual Meetings as soon as possible, 
because ‘the Committee was reminded that Miss Herbertson has not had 
much Organisation experience’.55 This offers a glimpse into how the NFWI 
executives found Herbertson a competent woman, included her in the NFWI 
Headquarters, and offered her experience as an organizer.  
Williams’ situation was similar. She joined the headquarter staff in 
September 1950 as an Agricultural Organiser. She was trained at Reading 
University and held a 1st Class Diploma in Horticulture. After working as 
head gardener at a school in Somerset and at Cheltenham Ladies’ College, 
she worked as Assistant Horticultural Officer in Wiltshire. During the war, 
she served in Burma.56 According to another article introducing Williams to 
readers, she had been a WI member since 1934 and came from a family with 
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lively WI sympathies. Her father had been an active helper in WI drama and 
choirs, and her stepmother had been a group convener for years. Her home 
was in a very small village near Salisbury, Wiltshire, where water supply was 
non-existent at that time. It is possible that this background was regarded as 
rendering her suitable for the work in Malaya.57  
As a result, it was decided that the NFWI would send Herbertson first to 
Malaya for six months, and at some later stage Williams would follow up the 
work she began. 58  In September 1952, in the Office and Finance 
Sub-Committee, it was reported that Herbertson had received a contract 
letter through the Crown Agents.59 She arrived at Malaya in October 1952, 
and began her work. According to an article in Home & Country that reported 
about her planned departure to Malaya, she brought many kinds of simple 
visual aids concerning such topics as child care, hygiene, gardening, plain 
sewing, and toy making to show what the NFWI was expected to teach to 
women in Malaya.60 This was shared by a WI member who had lived in 
Malaya with her husband at the end of the 1930s. In her letter titled ‘Helping 
Kampong Women in Malaya’, she described her experience of having taught 
Malay women how to feed their babies four-hourly (and not continually as 
they usually did), how to wash bottles and keep them in boiled water, how to 
put on a nappy without pricking the baby with the pin, and how to keep a cot 
sweet and clean with sheets and waterproofs – that is, the ‘modern hygienic’ 
child-rearing method. She seemed to be sure that her advice was welcomed 
and appreciated by local residents, and dispersed among them.61  
Home & Country’s January 1953 issue printed a letter from Herbertson in 
Malaya. According to her letter, she formed the first WI at a village called 
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Balik Plau on the Island of Penang on 5th November 1952, within about 
three weeks of her arrival. The Chairman was a local elderly lady who had 
experienced the pilgrimage to Mecca, entitling her to call herself Haji as a 
prefix to her name. As she was illiterate, she signed the WI rules with a large 
cross. The Secretary, named Che Sayang binti Mohhammed Saad, was a 
younger woman who could write Malay in the Latin script. In a gathering at 
a Malay school, Herbertson explained the aims and objectives of the WI 
movement through an interpreter. According to her letter, she had succeeded 
in forming the first Malayan WI so soon because Lady Templer had made 
arrangements before her arrival. Templer had toured nine states and two 
settlements, forming temporary organizing committees in each, with which 
Herbertson chiefly worked. However, as Herbertson described in the letter, it 
was more difficult to start a WI in other states, because ‘it was a new idea 
that women should come together and Malaya was a country at war’.62  
Another letter printed in a later Home & Country issue stated that the 
most popular activities in Malayan WIs were sewing (particularly for 
children’s clothes), embroidery, and instruction in knitting and crochet, 
although the latter was, as Herbertson herself admitted, inappropriate for 
the climate in Malaya. On the other hand, health talks proved not to be so 
popular, although NFWI members considered them important for people in 
Malaya. The ‘obstacle’ for the prevailing ‘modern’ method, Herberston told 
British readers, was ‘granny’, who told young mothers not to bother with 
what the Health Sister said but rather to stick to the old methods, ‘which 
were often dangerous’.63 In this situation, Herberston asked UK readers to 
send rags and pieces of patterns for various crafts with visual instructions. 
While WI members responded to this request willingly, as we can see from 
letters to Home & Country,64 this was subject to criticism from at least one 
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WI member. In the following letter, entitled ‘the right teaching in Malaya’, 
Mrs Avery of Sevenoaks, Kent, questioned the way Herbertson organized WI 
in Malaya: 
 
Dear Editor – It seems to me such a pity that the W.I. is apparently taking 
the easy way out in Malaya and teaching people, with their beautiful natural 
handicrafts, to do patchwork and smocking and make sponge cakes. The W.I. 
had surely an unprecedented opportunity to teach them elementary hygiene, 
vegetable cultivation, care of hens: such things would help the women to 
improve their standard of living, rather than impoverish their culture with 
alien arty-crafts.65     
    
   In response, the editor printed this explanation from Herbertson: 
 
The programmes of the Malaya Institutes must consist of activities which 
the members themselves like and ask to learn: colourful, new crafts make a 
very great appeal. It is certainly intended to introduce talks on hygiene, child 
care and food values: in fact, this is already being done, but the process must 
be tactful and gradual, for there is no real desire to give up old-established 
customs… for some of these simple countrywomen to come together at all 
socially, at WI meetings, is a big step and this initial enthusiasm to create 
attractive things with their hands must not be lost. A too rapid concentration 
on less attractive “improvement” will cost the Institutes their membership all 
together.66 
 
There was clearly a gap between what the British WI wished to teach for 
the ‘improvement’ of local women’s lives and what indigenous people in 
Malaya actually welcomed. It is not clear whether this gap finally lessened, 
but it is certain that British paternalism in the form of ‘modernity’ clashed 
with local rules and customs. After returning to England, Herbertson again 
talked about the difficulty of introducing ‘new ways’, especially ‘to Malayans 
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who were Muslims and had many religious taboos which affected such 
matters as hygiene, bringing up children and health’. Unlike the impression 
the previous Home & Country article about the first WI in Malaya might give 
us, as Herbertson admitted, the movement was largely dependent on a small 
handful of European women who were constantly moving to other posts.67  
After staying in Malaya for about six months, Herbertson left Malaya in 
May 1953 and her work was taken over by Williams, who was also accepted 
by Lady Templer and who worked in Malaya until at the end of 1953. After 
returning to the UK, Herbertson was frequently asked to speak about her 
experience in Malaya at various events, including the NFWI Annual General 
Meeting. Some counties, including Gloucestershire, also invited her as a 
speaker. However, she decided to resign from the NFWI staff in December 
1954 to ‘replenish her ideas and energies through some new sources’.68 
By the beginning of 1954 when Williams finished her duty, there were 250 
WIs and 40 Territorial Associations in Malaya.69 However, around this time, 
when the NFWI itself started to set up projects for international work (as will 
be discussed later), it faced difficulties in finding a British organizer to go to 
Malaya. In November 1954, because the first vacancy advertisement 
produced no results, the NFWI placed it in the Times and the Telegraph. 
Because the only application received was from a woman aged 50 who could 
not drive a car, the NFWI even decided to lift the age limit.70 Though this 
difficulty finding applicants seems to have been resolved later, this episode 
demonstrates that the NFWI recruited its international workers widely 
beyond WI.   
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At the same time, the NFWI started to train people in Malaya as WI 
organizers, in order to ‘localize’ Malayan WI and to shed its European-led 
nature. Williams stated that Malaya presented the challenge of having a 
‘very thin crust of educated people to help the mass of uneducated people who 
were clamouring for help’.71 Miss Lomas, Chairman of the National Union of 
Malayan WIs, also made a request to the NFWI, asking that they train a 
Malayan in England who would be appointed as an organizing secretary. The 
NFWI Organisation Sub-Committee showed hesitation, pointing out the 
problems involved in such a project, including lack of experience on the part 
of the NFWI, the risk that the trainee might prove unsuitable during the 
training or be unwilling to return to Malaya, and the difficulty of adapting 
the pattern of a mature movement of 37 years standing to the very different 
pattern that was necessary in Malaya. 72  However, the Malayan Union 
continued to stress the importance of training Malayans in England. In 1956, 
Mrs Davis, the Secretary-Organiser of the Malayan WIs, reported that her 
non-European successor had been appointed. The appointee, Miss Minuira 
Ma, was a Chinese Muslim girl. As such, she was ‘expected to be acceptable to 
the Malayans’. This time, the plan was made to bring her to England for six 
months of training.73 The NFWI decided to sponsor her. However, Miss Ma 
was a refugee from Communist China and not yet a citizen of Malay.74 Mrs 
Davis appears to have concentrated her effort on finding a suitable ‘local’ 
candidate, though she described the difficulty she faced ‘because of there 
being so few trained Malays to carry on’. Nevertheless, she found another 
woman, named Che Kamsiah bte Ibrahim. 
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In cooperation with the YWCA, the training programme in England for 
these two women started, though Miss Ma eventually resigned.75 The NFWI 
documents on these training projects reveal the racial stereotypes and 
cultural or religious friction with this only one left Asian visitor, Che 
Kamisiah. Because she was a ‘strict Muslim’ who was ‘unable to eat any food 
which came from the pig and forbidden to touch a dog’, the Norfolk county 
office had difficulty in finding a hostess. From this experience, the NFWI 
International Sub-Committee recommended that the NFWI only accept one 
more trainee, and that training should take at most four months: two with 
YWCA and two with NFWI. 76  A British observer described Miss Che 
Kamsiah as having the ‘typical Malay character of not liking hard work, and 
lack of perseverance’, but being ‘meticulous over financial affairs’.77   
In 1957, when the Federation of Malaya became independent, Mrs Davis 
was invited to the NFWI in England, where she talked about the WI 
movement in Malaya. Though she still thought that training state organizers 
was essential for continuing the movement in Malaya, ‘which even with these 
organisers might not survive the departure of Europeans for very long’, her 
words suggest the changing times. She continued that ‘even if it did not 
flourish in the future, it had been politically necessary at the time Lady 
Templer started it’.78 Judging from her statement, the WI movement in 
Malaya remained basically British-led, and seems not to have succeeded in 
becoming an indigenous voluntary grassroots movement.  
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At this stage, it is difficult to estimate to what extent the WI in Malaya 
bettered indigenous women’s lives, or what became of it after 1957. However, 
the experience of forming WIs in Malaya did cause some change in the NFWI 
international work. Although NFWI had begun to redefine its mandate in 
terms of international work after the end of the Second World War, the 
request from Lady Templer and the resultant work accelerated the expansion 
of NFWI’s international activities. In April 1953, the NFWI International 
Sub-Committee recognized that ‘the scope and the bulk of the work handled 
by International Sub-Committee had increased considerably during the last 
few years and showed every signs of continuing increase’. Thus, while the 
NFWI ‘Executive Committee still had to adhere to their policy of economy,’ 
the International Sub-Committee noted the necessity of increasing its staff, 
especially because there had already been 41 applications for Herbertson to 
speak on Malaya. Among various works, the committee had been involved in 
cooperation with international organizations, international education at 
Denman College Schools, hospitality for foreign visitors, and lectures for WIs: 
‘the committee thought that Colonial welfare was perhaps worthy of 
claiming’.79  
Indeed, the successful example (at least in the short term) in Malaya seems 
to have stimulated other parts of the empire for similar activities. An article 
in Home & Country in 1953 reports the increase of enquiries and visitors 
from overseas.80 The annual report of NFWI also noted that ‘there is no 
doubt that the publicity given to the starting of Women’s Institutes in Malaya 
encouraged many of these visitors to pay us a visit to enquire about our aims 
and objects and our methods of organization’.81 A WI member from Surrey 
saw the example of Malaya as applicable to other colonies. Her letter to Home 
& Country suggested that in order to improve the social conditions in 
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Jamaica, which she insisted were responsible for the recent increase in 
Jamaican immigration, the NFWI should help to form WIs in Jamaica. She 
continued that ‘the impression created has been intensified by discussions in 
the Women’s Institutes in Malaya suggests to us that the situation might be 
improved by a similar organization in Jamaica, since the reports indicate 
that in country districts Jamaican Women’s Federation and similar 
organizations find it difficult to get in touch with the individual housewife’.82 
These examples suggest how the experience in Malaya may have stimulated 
the NFWI’s concept of international work.  
In this context, at the Annual General Meeting of the NFWI in 1954, it was 
resolved that the promotion of international understanding and friendship 
should be one of the NFWI’s objects. With this resolution, in addition to 
offering hospitality to visitors and students, in the 1960s the NFWI was 
involved in various kinds of international works, including those to help the 
economic and social development in poor countries that included colonies and 
former colonies. The NFWI supported the ‘Freedom from Hunger Campaign’ 
run by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.83 The 
biggest project was the ‘Karamoja project’, which established a farm institute 
in Karamoja, Uganda in order to educate the youth of Karamoja and 
enlighten them about their country’s problems, which included over-grazing 
and erosion.84 It may be argued that anachronistic imperialist ‘missionary’ 
works by British women gradually transformed into modern international 
works for developing countries with the cooperation of the United Nations, 
and that the former and the latter often overlapped. As we have seen, 
especially in Malaya in the 1950s, the word ‘colonial’ sometimes overlapped 
with the word ‘international’. 
It is important to ask to what extent the international mind-set of the 
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NFWI Headquarters and certain WI members was shared across all of the 
British WIs in England and Wales. This question is difficult to answer 
because the NFWI and WIs have been diverse entities, in terms of social class, 
region, religion, political orientation, and ethnicity. While some letters to 
Home & Country show that members expressed their keen interest in 
NFWI’s international works, especially in colonies, other NFWI documents 
also reveal indifference to such activities among members to whom the 1954 
NFWI slogan ‘think internationally’ might be expected to appeal. For 
example, in 1955, the annual report of the NFWI stated that among several 
lecture courses offered at Denman College, ‘United Nations and Ourselves’ 
and ‘Home Life in the East’ did not attract as many applications as had been 
expected. The most popular lecture on international affairs was ‘A Journey to 
Holland’.85 To the disappointment of Headquarters, in 1957 lectures on the 
United Nations had to be cancelled due to the lack of applicants. As for the 
NFWI activities in Malaya, the International Sub-Committee requested that 
a map be printed in Home & Country clearly indicating Malaya’s geographic 
location, as WI members in the UK seemed so vague about it.86 In another 
International Sub-Committee, as Herbertson worried that members would be 
confused about who paid for her and Williams to go to Malaya, it was agreed 
that ‘on every appropriate occasion it should be explained that it was the 
Malayan Government and not the NFWI which bore the cost’.87 This may 
imply that there was criticism from WI members who opposed the NFWI 
spending money for people abroad, rather than for UK members.   
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Conclusion 
 
In the 1950s, the NFWI treated colonial welfare as an important part of its 
international work in close cooperation with official institutions including the 
Colonial Office and Colonial government. Malaya is a good example of the 
supplementary relationship between official and non-governmental actors in 
the provision of social welfare beyond borders. It was also important that 
such international work was carried out with other voluntary organizations. 
While the NFWI’s attitude toward colonial people was still paternalistic, 
reflecting the out-dated imperial idea of a ‘civilising mission’, its activities 
changed after the Second World War. They became more actively involved in 
the development of welfare in the colonies, which were intended to be on their 
way to future independence. Their main purposes were teaching modern and 
hygienic home-care and child-rearing and organizing grassroots civic 
women’s associations. It is doubtful how helpful these activities actually were 
to indigenous people, and this information could not be obtained from the 
NFWI documents. However, it is of great significance that the formation of 
WIs in Malaya, which was essentially an imperial project undertaken at the 
behest of the wife of the High Commissioner and in accordance with a 
recommendation from UNESCO, was regarded as the symbol of international 
work in the new era. While the NFWI remained primarily a domestic 
organization, in the 1960s it was involved in various developmental welfare 
activities for ‘deprived countries’ under the ‘Freedom from Hunger Campaign’, 
again in cooperation with various governmental and non-official institutions.  
This paper reflects the early stages of my research, and there is still much 
left to be studied. For example, I could not consider the discussions at the 
Colonial Welfare Advisory Committee, which will be vital to clarify the 
relationship and division of roles between the Colonial Office and voluntary 
organizations, as well as among different organizations including the NFWI. 
At this stage, I cannot suggest how colonial welfare activities undertaken by 
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voluntary organizations in the 1950s connect to today’s humanitarian 
activities by NGOs, nor, as far as the NFWI is concerned, when the overlap 
between the word ‘colonial’ and ‘international’ disappeared. Nonetheless, it is 
certain that the change of metropolitan–colonial relationships from imperial 
to international in the 1950s and 1960s is a key to understanding these 
subjects.  
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‘The Politics of Exhibiting Fine Art in the Soviet Union: 
the British Council’s activities 1955-1960’ 
 
Aiko Watanabe* 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper explores the politics lying behind the British Council’s selection 
of British art work offered for exhibition in the Soviet Union and its satellites 
during the early Cold War period, roughly during the mid-1950s and reaching 
a peak in the year 1960, when a major British Fine Art Exhibition was first 
held in the Soviet Union. They are important years because they cover the 
start of a remarkable cultural relationship between Britain and the Soviet 
Union. Focusing on the 1950s, it seems apparent that, in the case of the 
Soviet Union, the Council departed from its usual formula for cultural 
exchange – a balance between various genres – because the Soviets placed 
great emphasis on art in the form of large-scale cultural manifestations and 
were prone to find examples of Western decadence in visual forms. The 
Council’s strategy throughout the period was characterized by compromise 
and accommodation in order to meet Soviet ‘requirements’; so much so that 
internal correspondence reveals angst-ridden decisions about what examples 
of British visual culture might be acceptable to Soviet tastes. In a sense, this 
amounted to the ‘Other’ both defining and consuming British culture. What I 
would like to show, however, is the way in which the Council’s undoubted 
                                                   
* Professor, Faculty of Letters, Arts and Sciences, Waseda University, Japan 
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willingness to compromise was in fact a positive thing, and in some cases 
bore fruit. With shrewd judgment, the Council managed to showcase a good 
and broadly representative range of art in the Soviet Union during the period 
in question, including pieces of modern British art, many of which had 
hidden messages, which they hoped would reach the Soviet public. The 
relationship between the British Council and the Soviet Union turned out to 
be somewhat unique in the prominence that the arts sector was given, rather 
than education, which was traditionally the core of the Council’s fieldwork 
around the world.  
 
Key words: The British Council, the Soviet Union, cultural diplomacy, Fine 
Art Exhibition (‘British Paintings: 1720-1960’) 
 
 
Introduction 
  
It is always difficult to gauge how art influences politics, whether at the 
level of an individual piece, or as a movement. There has been much research 
dedicated to exploring the influence of politics on art, but much less in the 
other direction. One need go no further than the great era of Soviet Realism 
and its relationship to strands of Bolshevism to see an example of this 
predominantly top-down relationship. It is in fact during the great ideological 
struggle between Communism and Capitalism, that the interaction between 
politics and art appears at its most transparent, yet, this paper argues 
towards greater complexity through an examination of the politics of the 
British Council’s selection of British art works offered to the USSR as part of 
reciprocal cultural manifestations during the early Cold War period.  
When ‘culture’, generally defined as ‘the creation and communication of 
memory, ideology, emotions, life styles, scholarly and artistic works, and 
other symbols’, is applied to the study of international relations, it amounts 
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to ‘the sharing and transmitting of consciousness within and across national 
boundaries, and the cultural approach as a perspective that pays particular 
attention to this phenomenon’1. In the climate of hope for worldwide peace 
that accompanied the end of the Second World War, Ruth McMurry and 
Muna Lee, both researchers of the US State Department, operated with what 
to modern eyes may seem a rather naïve definition of what a nations’ culture 
is: ‘the sum total of its achievement; its own expression of its own personality; 
its way of thinking and acting. Its program of cultural relations abroad is its 
method of making these things known to foreigners’. 2  In The Cultural 
Approach (1947), they recognised that if peace was to prevail, countries 
needed to understand each other’s history, politics, way of life – in short, their 
culture. Despite much goodwill, however, and although they pointed to a new 
consensus which held that cultural exchange and mutual understanding was 
best pursued free from political interference, latent mistrust about the 
intentions and motives of other nations ensured that governments carefully 
controlled cultural dialogue. According to Archibald MacLeish, former 
Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (1944-45), who contributed an 
introduction to their book, the overriding aim of ‘cultural relations’ is that of 
correcting the ‘image of that nation formed abroad by those who only know it 
through its soldiers and diplomats or its men of business…’.3  This leads to 
the conclusion that the condition of possibility for ‘cultural relations’ is, a) 
that there is always a strong image of the other, and b) that this image is 
always false and therefore in need of correction. ‘Cultural relations’ aim to 
dispel these ‘falsehoods’, and to insert into the minds of the other the ‘real 
culture’ of the nation. However, this idealised view does not always fit with 
                                                   
1 Akira Iriye, ‘Culture and International History’, in Explaining the History of 
American Foreign Relations, ed. Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991, 215. 
2  Ruth McMurry and Muna Lee, The Cultural Approach: Another Way in 
International Relations, Chapel Hill 1947, 2. 
3 Archibald MacLeish, ‘Introduction’, in McMurry and Lee, IX. 
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reality on the ground: these American scholars of the period and the British 
Foreign Office differed in their view of how to use ‘cultural relations’. As will 
be argued in detail below, the British Foreign Office seemed ready to 
relinquish control over its own cultural image to the Soviet authorities – at 
least in part. 
With the outbreak of the Cold War, American cultural projection was once 
again tainted by the charge of hard ‘ideology’, and the falling (rather than the 
drawing) of the ‘Iron Curtain’ signalled the last performance of soft – though 
never benign – cultural diplomacy on the international stage. Henceforth, the 
term ‘cultural propaganda’ best described the understanding of the Cold War 
combatants in the exchange of art and artists in which culture was used to 
conduct a proxy war between the superpowers in lieu of physical conflict. 
This period has been euphemistically called, the ‘long peace’.4 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, cultural contestation between the United States 
and the Soviet Union has been analysed by a great number of scholars.5 By 
contrast, detailed research on British cultural diplomacy, which was the 
exclusive remit of the British Council is by and large lacking.6 The few 
                                                   
4 See John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold 
War, New York: Oxford University Press 1987. 
5 Frank A. Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas: US Foreign Policy and Cultural 
Relations, 1938–1950, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1981; Walter L. 
Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 
Basingstoke: Macmillan 1997; Naima Prevots, Dance for Export: Cultural 
Diplomacy and the Cold War, Hanover and London: Wesleyan University Press, 
1998; Yale Richmond, Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron 
Curtain, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press 2003; Richard T. Arnt, 
The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth 
Century, Dulles, Virginia: Potomac Books 2005. 
6 In the British context, scholarly attention in this field of cultural propaganda 
has been given to the activities of the Official Information Services, intelligence 
agencies, and BBC transmissions, as well as covert propaganda strategies. See, 
for example, Douglas Busk, The Craft of Diplomacy: Mechanics and 
Development of National Representation Overseas, London: Pall Mall Press 
1967; Robert Marett, Through the Back Door: An Inside View of Britain's 
Overseas Information Services, Oxford: Pergamon Press 1968; Fife Clark, The 
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scholarly works that are available such as by J. M. Lee’s have promoted 
theses that characterise Britain’s post-war diplomatic activity as passive.7 
This, though not without its faults generally, might go some way towards 
explaining why the ‘British case’ has not drawn as much attention as it 
deserves. However, when it comes specifically to Britain’s cultural diplomacy 
towards the Soviet Union and its satellite countries, Britain’s strategy was 
far from passive, and should be considered as active and even provocative: 
culture was recruited as a way of gaining influence, as analysis of the 
relationship between the British Foreign Office and the British Council 
shows. As Black has noted, propaganda has ‘become a regular peacetime 
instrument of foreign policy for most states, be they large or small’,8 but the 
very lack of physical warfare and a clear ‘enemy’ fostered conditions in which 
doubts and fears emerged, leading to a state of ‘psychological warfare’, and as 
Phillip M. Taylor argues, cultural propaganda ‘increasingly assuming a 
political dimension’.9 When straightforward diplomatic tactics no longer met 
the more opaque political conditions, the British Council attempted to 
increase the influence of democratic public diplomacy in the USSR. 
Exhibitions put on by the British Council backed by the British 
Government reflected a distinctive kind of ‘Britishness’, which may say as 
much about the tension between culture and politics in Britain as it does 
international relations. The paper rotates around the central question: what 
was exhibited under the auspices of the Foreign Office/British Council behind 
                                                                                                                                   
Central Office of Information, London: George Allen & Unwin 1970; Richard J. 
Aldrich, British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, 1945-51, London: 
Routledge 1992; Andrew Defty, Britain, America and Anti-Communist 
Propaganda 1945-53: The Information Research Department, London: 
Routledge 2004. 
7  See J. M. Lee, ‘British Cultural Diplomacy and the Cold War: 1946-61’, 
Diplomacy & Statecraft, 9/1 (1998), 112-34. 
8 John B. Black, Organising the Propaganda Instrument: The British Experience, 
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1975, iv. 
9 Phillip M. Taylor, British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century, Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press 234. 
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the Iron Curtain? More importantly, what brand of Britishness was purveyed, 
and why? We ought, I suggest, to be asking not how well such cultural 
offerings as Peter Brook’s Hamlet (1955) were received, but how 
representative they were of the British visual cultural scene, drawing a 
distinction between representing the ‘British way of life’, its customs, 
traditions and mores expressed in British art on the one hand, and on the 
other, the British art scene itself. 
This paper is based on archival research at the National Archives in 
London since the internal documents of the British Council are almost 
exclusively located there. Owing to the lack of accessible Russian-produced 
archival materials, however, a fuller analysis of official Soviet documents has 
not been possible. This is because, although in principle Russian archival 
material has been open for public inspection, the declassifying of archival 
documents is still in progress and full disclosure of any significant material 
related to cultural diplomacy is yet to 
come.10 Furthermore, ‘The Survey of 
Documents and Manuscripts in the 
United Kingdom Relating to Russia 
and the Soviet Union’ indicates that 
‘Little material relating to educational 
and cultural life in Russia or the 
Soviet Union has been found’11, whilst 
                                                   
10 For example, the on-line database service called ‘Access to Russian Archives’, 
‘containing descriptions of approximately 80,000 archival fonds (record groups) 
from more than 20 guidebooks on Russian federal archives and 40 regional 
archives published from 1987 to 2004’ is now available on the internet in 
Russian as well as in English transliteration, but the covering categories and 
period are still limited. – See http://online.eastview.com/projects/ticfia/#ara.  
11 Janet M. Hartley, ‘The Survey of Documents and Manuscripts in the United 
Kingdom Relating to Russia and the Soviet Union’ in The Study of Russian 
History from British Archival Sources, ed. Janet M. Hartley, London and New 
York: Mansell 1986, 15. 
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‘Inevitably, diplomatic material constitutes the largest category of records in 
the survey’12 and ‘The amount of material relating to religious and scientific 
relations between Britain and Russia exceeded expectations’.13 Nonetheless, 
since the focal point of this paper is to investigate the way in which the 
British side ‘anticipated’ and adjusted to the Soviets’ intention when 
projecting its national culture, the bulk of my archival research sheds light 
upon this largely neglected field of study.  
 
 
Background issues 
 
The British Council is a non- departmental public body (NDPB), created in 
1934, and operates under the auspices of the British Foreign Office. It was 
granted a Royal Charter in 1940, which defines its aims as promoting ‘a 
wider knowledge of [Britain] … and the English language abroad and 
developing closer cultural relations between [Britain] … and other 
countries…’.14 Since then, the main work remit of the Council has always 
been to encourage people exchanges (especially young people) and English 
language education, so the post-war circumstances were not exceptional in 
that regard. (see, Table 1: ‘Three major works of the British Council in the 
1950s’). The Director-General from 1954 to 1968, Paul Sinker, also describes 
how ‘Our main task is the making and fostering of contacts between 
                                                   
12 Ibid., 9.  
13 Ibid., 15. 
14 Royal Charter (1940).  
Cf. The current objectives of the Council under the Royal Charter and Bye-laws 
(1993) is: 
(a) promote a wider knowledge of Our United Kingdom; 
(b) develop a wider knowledge of the English language; 
(c) encourage cultural, scientific, technological and other educational 
co-operation between Our United Kingdom  and other countries; or 
(d) otherwise promote the advancement of education.―Royal Charter and 
Bye-laws (London: British Council, 1993). 
See also: http://www.britishcouncil.org/organisation/structure/status [Accessed 
29/12/2013] 
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individual people’.15 
On the other hand, throughout the 
Council’s history, the arts sector has 
never been a dominant area. The 
allocation for the visual arts has 
been consistently less than 10%16, 
and the post-war period was actually 
even worse: huge financial cuts 
brought a real winter-hardship to 
the arts field. Table 2 (‘The British 
Council: budget breakdown’) shows how the Council only allocated 
1% of its total budget to the arts-sector.17 
Reflecting these unfavourable conditions, when the British Council’s Soviet 
Relations Committee (SRC), 18  was set up in 1955 ‘to develop cultural 
relations with the U.S.S.R.’,19 with no exceptions, the committee tenaciously 
attempted to pursue the policy of promoting student and youth exchanges 
between Britain and the Soviet Union’.20 However, it soon came to light that 
this ‘was something on which the Russians were not keen…. [T]he Russians 
did not like student and youth exchanges and wanted major 
                                                   
15 Paul Sinker, ‘The British Council Now’, Economic Digest: A World Review, 
London: Economic Digest Ltd. July 1959, 201. 
16 See in detail, Frances Donaldson, The British Council: the First Fifty Years, 
London: Jonathan Cape 1984. 
17 See The British Council Annual Report: 1956-57, 91-93. 
18 On this matter, see in detail, Aiko Watanabe, ‘The British Council’s Soviet 
Relations Committee: A Departure from its “Cultural Brief” or the 
Manifestation of an Inherent Political Tendency?’, Odysseus (The Journal of 
Area Studies, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, University of Tokyo), 7, 
2003, 74-95. 
19 ‘Special British Council Number’, Economic Digest: A World View, London: 
July 1959, 205. 
20 The National Archives: Public Record Office, Kew (hereafter TNA), BW1/502, 
‘The Financing of Major Manifestations to the Soviet Union’, 31 March 1966, 
USSR and Eastern Europe (01/01/1962-31/12/1968). 
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manifestations...’.21 Therefore, there were only two suggestions left, but both 
seemed feasible: ‘the organisation of glamorous public manifestations 
(theatre, music, ballet, etc.) or the patient multiplication of personal contacts 
between representative individuals’.22 Archival documents suggest that the 
British Council chose both options, leaving behind English language 
education in its initial stage, were that the SRC wanted ‘(i) to bring 
influential Russians to this country in order that they should see with their 
own eyes that a lot of what they have been told about the West is false’; and 
‘(ii) to create some effect on public opinion in the U.S.S.R. by means of ‘major 
manifestations’.23 As for the first option, it is inferred that the Soviet Union 
did not want to send especially young people to the West for fear that they 
should feel more freedom there and be influenced by western cultures. It was 
purely because of this possibility, however, that Britain wanted to welcome as 
many young Russian people to Britain as possible.  
Indeed, there seems to have been several reasons why the Soviet side 
preferred and insisted upon large 
cultural manifestations to exchanges 
of people and English language 
education. Firstly, visual culture can 
be enjoyed and interpreted without 
language proficiency. As Richard Arnt 
argues ‘The arts have always had the 
advantage of transcending language 
barriers’, 24  this is probably the reason why language 
                                                   
21 Ibid. 
22 David Kelly, ‘Cultural Relations with Soviet Russia’, in The British Council 
Annual Report: 1956-57, 2.  
23 TNA, BW2/519, ‘Letter to Director-General from Nancy Parkinson, Controller, 
Home Division’, 23 November 1955, Soviet Relations Committee: 
correspondence (1955-56). 
24 Richard T. Arnt, The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in 
the Twentieth Century, Dulles, Virginia: Potomacs 2005, 360-61. 
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education was avoided in the first place by the SRC. Secondly, cultural 
manifestations have an enormous, spectacular impact on the public, for both 
sides.25 The Russians wanted to show how impressive Tchaikovsky’s music 
was, and Britain wanted to let the Russian public know that the Bolshoi is 
not the only ballet they should see. Thirdly, when dealing with the Soviet 
Union, the question of ‘reciprocity’ should not be overlooked, as the Soviets 
always set this policy for cultural manifestations in order to encourage a 
wider principle for cultural relations. That meant, for example, when four 
groups of six persons in the fields of science went in one direction the same 
scale of group visits was expected in return; a visit by a theatre company 
implied a theatre company in return. To finance each programme, basically, 
‘it was agreed that the exporting country should bear the cost of the fares of 
its delegations to the territory of the other, while the importing country 
would be responsible for arranging programmes and offering hospitality’.26 
 For most of the arts, the reciprocity policy worked well, because Britain 
had plenty of artistic forms with which to match those of the Soviet Union: 
for example, the Leningrad Philharmonic Orchestra [more traditional] or 
USSR State Symphony Orchestra for the London Philharmonic Orchestra or 
Hallé Orchestra; the Bolshoi Ballet for Sadler’s Wells, and so on. Historically, 
the Russians were very good at performing arts, such as music, ballet, and 
dance, although they had some films to export, too. Ruth McMurry and Muna 
Lee argue that the direction of Soviet cultural propaganda was always 
towards what might be best described as high culture: ‘the highest value was 
always placed on literature, art, music, the theatre, and the cinema’,27 whilst 
they also highlight the Soviet’s eagerness for scientific exchanges too. To be 
sure, evidence suggests that by the 1950’s the dominant features of the 
                                                   
25 See ‘Special British Council Number’, 205. 
26 TNA, BW2/532, ‘Report on Activities: April 1955 to December 1956’, Soviet 
Relations Committee: correspondence on matters of concern to the Committee 
including affairs of the British Soviet Friendship Society (1956-57). 
27 McMurry and Lee, 114. 
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Soviet’s cultural relations programme were the scientific and technical 
elements. 28  Eleven months after the establishment of the SRC, the 
Committee’s appraisal of what the Soviets wanted was ‘(1) to send 
delegations to this country which are directed primarily at the acquisition of 
technical knowledge, and (2) to get Soviet performances (ballet, musicians 
etc.) shown in Great Britain. They are not so interested in the 
straightforward professional exchange which is the first priority of the Soviet 
Relations Committee’.29 In the late 1950s, in an interview with the British 
Ambassador for Moscow, D. P. Reilly, G. A. Zhukov, the president of the Union 
of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign 
Countries,30 still insisted on proposing ‘a big development of scientific and 
technical exchanges…’. 31  It seems that under the heading ‘cultural 
exchanges’ the Soviets wanted to push for scientific and technical exchanges. 
It is plain that the type of things that the SRC and the Soviet authorities 
                                                   
28 See, for example, TNA, BW2/555, ‘Notes presented at the meeting of the 
British Council Executive Committee – Soviet Relations Committee, 
“Exchanges with the U.S.S.R. from May 1957”’, 10 July 1957, Soviet Relations 
Committee: draft agenda and matters for discussion (1957-59).  
29  TNA, BW2/532, ‘Note on the Soviet Relations Committee of the British 
Council’, November 1955, Soviet Relations Committee: correspondence on 
matters of concern to the Committee including affairs of the British Soviet 
Friendship Society (1956-57). 
30 ‘Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign 
Countries’ was established in February in 1958 to replace its forerunner, 
notorious VOKS (‘All Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign 
Countries’: 1925-58). G. A. Zhukov, former Chairman of the VOKS, was this 
time became the president, and most of the board members were also from the 
VOKS. According to the political advisor of Radio Europe, therefore, this ‘new 
union is merely VOKS under another name’. – ‘New Organization to Control 
“Friendship”’, 25 April 1958, Radio Free Europe/Munich, Office of the Political 
Advisor, Background Information USSR (Box Folder-Report: 55-3-16), Open 
Society Archives.  
http://fa.osaarchivum.org/background-reports?col=8&id=42427[Accessed 30/12/ 
2013]   
31 TNA, BW2/572, ‘Letter to Miss H. Tripp, Secretary of the SRC from F.G.K 
Gallagher (F.O)’, 6 January 1959, Soviet Relations Committee: correspondence, 
including scientific visitors from USSR; delegation to Moscow. 
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hoped to place under the umbrella concept of ‘cultural exchange’ was very 
different. Though there was a contest being fought between the Soviets and 
the SRC in terms of who managed to hold the balance of cultural trade profit, 
with the aim of cultural exports exceeding cultural imports by the largest 
margin possible, this was arguably not the case where technical and scientific 
exchanges occurred.  Indeed, the reverse situation arose whereby the 
Soviets wished to import as much of this form of ‘culture’ from Britain as 
possible while the SRC resisted such attempts fiercely. It is even possible to 
say their underlying assumption was that the Soviet interest in ‘culture’ was 
somewhat of a veneer for what was a desire to gain technical expertise that 
would have very real tangible benefits to the economy of the Soviet Union.32 
 Yet, this does not mean that the artistic side of cultural exchanges was 
unimportant, for they should be separated out into two distinct areas. The 
aim of the big artistic and musical manifestations was surely for prestige and 
the demonstrable celebration of the quality of Soviet art, the scientific 
exchanges had the more practical aim to significantly advance the Soviet’s 
technological skill base. It is indicative of how important these cultural 
contacts were deemed to be that in the midst of the 1950s’ financial 
stringency, ‘glamorous’ (read expensive) public manifestations were being 
envisaged and coming to fruition. Table 3 is the SRC’s Programme of Events 
for the year 1958/59 with costs. After a couple of years of rather unhappy 
neglect, although the language teaching started with the exchange of 
teaching specialists in January 1958, 33  as we can see in the planned 
programme of the SRC for 1958/59, the proportion of education is much 
smaller. In spite of the rigid reciprocity policy, however, the only performing 
                                                   
32 See also, Frederick C. Barghoorn, The Soviet Cultural Offensive: the Role of 
Cultural Diplomacy in Soviet Foreign Policy, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press Chapter 1, 1-27. 
33 ‘…as a result a course for twenty-eight Soviet teachers of English was held in 
Scotland this summer and a course for a similar number of British teachers of 
Russian was held in Moscow.’ – The British Council Annual Report: 1957-58, 
16. 
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arts that the Soviets had not got the equivalent for was ‘drama’. Britain had a 
worldwide reputation for its theatrical performances of English dramatists 
such as Shakespeare but the Soviets, mainly because of the language 
problem, could never bring their dramas without translation, which was less 
appealing. 
 Although performances of Shakespeare were the most popular in the 
history of British theatre, domestically, theatre in 1950s Britain saw new 
phenomena. The young playwrights called the ‘Angry Young Men’, rejected 
establishment plays creating rebellious theatre. Also, what is called ‘The 
Theatre of the Absurd’, represented by Samuel Beckett and Harold Pinter, 
brought new perspectives to the drama-scene in Britain. However, these 
distinctive theatre movements were not promoted overseas by the British 
Council – not just in the case of the Soviet Union, but basically anywhere. 
What they showed overseas was actually predominantly Shakespeare and 
the traditional canon of plays.34 The reason for this reticence was that 
potential language problems were even a concern for the British side. In 1955, 
the SRC committee decided that ‘Performances have limitations of language 
and hence should be confined to well-known classics – Shakespeare on our 
part, Chekov or something similar on theirs’.35 This policy may also have 
                                                   
34 For example, see the list of drama performed by companies for the year 1955 
in question: ENGLISH OPERA GROUP with ‘The Turn of the Screw’ [by Henry 
James] – Schwetzingen, Munich; Florence Festival; Holland Festival; Knocke. 
May-July 1955. 
SHAKESPEARE MEMORIAL THEATRE COMPANY with ‘King Lear’ and 
‘Much Ado about Nothing’ – Vienna; Zürich; Holland Festival. June-July 
1955.  
SHAKESPEARE MEMORIAL THEATRE COMPANY with ‘King Lear’ and 
‘Much Ado about Nothing’ – Berlin Festival, Hanover, Bremen, Hamburg; 
Copenhagen; Oslo. September-October 1955. 
TENNET PRODUCTIONS LTD. with ‘Hamlet’ – Moscow. November 1955. – 
See The British Council Annual Report: 1955-56, 85 
35 TNA, BW2/540, ‘Future Projects: Anglo-Soviet Cultural Relations: Note by [Sir 
Kenneth Loch,] Controller, Arts and Science, Executive Committee: 
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been influenced by the fact that the Council were exclusively connected with 
some traditional theatres such as the Old Vic, ‘one of the main protégés of the 
Arts Council’,36 the Shakespeare Memorial Theatre or Tennent Productions 
Ltd. There was also an underlying belief that canonical works (by definition) 
were most representative of British drama.  
 Given this, when in 1955 Britain took Hamlet directed by Peter Brook to 
Moscow, ‘the first British theatre company to visit Russia since the Tsarist 
days’?37 It was returned by a visit of the Bolshoi dancers the following year, 
who were opportunely invited to see another Shakespearean play, Othello, by 
the Shakespeare Memorial Theatre Company in Stratford-upon-Avon. By 
1955, Peter Brook had already directed plays overseas: in 1950, Measure for 
Measure performed in Berlin was so successful that it ‘received particularly 
good notices in the Press of the East Sector’.38 This might be one of the 
reasons why the young, up-and-coming Brook was spotted to direct a 
performance in the Soviet Union, and the play was welcomed by 15,000 
Russians ‘with the sharpest enthusiasm’.39 On the other hand, interestingly, 
the same production performed in London afterwards suffered such severe 
criticism that Brook himself regretted that ‘he had treated it too traditionally, 
in a convention too academic, an austerity that detached it from the theatre’ 
(Emphasis added).40 These different receptions to his Hamlet suggest that 
each audience had different taste and expectations, and that each nation had 
                                                                                                                                   
Sub-Committee on Cultural Relations with the U.S.S.R.’, 21 April, 1955, Soviet 
Relations Committee: minutes of meetings (1955-57). 
36 TNA, FO371/116814, ‘Letter from Kenneth Johnstone, British Council to Paul 
F. Grey, Foreign Office’, 23 December 1954, Proposal for Russian Moiseyev 
Folk Dance Ensemble to perform in London; Tennent’s Productions Limited’s 
performances of Hamlet at the Moscow Arts Theatre, November 1955. 
37 Kelly, 2. 
38 TNA, FO371/116814, ‘Letter from Kenneth Johnstone, British Council to Paul 
F. Grey, Foreign Office’, 23 December 1954, Proposal for Russian Moiseyev Folk 
Dance Ensemble to perform in London; Tennent’s Productions Limited’s 
performances of Hamlet at the Moscow Arts Theatre, November 1955. 
39 J. C. Trewin, Peter Brook: A Biography, London: MacDonald 1971, 90. 
40 Ibid. 
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a different theatrical climate. Cultural organisations such as the British 
Council were presented with the difficult challenge of understanding and 
reconciling what was popular, representative, or de jour in the arts 
domestically – with the desire to project this abroad – and what would be 
appreciated in a specific country. The latter half of a difficult equation ran the 
risk of, either upsetting the host, or pleasing but projecting a distorted 
self-image that could be politically and culturally damaging. 
 
 
The ‘culture’ debate in international cultural relations 
 
 The discourse of Fine Arts has been developed in a number of different 
ways. After the war, a number of new waves, such as ‘abstract expressionism’ 
(e.g. Peter Lanyon, Roger Hilton and William Gear) or Social realism (e.g. 
John Bratby), appeared. Unlike in the case of drama, the British Council 
reacted quite quickly to these movements and organised ‘Contemporary Art 
Exhibition overseas’, although controversially, some works of abstract 
expressionism (e.g. William Gear’s Autumn which won a prize of £500) was 
not really accepted in Britain itself and the controversy among the public 
over a work of art was sometimes brought to the House of Commons!41   
 Perhaps, a good way of understanding what kind of fine arts the British 
Council wanted to present in the Soviet Union is to look at work shown at the 
Venice Biennale, the International Exhibition, which originally started in 
1895. The British Council ‘assumed the management of the British Pavilion, 
taking responsibility for the British presentation at the Biennale, organising 
its first exhibition there in 1938’.42 In that year, the Council brought a small 
group show including contemporary British paintings and sculptures to the 
                                                   
41 David Christopher, British Culture: An Introduction, London: Routledge 1999, 
160. 
42 http://venicebiennale.britishcouncil.org/about/ [Accessed 29/12/ 2013] 
76 East Asian Journal of British History, Vol. 4 (2014)  
 
venue (e.g. Paul Nash, Matthew Smith, Stanley Spencer, and Christopher 
Wood). When the Biennale resumed in 1948 after the war, the Council’s Fine 
Arts Department ‘decided to send to Venice the works of Britain’s greatest 
painter and her greatest modern master. Paintings by [J. M. W.] Turner were 
sent from the Tate Gallery accompanied by works by Henry Moore’.43 In this 
exhibition, Moore won the International Sculpture Prize44 and from this time 
onwards, the Council started to exhibit abroad many more works by living 
artists such as Graham Sutherland and Ben Nicolson, noted for their 
abstract works. Since the British exhibition at the Venice Biennale was 
regularly organised by the British Council, it affords the opportunity to follow 
trends, or as the Council Chairman stated, gives ‘a fair conception of the Fine 
Arts Committee’s opinions and judgment’.45 Here is the list of exhibitions 
from 1948 to 1956: 
 
1948:  Painting: J. M. W. Turner. Sculpture: Henry Moore 
1950: Painting: John Constable; Matthew Smith. Sculpture: Barbara 
Hepworth 
1952:  Painting: Graham Sutherland; William Wadsworth. A few works each 
by eight young sculptors: Robert Adams, Kenneth Armitage, Reg Butler, 
Lynn Chadwick, Geoffrey Clarke, Bernard Meadows, Eduardo Paolozzi, 
William Turnbull. 
1954:  Painting: Ben Nicholson; Lucien Freud; Francis Bacon. Sculpture:Reg 
Butler’s first-prize-winning design for a memorial to the Unknown 
political prisoner. 
1956:  Painting: Ivon Hitchens; a few pictures each of four young painters: 
John Bratby, Derrick Greaves, Edward Middleditch, Jack Smith. 
Sculpture: Lynn Chadwick.46 
                                                   
43 Donaldson, 148. 
44 http://venicebiennale.britishcouncil.org/timeline/1948 [Accessed 29/12/2013] 
45 TNA, BW78/3, ‘Chairman’s Memorandum on the Function and Achievements 
of the Fine Arts Department’, 24 April 1956, Fine Arts Advisory Committee: 
minutes and papers; meetings 62-73 (1956-1960). 
46 Ibid.  
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From this list, it can be said that 1950 marked the end of a transition from 
classic to contemporary art: the last appearance of an old master, John 
Constable. In the same vein, the trend in the British Council’s projection of 
Fine Arts overseas had, by the 1950s, lurched towards ‘modern art’. The Fine 
Arts Committee established ‘the pattern of showing the work of either one 
accomplished artist in mid-career, or a small group’ and ‘the practice of 
exhibiting the work of artists from the past, initiated from Italy, was 
concluded after the 1950 Biennale…’.47 Thus, it seems to be reasonable 
enough to use traditional and modern art as the basis for a diagnosis of the 
British Council’s strategy in its cultural dealings with the Soviet Union.   
In an internal document of the Council, there are details of the type of 
exhibition the British Council wanted to present in the Soviet Union. In 
March 1956, Kenneth M. Loch, Controller, Arts and Science of the Council, 
told F. C. K. Gallagher, the Foreign Office, that the proposed exhibition of 
British Art in Moscow ‘should not be “Old Masters” but rather something to 
show that this country has a live and vigorous contemporary contribution to 
these matters’.48  This was in fact quite the opposite opinion than that 
expressed by the British Embassy, which was ready to diplomatically 
compromise with the country they were dealing with: ‘The exhibition 
confirms the truth that at this stage in our cultural relations with the Soviet 
Union, only the best exhibits or works of art should be sent here. The public 
image of our country is to a considerable extent projected by such exhibitions 
and we are judged critically by what we send’.49 Self-evidently, the type of 
                                                   
47 Sophie Bowness and Clive Phillpot, Britain at the Venice Biennale 1895-1995, 
London: The British Council 1995, 11. 
48  TNA, BW2/525, ‘Letter from Kenneth M. Loch to F.C.K. Gallagher, The 
Foreign Office’, on 29 March 1956, Soviet Relations Committee: delegations 
from Britain to Soviet Union. 
49 TNA, BW64/32, ‘Letter from D. P. Reilly, British Embassy in Moscow to 
Selwyn Lloyd, Foreign Office’, 10 May 1960, Correspondence. Includes 7 
photographs depicting: Fine art: Exhibition of British Paintings (1720-1960) at 
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representation of oneself is dependent upon the image that one wishes to 
project. For example, in the Sadler’s Wells Ballet performances in Moscow, 
where could we find the millions of British industrial workers?  From the 
outset, clearly, the notion of ‘culture’ that the Foreign Office held to was ‘high 
culture’, and this tendency to regard a nation’s culture as best represented by 
‘high culture’ was a generally shared understanding in the early post-war 
period.  
Obviously, the Council wanted to ensure that they did not project an image 
of Britain that appeared rooted in the past, and especially in empire, but a 
dynamic and forward looking country, comfortable with its heritage but not 
dependent on it. Modern art was not simply a British phenomenon, and there 
was a feeling that to expunge it completely from the cultural meal being 
offered to the Soviets would not be a true reflection of British creativity and 
artistic trends in the West. In this way, British cultural relations can be 
viewed as a metonym for all democratic (more specifically, English-speaking) 
economically advanced nations. Kenneth Loch continues: ‘As a result, 
modern art as we understand it might be open to embarrassing criticism in 
the Soviet Union. On the other hand the Soviet must be aware of these trends 
and to ignore them entirely would lay us open to the criticism of not being 
genuine in expounding the way in which we are thinking…’.50 Perhaps this 
seems unsurprising, for after all the British Council’s brief charges it with 
promoting contemporary Britishness, but another aspect of the same 
communiqué showed the Council’s preoccupation with selecting the ‘right’ 
artwork according to its anticipated reception in the Soviet Union (‘On the 
whole it would perhaps be better for the Soviet to take the lead in any 
                                                                                                                                   
the Hermitage Museum, Leningrad, 1960: Sir John Rothenstein at opening 
ceremony; visitors viewing exhibits, dated 1960. 
50 TNA, BW2/540, ‘Future Projects: Anglo-Soviet Cultural Relations: Note by [Sir 
Kenneth Loch,] Controller, Arts and Science, Executive Committee: 
Sub-Committee on Cultural Relations with the U.S.S.R.’, 21 April, 1955, Soviet 
Relations Committee: minutes of meetings (1955-57). 
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exchange programme of Fine Arts’).51 The British Council thus extended 
beyond its original remit, demonstrating how it not only promoted, but had a 
crucial hand in the defining ‘British culture’, and in circumscribing what 
Soviet Culture consisted of.  
In reality, however, Kenneth Loch was not as determined to ensure that the 
British Art exhibited was balanced and reflected current artistic trends, than 
his statement suggested. For he observed that ‘The Soviet has little or no 
“avant garde” movements such as exist in this country and in Western 
Europe’,52 and therefore, ‘Such art is not readily comprehensible to people 
accustomed to the more sedate art forms’.53 His interpretation of Soviet art 
appreciation was developed more fully: 
 
In the contemporary field it is felt that the ‘avant garde’ movement, though 
virile enough and widely appreciated abroad, would not go down in the Soviet 
Union and might even be classified as a decadent product of Capitalism. 
Accepting this point of view, we must turn elsewhere. The more sedate 
products of our painting and sculpture might in some ways be considered 
suitable to Soviet taste. On the other hand anyone over there with any 
knowledge of these things would know that we were not thereby sending what 
represents the way of our modern artists are thinking.54 
This being so, we must seek some other solution. We had hoped that the 
Soviet would like the photographic exhibition of modern architecture got 
together by the Arts Council. Mr Mikhailov saw it when over here. He did not 
like it, because he said there was too much glass. Whether that was the real 
reason or not, the fact remains we cannot force an exhibition on them when 
they do not like it.55 
                                                   
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54  TNA, BW2/525, ‘Letter from Kenneth M. Loch to F.C.K. Gallagher, The 
Foreign Office’, 29 March 1956, Soviet Relations Committee: delegations from 
Britain to Soviet Union 1956. 
55 Ibid. 
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This note of caution reflects a genuine desire by the British to make 
cultural relations work in what was only the infancy of their relationship 
with the Soviet Union. In the negotiations over the art exhibitions, The 
British Council was an astute political operator (in the lower case sense), 
demonstrating great deference to political sensitivities. In this sense, it 
should not be argued that the decision to steer clear of an offensive or 
provocative act is self-evidently maintaining the Council’s ‘neutrality’, but it 
is also ‘performing’ a ‘political’ act in the light of the Foreign Office’s 
stipulation to avoid creating an atmosphere of mistrust. This begs the very 
real question as to the extent to which the British Council was culturally 
impotent, when it was desperate for its ‘cultural manifestations’ to be well 
received. Thus if, the British Council was designed to promote and celebrate 
British achievement in the arts, it was ironically foreign countries that 
inadvertently (or deliberately) decided what was a ‘good’ or ‘representative’ 
image of British culture. The British Council thus went down a blind alley. As 
a vehicle for promoting the ‘British Way of Life’ on British terms, in this 
aspect of their work, perhaps the British Council failed. It begs the question 
whether this argument can extend to ‘cultural propaganda’ in general, such 
that we should not focus our attention on how a nation is able to self-promote 
in a ‘missionary-like’ way, but rather how it shapes its own identity by trying 
to shape that of the ‘other’?  In other words, countries always have a 
cultural veto. The Fine Arts Exhibition in question, although it was originally 
planned just after the launch of the SRC, became bogged down in wrangling 
over the exhibits. 
On the other hand, some Council staff were, more bearish against the 
recipient country of other aspects of British culture. When the SRC was 
planning a book exhibition in August 1957, for example, the Chairman of the 
SRC, Christopher Mayhew, and the then Director-General, Paul Sinker, were 
against the idea of making ‘the book exhibition in Russia dependent upon the 
Russian reply to the question about taking orders for British Books at the 
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exhibition’.56 The exhibition was actually held in late 1959 (21 November to 4 
December), with the ‘exhibition of 4,000 books and 650 periodicals displayed 
in the Lenin Library, Moscow … the largest ever mounted by the British 
Council in any country’.57 However, the result was that, just before the 
exhibition started, the Soviet authorities removed ‘at the last moment from 
the shelves some thirty of the books and several periodicals’. 58  This 
last-minute ‘censorship’ was a common manoeuvre of the Soviet Union at 
that period, and whilst predictable, was not preventable (‘It was only sad that 
the Russians should, as so often, have proved their own worst enemies by 
exercising the right of “censorship” which we had had to concede to 
them…’).59 Considering this bitter experience, it is understandable that the 
British Council was so sensitive towards the selection of art work for the 
coming Fine Arts Exhibition, especially when they were brave enough to 
endeavour to bring the modern, ‘abstract’ art work, which the Russians 
officially dismissed at that time.  
 
 
‘British Paintings: 1720-1960’ 
 
The long-projected Fine Arts Exhibition was finally realised in May and 
July 1960, entitled ‘British Paintings: 1720-1960’. This was a return event for 
the Russian and Soviet painting exhibition in London at Burlington House in 
1959.60  According to D. P. Reilly, British Embassy, in his letter to Mr 
                                                   
56 TNA, BW64/26, ‘Memo “Book Exhibition for Russia” from Literature Group’, 
21 August 1957, Book and periodicals exhibition, Moscow: draft agreement for 
reciprocal exhibitions (1957-1959). 
57 The British Council Annual Report: 1959-60, 18. 
58 TNA, BW64/67, Book exhibition in Moscow 1959. 
59 Ibid. 
60 TNA, BW64/32, Correspondence. Includes 7 photographs depicting: Fine art: 
Exhibition of British Paintings (1720-1960) at the Hermitage Museum, 
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Kuznetsov, Deputy Minister of Culture, this fine art exhibition in Moscow 
‘aroused great interest among the British public’61 and he explained the 
‘selection of the pictures and the preparatory work in the United Kingdom 
was carried out by the British Council’.62 It is interesting to see how Britain 
managed to make this happen; what the proportion of the style of the art 
work was; what the assumptions/anticipations by the British side were; and 
still more: what the reception by the Russian side was.  
To retrospect, this manifestation was tabled because the first cultural 
agreement between Britain and the USSR was concluded in late 1959, which 
was, as will be described in more detail later, a solid and more official tie than 
just having an ad-hoc cultural programme, so this agreement seems to have 
helped Britain to insist on what they wanted to represent: ‘This collection of 
paintings constitutes part of the mutual exchange of exhibitions between the 
Soviet Union and the United Kingdom provided for under the terms of the 
Anglo-Soviet Cultural Agreement’.63 Another encouraging event for Britain 
was the lifting of the Zhdanov Decree, a notorious doctrine, denunciating 
avant-garde movements, which had exerted an overwhelming influence over 
                                                                                                                                   
Leningrad, 1960: Sir John Rothenstein at opening ceremony; visitors viewing 
exhibits, dated 1960. 
61 TNA, BW64/32, ‘Letter from D. P. Reilly, British Embassy, Moscow, to Mr 
Kuznetsov, Deputy Minister of Culture (Enclosure to Moscow dispatch No. 56 
of 24/6/60)’, Correspondence. Includes 7 photographs depicting: Fine art: 
Exhibition of British Paintings (1720-1960) at the Hermitage Museum, 
Leningrad, 1960: Sir John Rothenstein at opening ceremony; visitors viewing 
exhibits, dated 1960. 
62 TNA, BW64/32, ‘Letter from D. P. Reilly, British Embassy, Moscow, to Mr 
Kuznetsov, Deputy Minister of Culture (Enclosure to Moscow despatch No. 56 
of 24/6/60)’, Correspondence. Includes 7 photographs depicting: Fine art: 
Exhibition of British Paintings (1720-1960) at the Hermitage Museum, 
Leningrad, 1960: Sir John Rothenstein at opening ceremony; visitors viewing 
exhibits, dated 1960. 
63 Ibid. 
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Soviet culture and arts over the past decade.64 It was officially lifted in May 
1958. 
The Fine Arts event which was described in The British Council Annual 
Report: 1959-60 as ‘the first important exhibition of British painting ever to 
be shown in the Soviet Union’ opened at the Pushkin Museum in Moscow,65 
and it was subsequently exhibited in Leningrad: ‘It contained 141 paintings 
covering the period from 1720 to 1960 lent by sixty-six museums and private 
owners, among them Her Majesty the Queen and Her Majesty Queen 
Elizabeth the Queen Mother. The National Gallery and the Tate Gallery 
between them lent thirty-four works…. It was enthusiastically received by 
the Russian public and was seen by 370,000 people in all, an average of 7,000 
a day’.66 Some examples of the paintings are:67 
 
From the eighteenth and nineteenth century:  
 Hogarth’s ‘Cholmondeley Family’, ‘Calais Gate’,  
 Reynolds’s ‘Self-portrait’, ‘Garrick as “Kitely”’,  
 Gainsborough’s ‘Portrait of Dr. Schomberg’, ‘The Watering place’,  
 Constable’s ‘Leaping horse’, ‘The Valley Farm’,  
 Landseer’s ‘Dignity and Impudence’,  
 Frith’s ‘Railway Station’,  
 Egg’s ‘The Travelling Companion’, 
 Millais’s ‘The Blind Girl’, 
 Whistler’s portrait of ‘Thomas Carlyle’  
 
From the twentieth century: 
                                                   
64 It was first conducted in 1946, by Andrey A. Zhdanov (1896-1948), the Central 
Committee secretary. Even after his death in August 1948, this doctrine 
remained officially effective until May 1958. 
65 The British Council Annual Report: 1959/60, 40. 
66 Ibid., 40-41. 
67 Revised from the list in BW64/32. 
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 John Orpen, Matthew Smith, Paul Nash, Stanley Spencer, Ben 
Nicholson and Graham Sutherland, Lucian Freud, and many more artists  
 
As shown in Table 4, the 
allocation of paintings was quite 
well balanced, and there were a 
substantial number of modern 
art paintings exhibited. 
However, although D. P. Reilly, 
British Ambassador for Moscow, 
expressed his pleasure that ‘we 
have been able to send to the 
Soviet Union a collection of paintings which includes not only 
examples of the work of our greatest masters of the past but also examples of 
our best contemporary paintings’,68 for the British, there had been a great 
deal of anxiety over the selection of artwork behind the scenes. In January 
1960, in the heat of preparation for the exhibition, the Director of the Fine 
Arts Department was extremely concerned about the possibility of a part or 
all the twentieth century paintings being withdrawn: 
 
There are about 25 paintings including works by Graham Sutherland and 
Ben Nicholson which the Russians might describe as examples of bourgeois 
decadence, out of a total of 52 works of this century. Whoever represents the 
Council at the opening should be briefed as to what is to be done in the event of 
                                                   
68 TNA, BW64/32, ‘Letter from D. P. Reilly, British Embassy, Moscow, to Mr 
Kuznetsov, Deputy Minister of Culture (Enclosure to Moscow despatch No. 56 
of 24/6/60)’, Correspondence. Includes 7 photographs depicting: Fine art: 
Exhibition of British Paintings (1720-1960) at the Hermitage Museum, 
Leningrad, 1960: Sir John Rothenstein at opening ceremony; visitors viewing 
exhibits, dated 1960. 
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suppression by the Russians. Possibly he should be instructed to withdraw all 
the 52 paintings of this century.69 
 
The Director-General, Paul Sinker, also anticipated the worst, perhaps 
remembering what had happened to the book exhibition in the previous year: 
‘The possibility of suppression of modern British paintings might land us in a 
very awkward situation which if it occurs, is likely to occur at the last 
moment’,70 He also thought that ‘Unfortunately, in dealing with the Russians 
we cannot separate Art from politics and I think therefore that we should be 
wise to let the FO see the Foreword and Introduction [of the catalogue] in 
draft’.71 In this way, every aspect of the exhibition had potential political 
pitfalls which the Council staff diligently attempted to navigate. Here again, 
the British Council demonstrated great deference to political sensitivities. 
Notwithstanding all these concerns, in the end, the exhibition was 
conducted without any omission by the Soviet authorities. D. P. Reilly was 
exhilarated by the Soviet public reaction, noting that ‘The public reaction, as 
far as I could judge from the day of our visit, was enthusiastic and it was 
encouraging to note the spontaneous interest displayed, at least by the 
younger members of it, in the modern works on show. It was obvious, however, 
that it was the abstract paintings, rather than the representational modern 
                                                   
69  TNA, BW64/32, ‘Circular from Director, F. A. Dept. [L. Somerville]: 
“Exhibition of British Paintings 1720-1960 for USSR 1960”’, 4 January 1960, 
Correspondence. Includes 7 photographs depicting: Fine art: Exhibition of 
British Paintings (1720-1960) at the Hermitage Museum, Leningrad, 1960: Sir 
John Rothenstein at opening ceremony; visitors viewing exhibits, dated 1960’. 
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Leningrad, 1960: Sir John Rothenstein at opening ceremony; visitors viewing 
exhibits, dated 1960’. 
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ones, which aroused the real interest’:72 
 
The exhibition has already proved a great success. The gallery over the last 
weekend was full of people, many of them young and as one would expect from 
the intelligentsia. The museum experts were unanimously delighted with the 
quality of the 18th and 19th Century paintings.... The Constable paintings had 
been a revelation. As regards the modern section, it drew the young the artists 
and the curious like a magnet. Abstract art is officially frowned on in the 
Soviet Union and is usually described as the outpourings of decadent 
bourgeoisie. But a member of my staff saw a young Soviet artist vehemently 
defending the works of Passmore [sic.] before an attentive group of Soviet 
bystanders. There were some who tittered, a few who jeered, but no more 
perhaps than in any English gallery.73 
 
Reilly also sent a letter to the Soviet officer, thanking him for his 
co-operation, convinced that the exhibition contributed to furthering the 
embryonic cultural relationship between the two countries, and that it had 
reflected the richness of British art: 
 
We likewise believe that cultural exchanges between our two countries will 
play a positive role in the reduction of world tension.... We hope that our 
exhibition will afford you pleasure and that it will serve as a token not merely 
of the richness of our cultural heritage but also of the vitality, variety and high 
quality of contemporary British painting.74 
                                                   
72 TNA, BW78/3, ‘A Letter from D. P, Reilly to Selwyn Lloyd, Foreign Secretary’, 
21 June 1960, Fine Arts Advisory Committee: minutes and papers; meetings 
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73 TNA, BW64/32, ‘Letter from D. P. Reilly, British Embassy in Moscow to 
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ceremony; visitors viewing exhibits, dated 1960. 
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The first press reaction was not too bad, either: ‘The day after the opening, 
Pravda carried a short account, and articles appeared in other newspapers. 
On the whole, they have been favourable and have in particular praised 
highly the work of Constable, Gainsborough and Hogarth’75. Again, Reilly 
observed that: ‘little has been said about the modern painting’; ‘it may well be 
that the official line is to ignore rather than criticise’.76 
However, a couple of months after the exhibition, the first negative 
comments on British painting by the Soviets began to emerge. In the Council 
report of 25th October 1960, there is a translated review of the exhibition by 
the Moscow newspaper, Sovietskaya Kultura.77 The review comment was 
read and introduced by a Council staff member as follows: 
 
While paying warm tribute to a splendid exhibition, and especially to the 
paintings by Gainsborough and Constable, he [= the writer of this column] 
regretted the ‘dull’ choice of Turners, and poured scorn on Frith, Landseer, 
Watts and the Pre-Raphaelites. He applauded the excellent representation of 
the ‘realistic art’ of ‘the American Whistler’ and his successors Augustus John, 
Orpen and Sickert, and criticised the emphasis on ‘the monotonous splodges of 
the representatives of abstractionism’, and the exposition of it by the authors of 
the catalogue, especially Miss Chamot of the Tate Gallery (‘the main 
propaganda centre for abstract and surrealist art in England’).78 
 
                                                   
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
77  Sovietskaya Kultura [SOVETSKAIA KUL’TULA (Soviet Culture)] was ‘a 
newspaper of the Central Committee of the CPSU, founded in 1973. Sovetskaia 
kul’tula is published in Moscow twice a week and consists of eight pages. From 
1953 to 1972 a newspaper bearing the same name was published by the 
Ministry of Culture of the USSR and the Central Committee of Trade Union of 
Cultural Workers’. – The Great Soviet Encyclopedia, New York: Macmillan, 
c1981, vol 24, 338. 
78 TNA, BW78/3, ‘Fine Arts Committee: Report on Progress to the 73rd Meeting’, 
25 October, 1960, Fine Arts Advisory Committee: minutes and papers; 
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Which particular painting the writer of the review meant by ‘the 
monotonous splodges of the representatives of abstractionism’ is unknown, 
but what is sure is that he intended to express his disgust towards modern, 
abstract paintings. This kind of comment or criticism, to some extent, must 
have been expected, and possibly could have been avoided by the British side, 
if they had excluded at least the art works with ‘monotonous splodges’. In 
spite of previously having worried about the Soviet reaction so much, why, in 
the first place, did they decide to include them? 
On selecting the art work, there were indeed more aggressive, alternative 
opinions towards the Soviet authorities. Christopher Mayhew, Chairman of 
the SRC, insisted on 10 March 1959 that ‘We are anxious that the scope of the 
exhibition, in so far as it concerns the representation of living artists, should 
be as wide as possible. It is important in our view to give the Russians a 
comprehensive picture of what is being done in this country at the present 
time.’ He continues: ‘The D.G. also expressed … verbally his hope that the 
committee would not omit examples of modern art which might be difficult 
for the Russians to appreciate as he considered it was politically very 
important to stress the freedom of the artist in Great Britain to work in any 
style he pleased’.79 Whilst he was meticulously careful not to provoke with 
any paintings destined for the exhibition, he actually would not countenance 
the airbrushing of modern art altogether. Of course, the Director-General 
wanted to avoid deliberate provocation by content that might be objectionable, 
but wanted to show modern-art forms. He took modern art itself as a genre 
being expressive of liberalism, and wanted to use the existence of a thriving 
modern art scene in Britain as a political message, emphasising the liberal 
and tolerant characteristics of British society.  
                                                   
79 TNA, BW64/32, ‘Circular: ‘Exhibition of British Painting for USSR 1960) from 
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This kind of exhibition did seem to have an impact on people. Dmitrii 
Sarab’yanov, a Russian art historian reflected on the 1950s, around the time 
when he was teaching at the Institute of Art History, Moscow: 
 
[S]trangely enough, at least in the 1950s we did have some access to modern 
Western art, especially via exhibitions…. And access meant that they ‘knew 
more about Western Modernism than about the Russian avant-garde.... So you 
see that we did not live in a complete cultural vacuum...’.80 
 
There is no way to know whether he actually saw the British Painting 
exhibition in the year of 1960, yet all in all, this exhibition must have been a 
positive experience for Britain. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
British cultural diplomacy with the Soviet Union in the 1950s represented 
an amalgam of shifting opinions, expressed differently by members of the 
Foreign Office, British Council and the SRC, sometimes rather fragile and 
hesitant – but never selling British culture out completely. However, they 
were determined to ensure that representative contemporary British artwork 
was exhibited, bearing the underlying political message that the West 
permitted freedom of expression in all the liberal arts. It was hoped that such 
exhibitions would also provide a template for mutual understanding and 
trust that would allow better communication in political discourse. In so 
doing, the British managed to show-case modern or avant-garde art work 
which the Soviets officially dismissed in the Soviet Union for certain political 
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purposes, reaching an interested public. This paper does not determine who 
‘won’ the cultural battle, nor what influence this particular cultural 
manifestation had on the respective peoples. Assessing the impact of 
culture/art on political culture is problematic, and the fact that the arts 
section of any cultural organisation the world over today, struggles to win 
satisfactory subsidies or to justify its worth, indicates that its value as an 
arm of diplomacy is questionable. Such a conclusion still seems to suggest 
that politics (and economics and military matters) are always located at 
centre in international relations, whilst art/cultural matters are always 
shunted off to the periphery sphere. The Cold War period was no exception. 
Nevertheless, this paper tried to show the way in which the British Council 
successfully injected examples of ‘British culture/art’, both contemporary and 
historic into the Soviet Union in the 1950s and early 1960s, at a time when 
political relations were extremely stretched: the arts in this period were 
certainly useful for political purposes81 and arts might have potential to 
change political courses.  
                                                   
81 It is inferred that Britain’s prospect for itself started to change at around 1960, 
and from the late 1960s onwards, British external cultural policy was 
determined on the basis of a ‘commercial’ motivation, rather than political or 
military one. This was triggered by the government’s decision to retreat from 
all countries East of Suez, announced on 16 January 1968. The Duncan Report 
(1969) took this new decision on foreign and defence policy seriously, and 
concluded the Britain should ‘shift from politico-military to commercial and 
cultural representation’. This report strongly admonishes separation of politics 
and culture. – See ‘Report of the Review Committee on Overseas 
Representation 1968-69, Chairman: Sir Val Duncan [Duncan Report]’, 
Miscellaneous No. 24 (July 1969), Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty, 
Cmnd. 4107. 
  
 
The Conservative Party’s Opposition to the ‘Voluntarist’ 
Approach towards Trade Unions under the Macmillan 
and Home Administrations 1957-1964* 
 
Tae Joon Won** 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This article seeks to explore the gradual erosion of the Conservative 
Party’s post-war ‘voluntarist’ approach towards the trade unions during the 
administrations of Harold Macmillan (1957-1963) and Alec Douglas-Home 
(1963-1964). Before going into the main content in earnest, the article first 
looks at the change of attitude of the Conservative Party leadership from its 
anti-trade unionism stance during the interwar years to its trade 
unionism-friendly position in the aftermath of the massive defeat in the 1945 
General Election. The article then seeks to argue that from the 1960s, 
however, both the grassroots and the higher echelons of the Party slowly 
began to pressure the Party leadership into abandoning its stubborn 
adherence to the voluntarist approach. In order to support this argument, the 
article will explore various evidence including the speeches made at the 
subsequent Party Conferences, the Conservative grassroots’ ‘Contracting-Out’ 
campaign activities that aimed to inform trade unionists of their right to opt 
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out of having to pay the political levy which was automatically imposed on 
their wages, and the reaction of the Party faithful in regard to judicial 
decisions on the Electrical Trade Union elections dispute and the landmark 
Rookes v. Barnard case.  
 
Keywords: Conservative Party, Trade Unions, Voluntarism, Harold 
Macmillan, Alec Douglas-Home 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The post-World War II consensus among the Labour and Conservative 
Parties, frequently dubbed ‘Butskellism’ after the names of two leading 
moderates of the time (Richard Austen ‘Rab’ Butler of the Conservatives and 
Hugh Gaitskell of Labour), was in effect the successive Conservative 
administrations from 1951 to 1974 adhering to the economic agenda which 
was spelled out by the Labour government of Clement Attlee from 1945 to 
1948. Whilst there is still some debate among contemporary historians about 
whether such consensus ever actually existed at all, the ‘acceptance by the 
Conservatives of the nationalisation of major industries […] of full 
employment and the need for government economic action, if necessary, to 
realise it […] acceptance that the trade unions had an important role to play 
and should be consulted over economic policy […] acceptance of the welfare 
state [such as the creation and maintenance of the National Health Service]’1 
all serve to persuade the majority of the notion that British society, for the 
thirty years between the destruction of WWII and the economic crises of the 
1970s, was content for its successive governments to pursue a relatively 
                                                   
1 C. More, Britain in the Twentieth Century, Harlow 2007, 162. 
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similar pattern of economic management regardless of whichever party 
happened to be in power. 
The position of the Conservative grassroots supporters on such consensus 
during the 1950s and 1960s has been taken for granted by some historians as 
having been by and large submissive to the desire of the Conservative 
leadership. The mainly positive response of those rank-and-file party 
members present at the 1947 Conservative Party Conference in relation to 
Rab Butler’s trade union-friendly Industrial Charter is regarded in 
particular as evidence of the Conservative voters’ acquiescence to their party 
leaders’ determination in mirroring the Labour line on industrial relations.2 
However, as A. Lawrence Lowell, Robert McKenzie and others have analysed, 
the Conservative Party Conference in general was no more than proof that 
the extra-parliamentary party was ‘a transparent sham’3 and ‘primarily a 
demonstration of party solidarity and enthusiasm for its own leaders’,4  and 
therefore was nothing more than an event where ‘the rank and file can see 
and hear and even meet the Olympians of the Party’.5 With such a dubious 
reputation, therefore, utilising the atmosphere of a Party Conference as a 
gauge of the Party grassroots’ true feeling towards the leadership’s policy 
announcements has significant potential for inaccuracy and misjudgement. 
But subsequent emphasis on analysing the political willpower of the 
high-ranking decision-makers of the Conservative Party as a result of 
accepting the Party Conference attendees’ superficial approval as accurate 
has shifted the observer’s attention away from the voices of the traditional 
die-hard Conservative followers, who felt that the leadership had abandoned 
the free-market ideals of the Conservative Party in order to shore up and 
                                                   
2 Ibid., 163. 
3 A. L. Lowell, The Government of England, Vol. 1(, London 1908, 563. 
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5 I. Bulmer-Thomas, The Party System in Great Britain, London 1953, 196. 
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widen its support base to include those with whom the Conservatives had 
never been, and should never be, ideological bedfellows. 
In accordance with this author’s opinion that dissent by the Conservative 
Party loyalists over their own government’s stance on the post-war consensus 
should not be left unnoticed, this article seeks to observe the actions of 
Conservative Party supporters, both in Parliament and in the wider country, 
in their attempt to voice their opposition to the Macmillan and Home 
administrations’ mollification of the trade unions. In the course of this 
observation the article pays particular interest to the supporters’ 
participation in the ‘Contracting-Out’ campaign from the political levy and 
the lobbying of their government’s leaders to introduce at times when the 
political position of the trade unions were particularly vulnerable due to 
scandal or to judicial decisions.  
 
 
The Conservative Party and Trade Unionism  
during the Interwar Period 
 
It is historically appropriate to state that the story of the Conservative 
Party’s complex and tumultuous relationship with the trade unions in the 
20th century began with the eruption of a national disaster in the shape of the 
1926 General Strike. Called by the General Council of the Trades Union 
Congress (TUC) after coal mine owners demanded the extension of the 
seven-hour working day to eight and a reduction in wages for all miners in 
their employment starting from May 1926 and refused to budge on the issue 
despite the rejection by the Miners’ Federation and the subsequent 
intervention by the government, the strike lasted nine days from 4 May to 12 
May in which not only a million miners but also a million and a half 
transport workers, electrical workers, dockers, ironworkers, steelworkers and 
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other such industrial workers around the country were called out. Although 
the strike effectively failed after the TUC, who themselves ‘did not want the 
strike to go on indefinitely […] and began to look round for line of retreat’6 
decided to accept a government compromise (known as the Samuel 
Memorandum) that included wage cuts, the Conservative Party leadership 
realized that some sort of legislation to curb trade union power was needed in 
order to appease disgruntled Tory backbench MPs and their voters in the 
constituencies. After much wrangling about how such legislation should be 
shaped (for example, Harold Macmillan, the new MP for Stockton-on-Tees, 
agreed that a Bill was necessary ‘but also wanted to ensure that the 
conditions for a general strike should not reoccur’,7 while the more hawkish 
elements such as the Secretary of State of India, Viscount Birkenhead, 
wanted a Bill that comprehensively circumscribed a whole range of trade 
union activities), the Baldwin administration passed the 1927 Trades 
Disputes and Trade Unions Act. Under the Act, any strike that was started 
by workers in one industry but supported by workers in other related 
industry (otherwise known as ‘sympathy strikes’) was illegal. The Act also 
abolished ‘contracting out’ of the political levy and allowed trade union 
members to voluntarily ‘contract in’. Mass picketing and civil servants 
joining the TUC were also forbidden under the Act. As a result of these 
measures, coupled with mass unemployment following the economic 
depression, union membership plummeted to less than 4.5 million by 1933 
from a peak of 8 million in 1920,8 and as a result the 1930s was a decade of 
relatively few industrial disputes. 
However, the trade unions would soon find their influence and importance 
                                                   
6  T. Lloyd, Empire, Welfare State, Europe: History of the United Kingdom 
1906-2001, 5th edn., Oxford 2002, 128. 
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in British society restored and expanded with the outbreak of World War II. 
Despite the passage of the 1927 Act, ‘most Conservatives had come to accept 
that trade unions were a permanent and important feature in industrial life 
in Britain’9 by the 1930s, and with the declaration of war in September 1939 
the government had to rely upon the trade unions in order to increase the 
war effort as much as possible. Neville Chamberlain was admittedly less 
than enthusiastic about appeasing trade union leaders; when asked by the 
TUC to consider amending the 1927 Act in exchange for supporting the 
government’s war effort, Chamberlain replied that ‘it depended on the 
behaviour of the unions during the war’.10 But Winston Churchill, when 
asked to form an administration in May 1940 after Chamberlain’s 
resignation, appointed the leader of the TUC General Council, Ernest Bevin, 
as Minister of Labour and National Service. Bevin concentrated his efforts in 
bringing union leadership into the decision-making process; he established a 
Joint Consultative Committee comprised of seven employers and seven trade 
union leaders and put forward various proposals for their advice. In spite of 
the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act of May 1940, which authorized the 
government to ‘issue regulations making provisions for requiring persons to 
place themselves, their services, and their property at the disposal of [the 
government], as appears to [the government] to be necessary or expedient for 
securing the public safety, the defence of the realm, the maintenance of public 
order and the efficient prosecution of any war’,11 Bevin would only authorize 
orders under the Act which, in his judgment, would not compromise the 
welfare of labourers. Also, despite the issue of Order 1305 which banned 
strikes and lockouts, there were few prosecutions due to the Labour 
                                                   
9 Ibid., 34 
10 H. Pelling, A History of British Trade Unionism, 2nd edn. Basingstoke 1972, 
215. 
11  Cited in C. Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship – Crisis Government in 
Modern Democracies, Princeton 1948, 187-188. 
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Minister’s determination to sustain this new spirit of cooperation between 
government, employers and workers. For instances of industrial disputes, the 
government set up a National Arbitration Tribunal Compulsory for the 
Minister of Labour to refer cases to, rather than sending the striking workers 
to prison under the Order. All in all, the exceptional circumstances of being in 
a state of war and having a prominent trade unionist oversee the 
government’s labour policy enabled trade union officials to participate 
heavily in the government’s policy-making process at every level. By the end 
of the war, trade unions were regarded by the both the politicians and the 
public of having done a great service for the nation, and trade union 
membership had surpassed 1920 levels; the total number of trade union 
membership rose from 6,053,000 in 1938 to 7,803,000 in 1945. 12  As a 
consequence, the Conservative Party now needed to ‘adopt a much more 
positive attitude and approach towards the unions’.13  
 
 
The Conservative Party and Trade Unions after  
1945 – The ‘Voluntarist’ Approach 
 
The necessity for a more conciliatory, or ‘voluntarist’, approach towards the 
trade unions was cemented by the crushing defeat of the Conservatives in the 
1945 general election. This completely unexpected disaster for the Party 
brought the leadership into a state of deep soul-searching and it soon led to a 
formal reappraisal of its trade union and industrial policies, thereby hoping 
to catch floating voters by appealing to them via constructive policies. Under 
the guidance of Rab Butler, the Chair of the Party’s newly-created, 
nine-member Industrial Policy Committee, the Tories launched the 
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‘Industrial Charter’ in May 1947. Eager to ‘counter the charge and the fear 
that [the Conservatives] were the party of industrial go-as-you-please and 
devil-take-the hindmost, that full employment and the Welfare State were 
not safe in [Conservative] hands’,14 the Industrial Charter ‘accepted much 
that had developed in industrial and employment policy since 1940’15 and 
emphasised the Party’s commitment to cooperating with the trade unions. It 
argued that, since trade unions could only be effective and wholly 
representative with a large and active membership, trade unions should 
endeavour to register all workers as members, but it also stressed that 
joining a trade union should be a voluntary choice made by the individual 
worker and by no one else. In the ‘Workers’ Charter’, the final section of the 
Industrial Charter, the Party made it clear that it no longer believed that 
there were ‘two sides’ of industry and emphasised that everyone participating 
in industry, having the same interests of generating greater profits and being 
more efficient, needed to work more closely together. The Workers’ Charter 
also stressed that ‘industry should provide to those engaged to it security of 
employment, incentive to do the job well and to get a better one, and status as 
an individual’,16 thereby aiming to reduce the hostility the workers might 
harbour towards their employers in the hope of making industrial relations 
more harmonious. The Charter, however, made it clear that the Conservative 
Party leadership did not regard government legislation as a desirable method 
of cementing good industrial relations: instead, it argued that the 
government’s role was only to encourage management and workers to 
develop a trusting working relationship. In order to ‘bring back into 
large-scale industry the personal contact and interest at present found most 
strongly in the small firm just as [the Conservatives] make general among 
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small firms that higher standard of welfare service which has been the 
special contribution of large firms’, 17  the Charter suggested the 
reintroduction of the joint consultation production committees that had been 
a great success during the war. This theme was echoed in The Right Road for 
Britain, a 1949 policy pamphlet which, in its ‘commitment to de-centred 
government […] against the encroaching might of the State’,18 declared that 
the issues facing British industry were not problems to be solved by 
government-led legislation but by the improvement of personal relations 
between management and the workers. 
Such ‘human relations’ perspective in industrial relations ‘constituted the 
orthodoxy amongst senior Conservatives’ during the 1950s. 19   Upon 
returning to power in the 1951 General Election, Winston Churchill 
appointed Walter Monckton as Minister of Labour. Monckton was seen as a 
strong believer in the ‘conciliatory’ approach to industrial relations, and this 
could not have been made more clear than when he spoke at the 1953 annual 
Industrial Welfare Society dinner, during which he argued for the 
employer-employee relationship to ‘be gradually developed into something 
nearer membership of a working team’ which ‘will certainly not be brought 
about by Government or employers or workpeople alone. It calls for a greater 
measure of give and take, of working together, than we in this country have 
so far been able to achieve in our structure. Certainly we cannot afford to look 
backward to outworn methods of discipline or to practices that had as their 
objective the furtherance of sectional interests’.20 Monckton’s successor Iain 
Macleod, who was appointed in 1955 by the new Prime Minister, Anthony 
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Eden, was equally sympathetic to the human relations approach and 
diligently toed the government line of opposing trade union legislation. At the 
Party’s 1956 Annual Conference in Llandudno, Macleod stated that he did 
not believe the notion that introducing compulsory strike ballots would 
reduce strikes overall: he rejected the conventional idea that workers were 
less militant than their union leaders by way of his ‘experience’ as Labour 
Minister, and presented his ‘honest belief ’ that ‘if every single cause of 
friction […] could be made the subject of a call for a pre-strike ballot, the 
numbers of strikes would increase’.21  Six months later, when answering a 
question in the House of Commons on plans to introduce legislation to enforce 
registration of restrictive practices in trade unions, Macleod made it clear 
that while he believed that there were ‘restrictions on both sides of industry’, 
he ‘[did] not think […] that registration would be a practical proposition’ and 
‘[did] not believe that these kinds of problems can be solved by legislation’.22  
However, by the latter half of the 1950s Britain was facing rising inflation 
(of a rate that was ‘higher on average than that ruling in the rest of the 
world’)23 brought on by unreasonable increases in pay. The Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Harold Macmillan, was forced to produce an emergency budget in 
1955 which cut government spending, restricted hire purchase and raised 
rates on distributive profits tax and purchase tax. The Eden administration 
felt that there was a need to make the trade union membership understand 
that excessive pay rises were detrimental to the British economy, and to that 
end the government published a White Paper in March 1956 entitled The 
Economic Implications of Full Employment, which argued for restraint in pay 
increase demands in order to prevent rising inflation and the reduction of 
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exports. In addition the government, now with Macmillan as Prime Minister, 
set up the Council on Prices, Productivity and Incomes (known as the Cohen 
Council after its chairman) in August 1957 ‘having regard to the desirability 
of full employment and increasing standards of life based on expanding 
production reasonable stability of prices, to keep under review changes in 
prices, productivity and the level of incomes (including wages, salaries and 
profits) and to report thereon from time to time’.24 However, despite such 
attempts by the government to change the trade unions’ attitude towards 
income hikes, the administration still refused to pass any legislation curbing 
trade union power or setting up a formal wage policy, and this was owed in no 
small part to the political inclinations of the new Prime Minister. 
  
 
The Macmillan Administration and Trade Union Reform 
 
   Harold Macmillan was a committed One Nation Conservative who, by 
way of his experiences as an MP in the depressed Stockton constituency in 
the 1930s, cared deeply about the welfare of the lower classes. Indeed, 
Clement Attlee privately described him as ‘the most radical man I’ve known 
in politics […] He was a real left-wing radical in his social, human and 
economic thinking’.25 Such political philosophy focused the Prime Minister’s 
mind on reducing unemployment, and this led to his opposing deflationary 
measures (which would have meant cuts in government spending), which 
was the Treasury’s official advice in the attempt to improve Britain’s 
deteriorating economy. Instead, he introduced two controversial methods to 
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bring about a permanent wages policy which would solve the biggest problem 
of salaries being increased faster than the rate of growth in manufacturing 
output; the implementation of the ‘pay pause’ in 1961 and the creation of the 
National Economic Development Council (NEDC) in 1962. The NEDC, or 
Neddy as it was known collectively with the National Economic Development 
Office (NEDO), was a corporatist forum which was set up with members from 
‘trade unions, management and government, who would participate in 
central planning advice’26 with the objective of ‘creat[ing] a plan which would 
indicate a target growth rate [of around 4 per cent] for the British economy 
agreeable to the three partners’: 27  Macmillan’s opinion was that 
incorporating trade unions into the economic policy-making process via the 
NEDC would enable them to understand the economic situation and 
therefore make it easier for the government to persuade them to accept lower 
wage settlement (via an incomes policy set by the government) while 
increasing manufacturing output; in Macmillan’s own words, the 
involvement of the TUC in the NEDC ‘would at least lead them to greater 
understanding of the real problems with which this nation was confronted’.28 
Macmillan was firm in his determination to push through wage control, 
saying that the government was ‘determined to keep Government 
expenditure under control, but [were] equally determined to follow through 
the policy of wage and income restraint as a basis for future growth’.29 
However, there was no denying that a significant proportion the 
Conservative Party faithful as well as a considerable number of Tory MPs 
was deeply concerned about the power of the trade union movement as 
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Britain entered the 1960s. A good example of this was the Party’s 1961 
Annual Conference, which saw the introduction of a motion that was brought 
forward by a Mr. T. Wray, which proposed that the conference ‘would welcome 
an inquiry by H.M. Government into the affairs of trade unions, and is of the 
view that the nation would support H.M. Government if subsequently they 
decided to introduce reforming legislation’ under the premise that legislation 
should ‘confine the legal privileges of trade unions to those unions registered 
with an official arbitrator’ and that the Minister of Labour should ‘refuse 
registration to those unions which failed to protect the rights of their 
members, and could have the power to strike off those unions which failed 
most miserably to end restrictive practices’.30 The motion was defeated after 
the strong intervention of the Minister concerned, John Hare, who reiterated 
the government’s position that passing Acts of Parliament in order to curb 
illegal trade union strikes would be counterproductive, and that it could only 
be done by ‘persuasion and by constant appeals to common sense and 
common interest’ because the government’s position was that ‘the future of 
the unions and management was as partners of the Government in a new, 
responsible, imaginative approach to the challenge that faced British 
industry’. 31  Despite such insistence by the government on harmonious 
relations between management and the trade unions, however, the issue 
refused to disappear. In late 1961, the Conservative MP for Tynemouth, 
Dame Irene Ward, accused the Chancellor of the Exchequer and ex officio 
Chair of the NEDC, Selwyn Lloyd, of ‘think[ing] that this country consists 
only of the T.U.C. and the employers' organisations’ and ‘not [being] aware 
that there are many hundreds of thousands of people who are not associated 
with either’ and challenged him to ‘pay more attention to a lot of other people 
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who are just as interested as are these bodies’.32 Earlier, the Tory MP for 
Harrow West, John Page, had deplored the use of the term ‘both sides of 
industry’ when describing the formation of the NEDC, stating that it was 
‘grossly inaccurate and wholly misleading to give the impression that there 
are two sides of industry. There are six or seven sides, or six or seven parts, 
and industry is not complete unless all those parts are there’.33 
The most important issue surrounding the debate of industrial relations at 
the time was the problem of the significant number of Conservative trade 
unionists and their votes. The concern that the Conservative Party had 
towards this seemingly illogical grouping was evident: the Conservative 
Central Office’s Industrial Department’s opinion was that ‘[n]o-one can doubt 
the decisive impact of trade unionists on the Party’s vote. Hugh Gaitskell has 
said that 3 out of 10 trade unionists and 4 out of their wives vote Tory’.34 
Consequently, the question that needed to be addressed most urgently in 
order to formulate a consistent and coherent Conservative Party policy 
towards trade unionism was naturally why many trade unionists voted Tory 
in the first place. The government’s position on this dilemma, of which the 
prime proponent was Iain Macleod (now Party Chairman), was spelled out in 
a speech to the Conservative Trade Union Conference in March 1963 which 
stated that ‘because these millions [of trade unionists] vote Tory, no Tory 
Government could ever embark on a course of legislation or of any action that 
was deeply or profoundly abhorrent to trade unions as a whole’.35 In short, 
while the Conservative government did value and appreciate the importance 
of the existence (and the votes) of the Conservative-supporting trade 
unionists, it was only because the Party needed them ‘to act as trained 
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gossipers in their factories and works, so that they are constantly spreading 
Conservative ideas’. 36  There was little effort on the part of the Party 
leadership to understand the actual reasons the unionists voted Tory instead 
of Labour, and this in part led to the misunderstanding that doing something 
‘abhorrent’ to Labour-supporting trade unionists would also be completely 
unacceptable to Conservative-supporting trade unionists. The government 
took a benign and fatherly but otherwise indifferent and patronising attitude 
towards this lower-class franchise, preferring to lump all trade unionists 
together as one and the same regardless of voting intentions and to treat 
them as such and to be wary of their power for the same reasons. This rather 
unsympathetic point of view was clearly shown by Quintin Hailsham when 
he described his trade unionists in a Party Consultative Committee paper as 
‘inarticulate and somewhat miserable, ground down as they are between the 
upper millstone of Socialist oppression and the nether millstone of middle 
class hostility to the Unions’. 37  Such unenthusiastic and uninterested 
attitude taken by the government was not lost on the wider Conservative 
electorate: party members were now ‘questioning the wisdom of keeping 
[Conservative] trade unionists in a special hot-house of their own […] We’ll 
never really get anywhere so long as we insist on treating them as if they 
were Africans or something’.38  
However, the Conservative Party leadership’s muddled policy on trade 
unions had actually exasperated a rising number of Conservative trade 
unionists who themselves started to demand a certain degree of reform of 
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trade union practices, as was evident in the wrangle over how best to proceed 
with educating trade union members over their legal rights. In January 1946 
the Attlee Government had repealed the 1927 Trades Disputes and Trade 
Unions Act and as such the ‘contracting-in’ aspect to the political levy was 
once again replaced with ‘contracting out’ which meant that trade unionists 
would no longer be automatically opted out of paying the political levy as 
they had been for the previous twenty years. In response to the change in 
legislation, the Conservative Party started an all-out ‘Contracting-Out’ 
campaign across the country ‘to bring to the notice of fellow Trade Unionists 
their rights under the law, advise them to get forms [allowing the applicant to 
be exempt paying the political levy] from the Trade Union branch secretaries 
and if these are not forthcoming council members should be in a position to 
supply’. 39  The campaign placed particular emphasis on party workers 
talking to the unionists concerned on a one-to-one basis since ‘[e]xperience 
teaches us that the personal talk, the simple verbal explanation is a hundred 
per cent more effective than is the most vigorous “written” publicity 
campaign’.40  However, this by no means meant that the campaign was less 
committed to its distribution of printed materials. Hundreds of thousands of 
leaflets, drawn up and edited afresh every year, were distributed to the 
Conservative Trade Unionists Councils across the country to be given out in 
the streets: for example, the leaflet for 1963 titled A Tidy Sum, ‘draws 
attention to the huge sums being contributed this year to the funds of the 
Labour Party. As a lead in to the campaign, a very large number of the leaflet 
“Trade Unions and the Political Levy” have been distributed during the past 
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three months’.41 Along with the leaflets, simple but imposing posters were 
produced in order to catch the eye of anyone passing by them. Also, in order 
to appeal to the wider audience, the Conservative Party also took to writing 
‘Letters to the Editors’ of major national, as well as local, newspapers. The 
best example of this was a letter published in November 1962 in the name of 
Ray Mawby, Conservative MP for Totnes (and the first President of the 
Conservative Trade Unionists’ National Advisory Committee), which stated 
that ‘[o]ver one million trade unionists have already realised [that they can 
contract out of paying the political levy] themselves, have exercised their 
legal rights and so do not contribute through their unions to the Labour 
Party funds. It is surely important, therefore, that all trade unionists at 
present paying political levy should seriously consider contracting out in the 
interests of greater unity throughout the trade union movement’.42 Party 
workers strongly believed that ‘the best form of propaganda is that of having 
letters published in the Press. The more we have published the better’.43 
The ‘Contracting-Out’ campaign became more vocal after the Conservatives 
regained power in the early 1950s and continued in office until 1964 because 
in spite of their return to government, the Conservative administrations did 
not seem all that keen to re-introduce ‘contracting in’. This led many 
Conservative trade unionists to strongly prod the government into bringing 
back the automatic opt-out of paying the political levy. A motion proposed at 
the annual Conservative Trade Union National Advisory Committee 
(TUNAC) meeting in 1962 was that ‘this conference is of the opinion that 
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contracting in to the political levy should be re-introduced’,44 while the year 
after another motion stated that ‘instead of the present “contracting out” 
system it should be changed to “contracting in”, as previously operating prior 
to the alteration in the law by the Labour Government in the 1947 Act’.45 Of 
course, not every Conservative trade unionist was in favour of this course of 
action: for example, in the 1961 annual TUNAC meeting, a proposed motion 
was of the opinion that ‘for the present the policy of contracting out of the 
political levy should be retained’.46 But this was not so much because they 
agreed with the principle of contracting-out as because Conservative Party 
workers also had the opportunities to talk to their target audience of the 
‘evils’ of socialism in general during the course of the ‘Contracting-Out’ 
campaign. Their strong belief in the merits of such opportunities is reflected 
in a boast made by an individual which was that ‘[t]he anti-Socialist vote in 
recent by-elections has been in the ratio of 2 to 1, a fact which accounts for 
the intensive Publicity Campaign carried by the Party’. 47  Despite the 
divisions, the demand by Conservative trade unionists for the government to 
reverse the previous Labour administration’s policy on the political levy had 
become too significant to ignore, as was evident when the Nuneaton 
Divisional Council of Trade Unionists were forced to write to TUNAC 
warning that ‘there is a growing demand among Conservative Trade 
Unionists for the reintroduction of ‘Contracting-In’, which could well be 
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hiding a reluctance on the part of its supporters to continue with the 
campaign to encourage trade unionists to ‘contract-out’ […] [W]e have this 
division in our midst which threatens to nullify all the gains so far made […] 
[T]his council is of the opinion that there is urgent need for a clear statement 
of intentions by the Conservative Parliamentary Party in the matter ’.48 In 
short, the Conservative trade unionists, rankled by the government’s 
continued ambivalence, were now themselves pressing the administration 
towards taking a firm, unilateral line on the issue of trade union reform by 
making maximum use of specific related polices, such as the political levy.  
Such pressures from the bottom end of the Conservative Party for the 
government to show a stronger commitment to legislation concerning the 
reform of trade union practices resulted in the division of the Party 
leadership over whether to give the benefit of the doubt to the trade union 
bodies concerning their own ability to correct themselves, a fact that was 
made evident in the case of the Electrical Trades Union (ETU) in 1961. In 
1960, the ETU was a radical left-wing organisation where nine of the 
fourteen executive officers were members of the Communist Party of Great 
Britain: the President, Frank Foulkes, his General Secretary, Frank Haxell, 
as well as the Assistant General Secretary, Bob McLennan, were all 
prominent Communists. In December 1959, an election was held in the ETU 
to choose a new General Secretary, with Frank Haxell running for re-election. 
His most fierce rival was John Byrne, an anti-Communist Scottish area 
official. Haxell was declared the winner of the closely-run election in 
February 1960, but not before votes in 109 branches were disqualified. It was 
clear that the Communist leadership had rigged the election to help Haxell 
keep his job, and Byrne (together with another non-Communist executive 
member, Frank Chapple) went to the High Court in April 1961 to contest the 
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election result and to expose the fraud that Communists had perpetrated. In 
June of the same year, the High Court found that the election was indeed 
rigged and ruled that Byrne was the valid winner of the December 1959 vote. 
Consequently, the TUC demanded that the ETU immediately take steps to 
debar its current office-holders for five years, and upon the ETU leadership’s 
refusal to do so the ETU was expelled from the TUC and later from the 
Labour Party. 
The Macmillan government followed the ETU case with great interest, and 
some within the administration naturally hoped to use the incident as an 
impetus for trade union reform: in particular, the Attorney General, Reginald 
Manningham-Buller, thought that ‘[i]f we are ever to do anything about Trade 
Unions, there could hardly be a better opportunity than at the end of this 
outcome’.49 The problem was, as always, how to set about doing anything. 
Incidentally, despite the argument of Kenneth O. Morgan and others that the 
Minister of Labour and government point-man on this issue, John Hare, 
found it easy to argue that trade unions could be contained without 
‘inflammatory’ measures such as government legislation,50 Hare was, as 
Peter Dorey argues, ‘initially inclined towards legislative action’51  to be 
passed in order to ensure voting procedures within trade union elections 
would never again be subject to rigging and other illegal activities. Time and 
time again Hare argued that he was ‘by no means convinced that the action 
which the T.U.C. have taken, or are willing and able to take, is a satisfactory 
answer to the problem of rigging of trade union elections’52 and that it was 
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his ‘personal opinion that there is a gap in the law about trade union elections 
which needs to be filled’.53 Many of the Conservative backbench MPs were 
supportive of this hard-line stance: Hare warned his Cabinet colleagues that 
‘our own backbenchers are pressing for Government action on ballot-rigging. 
Indeed I have been warned that unless there is reference to this subject in 
The Queen’s Speech [in November 1961] we may expect a hostile 
amendment’.54 In fact, discontent among the Tory backbenchers concerning 
trade union voting procedures was brewing even before the ETU scandal 
broke: the Conservative MP for Ilford North, Tom Iremonger, wanted to ‘bring 
in a Ten-Minute Rule Bill to regulate the voting rules of Trade Unions and, 
according to [the MP for Hereford] David Gibson-Watt, “[was] not going to let 
this drop”’ even before the ETU election was held.55 Nor was this issue a 
concern purely for the Conservative Party: Hartley Shawcross, a former 
Labour MP for St. Helens who was recently ennobled as a crossbench life peer, 
wrote to Harold Macmillan suggesting that his newly-formed law reform 
organisation, JUSTICE, ‘examine the extent to which the law should provide, 
or the courts protect, the rights of individuals including their right to a 
livelihood as they are affected by membership conditions, powers of expulsion, 
voting systems and other actions of unincorporated association’. 56  Such 
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pressure from all sides of the political spectrum rendered Macmillan to 
instruct Manningham-Buller, in the latter’s role as Attorney General, to look 
into possible forms of legislation which would be acceptable to both 
pro-reform hawks and trade union leaders. Manningham-Buller’s 
recommendations were that the ‘Registrar of Friendly Societies should be 
empowered to examine the election rules of trade unions so as to reveal 
drafting defects, unintelligibility and unworkability and possible omissions in 
the election rules. These would then be brought to the attention of the trade 
union concerned for correction’.57 This idea was largely in tune with that 
suggested by the Economist, which hammered the point home by declaring 
that ‘Mr. Hare should regard it as his duty to introduce such legislation in the 
next Session of Parliament’.58 
Despite pressure from both the Minister responsible and a disgruntled set 
of MPs for government reform, however, Hare’s initial position was by no 
means shared by all in the government. There was still a significant voice 
within the administration which called for the government’s complete 
non-interference in trade union reform. A memorandum written for 
Macmillan argued passionately that ‘[i]f the Government took some such line 
as an act of faith in the essential soundness of the T.U. movement it would be 
enormously appreciated by responsible T.U. opinion. The Government’s hand 
would be strengthened in its approaches to the T.U. movement in countless 
ways […] It is sound “Tory democracy” and it is eminently a palatable 
doctrine for conservative trade unionists”.59 The Attorney-General’s proposal 
concerning a new role for the Registrar of Friendly Societies was also met 
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with some opposition: some thought the proposal had ‘no teeth’ because the 
‘union could ignore any suggestions made by the Registrar and this might 
lead to pressure for further action to impose the rules on a recalcitrant trade 
union’.60 To add to this, such sympathetic views held by some in the Party 
willing to give the trade union leadership the benefit of the doubt were 
unsurprisingly seized upon by the trade unions themselves. In an exchange of 
letters with John Hare, George Woodcock, the General Secretary of the TUC, 
argued that the ‘E.T.U. case was quite exceptional and not too be reckoned as 
in any way typical of the way in which trade union elections generally are 
conducted […] it would not be right to consider a problem of trade union 
elections in the light of one incident. In any case the position in the E.T.U. 
was, as I am sure you will agree, adequately dealt with […] The T.U.C. has 
authority to deal with individual unions whose conduct either in respect of 
elections or in other respects is detrimental to the interests of the Trade 
Union Movement […] we see no justification and therefore no need for any 
additional or special measures directed towards trade union elections’.61 
Some in the Ministry of Labour felt that Woodcock’s letter was a ‘pretty 
unsatisfactory reply to the Minister’s letters […] It is very defensive. It does 
not suggest a new outlook or a new and more vigorous determination to 
prevent abuses in the conduct of trade union elections. It gives the general 
impression of arguing that everything is under control in the trade unions 
and even cited the outcome of the ETU case as evidence of this’.62 But the 
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opposition from within the Party, the Ministry of Labour and the trade unions 
themselves was enough to undermine Hare’s initial determination to take a 
hard stance against the trade unions by introducing legislation. Shouted 
down by colleagues in government and in the Party, Hare had no choice but to 
revert to the Tories’ time-old position of voluntarism and non-confrontation 
with the unions, forcing him to argue that ‘[l]egislation would […] end the 
prospect of further progress [and] cause a head-on collision with the trade 
union movement. It might lead them to withhold their co-operation over the 
whole field of relation with the government’.63  It was an embarrassing 
turnaround for the Minister who had tried and failed to break away from the 
conventional Tory thinking on dealing with trade unions. Indeed, Joseph 
Godber, Hare’s successor as Minister of Labour, later deplored this ‘general 
line of avoiding sharp controversy with the trade union movement [which 
had] dominated our policy in greater or lesser degree in this field over 
thirteen years in office’ as having ‘incurred the lively dissatisfaction of the 
right wing of our Party […] [A] feeling that we had not faced up sufficiently to 
the built-up inertia of trade union practices, which were hampering our 
economic development, has become much more widespread’.64 
In short, despite the ultimate failure by the Macmillan administration to 
drop the Tory Party’s traditional approach to trade union affairs, by the early 
1960s there were now clear divisions among leading government figures over 
whether the once iron-cast principle of voluntarism was still feasible. There 
was indeed scope for hope that another major political jolt on the matter 
could push the government to completely reassess its previous position and 
take a more assertive stance in trade union reform.     
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The Home Administration and Rookes v. Barnard 
 
Notwithstanding the failure to capitalise on the ETU affair, the 
Conservative administration tried to keep up the pretence of exerting 
pressure on the trade unions in order to appease disappointed Tory 
hardliners, with Hare warning the unions that it was ‘essential that [the 
TUC’s decision to embark on a fundamental review of its purposes and 
structure] should lead to effective reform […] Should it fail to do so, we shall 
be confronted with a very serious situation. We should not under-estimate 
the strength of feeling up and down the country there is on all this’.65 
However, the Conservative Party’s long-awaited excuse to deal with trade 
union reform came about in January 1964, when the House of Lords ruled on 
a legal action brought by a draughtsman named Douglas Rookes. Rookes, an 
employee of the British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC), was also a 
member of the Association of Engineering and Shipbuilding Draughtsmen 
(AESD) as was required by the ‘closed shop’ agreement between BOAC and 
AESD. However, Rookes had disagreements with the branch secretary and 
subsequently resigned from the union in 1955 but continued in his job at 
BOAC. The union did not want to set a precedent of having a non-member 
employed at the company and tried to get Rookes to rejoin. When Rookes 
refused, the AESD, threatening strike action, forced BOAC to first suspend 
Rookes from his duties and then to dismiss him. Since BOAC ‘neither broke 
their contract with [Rookes] nor committed any tort against him’,66 Rookes 
sued two members and an official of AESD on the grounds that AESD had 
wrongly forced BOAC to dismiss him. In the first instance, with Mr. Justice 
Sachs presiding, Rookes won his case and was awarded £7,500 in damages. 
But the Court of Appeal overturned the ruling by finding that the defendants 
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had not committed any tort against Rookes and that even if they had, they 
were protected from any liability under the 1906 Trade Disputes Act because 
their actions were done in furtherance of a trade dispute. However, that 
ruling was again overturned in the Lords where it was stated that the 
defendants were not protected by the 1906 Act because it was unlawful 
intimidation to 'to use a threat to break their contracts with their employer 
as a weapon to make him do something which he was legally entitled to do 
but which they knew would cause loss to the plaintiff ’.67 The Lords decided 
that Rookes was indeed entitled to damages, and ordered a new trial to 
decide the appropriate amount. 
The Rookes v. Barnard finding caused huge interest within the Alec 
Douglas-Home administration and the Conservative Party as a whole: it was 
the most significant opportunity in decades for the Party to unite in 
discussing trade union reform in depth and in earnest. The administration 
had already set up a Committee on Trade Unions and the Law, made up of 
officials mainly from the Ministry of Labour, the Home Office and the Lord 
Chancellor’s Office, with the brief of ‘consider[ing] the law relating to trade 
unions and employers’ associations, and to report what changes, if any, are 
desirable’.68 Whilst the initial Report of the Committee argued against an 
immediate wholesale change in trade union legislation policy and asked that 
‘consideration be given to legislation under which an employer would have to 
be able to justify a dismissal and an employee would have a right of appeal to 
an independent tribunal against unjustifiable dismissal’, it nevertheless also 
recommended that ‘[i]f the danger of irregularities [in trade union elections] 
again become serious, the government should urge the T.U.C. to take 
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effective action and, in the absence of this, should consider legislation’.69 It 
also recommended a more active involvement of the state in trade union 
affairs by suggesting that ‘registered unions with more than 500 members or 
£5,000 in assets might be required to employ professional auditors’, that 
‘registered unions with superannuation funds might be required to have the 
funds valued every five years, and new schemes might be certifiable by an 
actuary’, that ‘it might be provided that no alteration of rules of a registered 
union is to be valid until registered’, that ‘the law might require that 
registered union’s rules should set out the statutory right of members to be 
sent a copy of the rules for more 1 s. on request, to have a copy of the annual 
return to the Registrar [of Friendly Societies] free on request, and, if the 
union provides death benefit, to nominate a person to whom the benefit is to 
be paid’, and that the Registrar ‘might be given power […] to withdraw a 
certificate [that the Registrar, under the 1913 Trade Union Act, can issue to 
an unregistered trade union to make it a registered one] on his own initiative 
and to require a union periodically to give evidence that a certificate is still 
justified’.70 The Report concluded that the ‘need for [trade union] reform is 
becoming more and more urgent and if the T.U.C. does not carry it out, and 
cannot be persuaded to, then in the long run the more drastic remedy of 
legislation, and with it greater oversight of trade union affairs by the State, 
may become inevitable’.71 The Committee was later asked to report back to 
the government on the implications of the Rookes v. Barnard ruling, and it 
presented a Supplementary Report arguing that while the Lords’ decision did 
‘not appear to make legislation urgently necessary’, it was ‘doubtful whether 
[leaving the law as it is] would be satisfactory or perhaps even practicable’ 
and it would ‘not seem justified’ to amend the law in order to reverse the 
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effect of the decision since it gave ‘a jolt to those who thought that all strikes 
however irresponsible were beyond the reach of the law’.72 Backbench Tory 
MPs now had no hesitation in immediately taking up the crusade for trade 
union reform: in a meeting of the 1922 Committee on the evening of 13 
February, several speakers ‘suggested that the recent decision of the House of 
Lords in Rookes v. Barnard clearly demonstrated that the Trade Disputes Act, 
1906, was outdated’ and a group of around 30 to 40 MPs tabled a motion 
urging the government ‘to set up a Royal Commission to study the law and 
practice relating to trade unions’.73     
Conservatives in the wider country were also voicing their strong desire for 
trade union reform. In February 1964, a pressure group called the Freedom 
Group commissioned a Gallup Poll on trade union reform to be published in 
the Daily Mail.74 On the question of whether the respondents ‘approved or 
disapproved if the Government were to set up a Royal Commission to suggest 
new laws on problems affecting the trade unions’, 50% of the respondents 
approved (with 67% of Conservatives and 48% of trade unionists approving). 
On the question of whether the respondent would be more inclined to vote 
Conservative ‘if the Conservative Party included in their General Election 
programme the setting up of a Royal Commission to deal with union 
problems’, 17% of the respondents replied in the affirmative (with 33% of 
Conservative voters and 23% of trade unionists being more inclined), while 
only 5% of the respondents replied in the negative (with 1% of Conservative 
voters and 6% of trade unionists being less inclined). The poll concluded that 
all sections of society were in favour of trade union reform, and despite 
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arguments by the Ministry of Labour civil servants that the questions were 
somewhat ‘loaded’ and therefore could not be regarded as fully reflecting the 
public opinion,75 the findings were nevertheless seized upon by the Chief 
Whip, Martin Redmayne, who wrote to Home arguing that he had ‘said on 
several occasions that a step in this direction, if it were deemed possible, 
would be very popular with Conservatives both in the House and in the 
country. This Poll would seem to confirm that view’.76 Redmayne also wrote 
to the Minister of Labour, Joseph Godber, saying that the Chief Whip was 
‘not trying to pressurise you, but you will agree that the Poll is interesting’.77 
Redmayne was not the only Cabinet heavyweight to lend his weight behind 
trade union reform. Another opinion of the time that is worth noting was that 
of Rab Butler. Whatever the Foreign Secretary’s opinion was before, there is 
no doubt of his belief on the matter as the government went into 1964. In a 
letter to the Prime Minister, after claiming that the Rookes v. Barnard ruling 
presented ‘a opportunity which we have not had for more than ten years and 
which it would be a very great pity to miss’, Butler argued that it had ‘been 
clear for a very long time indeed that the law relating to trade unions […] 
needs to be comprehensively reviewed and probably fairly extensively revised 
both in matters of detail (e.g. arrangements for the auditing of union 
accounts) and in matters of principles (e.g. the extent of corporate 
responsibility, relationship with the individual, the judicial nature of strikes, 
etc.)’ and suggested the setting up of ‘a Royal Commission with broad terms 
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of reference to review the whole body of law relating to trade unions and to 
recommend how it could be brought to date and adapted to the present 
position of trade unions in our society’.78 With such pressure from all sides of 
the Party membership, it was decided on 3 March 1964 at a meeting between 
Douglas-Home, Godber and Redmayne that such a Royal Commission would 
indeed be set up if the Conservatives were returned to power in the general 
election.79 However, in a Cabinet meeting on 17 March, it was argued that ‘it 
would be inadvisable at this stage to purport to give any precise indication of 
the ground to be covered in the inquiry’80 and such an ambiguous statement 
did little to dampen the dissatisfaction felt by the wider Party on the matter. 
But, as fate would have it, the Conservatives would go on to lose the October 
general election and a Royal Commission would be set up, ironically, under a 
Labour administration instead. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The lengthy preservation of the post-war consensual agreement among 
the upper echelons of the main political parties has led many observers to 
disregard the discontent concerning such consensus amongst the 
Parliamentary members as well as the grassroots membership of the 
Conservative Party throughout the late 1950s and 1960s. But this article has 
demonstrated that whilst post-war Conservative Prime Ministers such as 
Winston Churchill, Harold Macmillan and Alec Douglas-Home had found it 
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conducive, even necessary, to go along with the collectivist atmosphere of the 
era, this was by no means a political decision which was consistently and 
wholeheartedly supported by the Party’s faithful. A significant portion of 
Conservative supporters was deeply dismayed by the left-wing actions of 
their own right-wing administrations, especially concerning the governments’ 
tolerance and affability towards the perceived enemies of industrial 
modernisation and the free market system, the trade unions. Whatever the 
political motivations behind the reluctance to change posture might have 
been, there is little doubt that the continuation of the Conservative 
administrations’ outward amenableness on trade unions during the 30-year 
consensus was little more than habitual veneer covering up the cracks which 
were rapidly appearing on the wall of party opinion on this most contentious 
matter. The façade would soon go on to finally dissolve itself entirely with the 
end of consensus and the advent of Thatcherism in the late 1970s. 
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Scottish Propaganda at the End of Empire 
 
Bryan S. Glass* 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This article investigates the disputes among Scottish middle-class 
professionals over the Central African Federation in the early 1960s. The 
Scottish Council for African Questions, composed mainly of intellectuals, 
lawyers, and clergy, wanted to bring the Central African Federation to an end 
because of their opposition to a white minority regime that seemed destined 
to institute the colour bar over the whole of the region.  Their position was 
opposed by another Scottish middle-class organization called the Scottish 
Study Group on the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which was 
headed by an influential businessman named William Thyne. In The 
Scotsman, the Scottish Study Group proclaimed its dedication to ‘setting the 
record straight’ on the Central African Federation in Scotland. The archives, 
however, show that the group was in constant, direct contact with Roy 
Welensky, the Prime Minister for the Central African Federation, and many 
other officials of the white minority regime. Both of these organizations 
engaged in a sometimes covert propaganda battle over the Federation, meant 
to sway the opinion of the imperially-engaged Scottish public. Overall, this 
article represents the vastly differing views on the Federation held by 
important and influential professionals in Scottish society and reiterates that 
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the Scots were constantly aware of and engaged with the empire — even if 
they wholeheartedly disagreed about what should come of it following the 
Second World War. 
  
Keywords: British Empire, Nyasaland, Central African Federation, Scottish 
Council for African Questions, Scottish Study Group, Roy Welensky, Colour 
bar, William Thyne, Kenneth MacKenzie, Propaganda, Scotland, Scottish 
Propaganda 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The rise and fall of the British Empire profoundly shaped the history of 
modern Scotland and the identity of its people. From the Act of Union in 1707 
to the dramatic fall of the British Empire following the Second World War, 
Scotland’s involvement in commerce, missionary activity, cultural 
dissemination, emigration, and political action cannot be dissociated from 
British overseas endeavours. In fact, Scottish national pride and identity 
were closely associated with the benefits bestowed on this small nation 
through access to the British Empire. The empire, after all, had taken the 
Scots to the pinnacle of global power. During the era of decolonization 
(1945-1965), in which the empire quickly unravelled over the course of 20 
years, the Scots paid close attention to the British Empire through 
newspapers, the committees of the Church of Scotland, and the educational 
system, and their interest was further amplified by propaganda 
organizations dedicated to swaying the imperially-engaged Scottish public. 
No area of the empire received more attention from the Scots than Central 
Africa, following the formation of the white settler-dominated Central 
African Federation in 1953.  Included within this political construct was the 
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Protectorate of Nyasaland, a territory that was incorporated into the British 
Empire in the late nineteenth century mainly through the work of Scots. 
Accordingly, the Scots were very keen to monitor the situation in Central 
Africa and this was made easier through two major propaganda 
organizations, the Scottish Council for African Questions and the Scottish 
Study Group for Rhodesia and Nyasaland.     
On Friday, 7 October 1960 an article appeared in The Scotsman newspaper 
describing a press conference held the previous day in Edinburgh. The press 
conference announced the formation of a new organization dedicated to the 
spread of information about the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland to the 
Scottish public. Named the Scottish Study Group for Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland (SSG), the organization claimed to be non-political and concerned 
with ensuring that Scots were given the facts about the Federation and not 
the tainted propaganda provided by many within the Church of Scotland.1   
Although never mentioned, their target was the Scottish Council for 
African Questions (SCAQ), an anti-imperial propaganda organization formed 
in 1952 to voice displeasure at the creation of the Federation. Established by 
an Edinburgh lawyer, Gerald Sinclair Shaw, the SCAQ was comprised of 
numerous Church of Scotland ministers and missionaries, foremost among 
them Reverend Kenneth MacKenzie, as well as leading Scottish academics 
like Professor George Shepperson.2  The SCAQ was immediately suspicious 
of the SSG and aired their grievances in the Letters to the Editor section of 
both The Scotsman and The Glasgow Herald newspapers. A battle had 
broken out over the type of information Scots were being proffered about the 
                                                   
1  “Study Group on Rhodesia and Nyasaland Formed: Independent; non-political,” 
The Scotsman, 7 October 1960, 14. 
2 Gerald Sinclair Shaw liked to introduce himself to others as “a friend of Dr. 
Hastings Banda.”  Letter from Sinclair Shaw to Mr. Mkandawire, 1 November 
1960, Edinburgh University Library Special Collections (hereafter EULSC), 
MS. 2497: Scottish Council for African Questions. 
130 East Asian Journal of British History, Vol. 4 (2014) 
 
Federation as its end rapidly approached. But while the SCAQ was willing to 
admit its anti-Federation bias, the SSG refused to reveal its pro-Federation 
sentiments and connections. They claimed to be fully independent with a 
singular desire to counter the inaccurate propaganda disbursed to the 
Scottish public. As this article will show, this was a mendacious claim. 
Both the SCAQ and the SSG were organizations that operated solely 
through volunteer labor. The people who volunteered for both organizations 
were, in many ways, obsessed with the Federation: one of the most 
controversial imperial issues in the post-war period. Accordingly, the amount 
of time demanded of the volunteers made it necessary for them to come from 
the classes of Scottish society that had the financial means to support unpaid 
effort. Thus, these volunteers were either from the business and professional 
middle classes or the aristocracy.3   
As mentioned above, the Scots cared a great deal about Central Africa 
because of the role of their forebears in the inclusion of Nyasaland within the 
British Empire.  Accordingly, many Scots felt Nyasaland was a Scottish 
concern and this played a major role in the passion exhibited by these two 
propaganda organizations as they debated the merits of the white 
settler-dominated Central African Federation. The mere existence of these 
two completely voluntary propaganda organizations also demonstrates that 
whether Scots categorized themselves as proponents, opponents, or victims of 
empire, one conclusion is clear: they were aware of and constantly engaged 
with the empire during the era of decolonization from 1945 to 1965.4 The 
Scots were not about to see the empire recede into history without taking 
notice. They would stay involved to the very end.       
                                                   
3 The members of the working class do not factor into this article except as 
recipients of the propaganda.   
4 For the high level of Scottish interest in the British Empire during the era of 
decolonization see: Bryan S. Glass, The Scottish Nation at Empire’s End , 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2014. 
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The Scottish Council for African Questions (SCAQ) 
 
The Scottish Council for African Questions appeared in 1952 as a reaction 
towards the British Government’s policy of creating a Central African 
Federation, “irrespective of the wishes of the Africans.”5 Composed mainly of 
Churchmen and intellectuals, the Council’s origins can be traced to February 
1952 when a meeting of protest against plans for the Federation was 
organized in the Church of Scotland’s General Assembly Hall in Edinburgh. 
“At that meeting 1200 people were present” to listen to speeches by the 
missionary Kenneth MacKenzie and the future head of an independent 
Malawi Dr. Hastings Banda.6 Given the success of the meeting, Sinclair 
Shaw, Kenneth MacKenzie, and Sir Gordon Lethem, amongst others, decided 
that something more permanent was needed.  Eventually it was decided 
that the Scottish Council for African Questions should be formed. It would 
last until 1976 and, in the intervening twenty-four years, take up any and all 
topics related to Africa. But the main arena of interest remained the fate of 
the three Territories of Central Africa: Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia, and 
Southern Rhodesia. 
While the object of the SCAQ could be succinctly put as “arousing in 
Scotland a greater interest in British Africa and to help in the promotion of 
full political rights for all, whatever their colour, race or creed, in British 
Africa,” its constitution went even further.7  
 
1. To strengthen and further the best traditions of British policy in relation 
to Africa, especially with regard to the moral and legal obligation to 
                                                   
5 Gerald Sinclair Shaw, “Speech at Perth in June 1959,” EULSC, MS. 2495: 
Scottish Council for African Questions. 
6 Ibid.   
7 Letter from Winifred S. Hardie (Honorary Secretary to the Council) to various 
dignitaries, “Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 1960 Review Conference,” 
30 November 1959, EULSC, MS. 2495: Scottish Council for African Questions.  
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safeguard the rights of all communities against domination by any 
minority or majority.  
2. To promote in Scotland a fuller understanding of the aspirations of the 
people of Africa and an informed sympathy with them in their problems. 
3. To promote in Britain policies ensuring the economic and social 
development and the equitable political rights of all communities in 
Africa. 
4. To assist peoples in Africa in their struggle against unfair discrimination 
and inequality of opportunity in their educational, economic and social 
progress and to foster in all non-self-governing territories responsible 
forms of self-government.  
5. To encourage practical projects of development which will provide a living 
experience in Africa of economic, social and political co-operation, in the 
true sense of the word, amongst people of different races.8     
 
The SCAQ wanted a movement towards independence sooner rather than 
later in Africa, which was in direct conflict with the desires of the Federal 
regime in Central Africa to maintain white minority rule for as long as 
possible. Even more interesting, and underscoring the close affiliation of 
many SCAQ members with the Church of Scotland, was their stated goal of 
pressuring governmental officials to ensure the economic and social 
advancement of indigenous peoples in a Westernized world.  Independence 
for Africans was not enough.  The civilizing mission was alive and well 
within the Constitution of an anti-imperial propaganda organization during 
the era of decolonization.9 
The SCAQ was composed of numerous branches throughout Scotland.  
The cities of Glasgow, Perth, and Aberdeen all had branches. However, the 
main center of activity resided with the first branch in Edinburgh, founded 
                                                   
8 “Constitution of the Scottish Council for African Questions,” EULSC, MS. 2495: 
Scottish Council for African Questions. 
9 The civilizing mission is defined as intervening in a territory in order to spread 
Western values to indigenous peoples. 
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by Sinclair Shaw. In almost all instances the branches would organize their 
own activities and compose letters to members of the British Government on 
areas of concern in Africa. However, in perceived critical situations, such as 
the drafting of a memorandum for the consideration of the Monckton 
Commission in 1960, they would issue a combined statement.10 The branches, 
though separate, worked very closely together as all were bound to adhere to 
the SCAQ’s Constitution.   
So what, exactly, were the propaganda methods employed by the SCAQ to 
increase Scottish interest in Africa while at the same time winning adherents 
to their anti-Federation point of view? 11  The first method was the 
organization of lectures by like-minded, distinguished Scots. This was the 
preferred technique used by the SCAQ to convey their message to the 
Scottish public. Perhaps the most famous speech organized by the SCAQ 
featured Dr. Hastings Banda on Monday, 25 April 1960.  Held in the Central 
Hall in Edinburgh, “every one of 1,100 seats were occupied and people were 
standing at the back both upstairs and downstairs.”12 The vast majority of 
the speakers were Africans, intellectuals, or clergy. Speeches of note included 
Mr. Anthony Sampson on “Black and White in Johannesburg” (Tuesday, 30 
April 1957), Mr. M. W. K. Chiume, member of the Nyasaland Legislative 
Council and the Nyasaland African Congress, on “What Nyasaland Africans 
                                                   
10  “Memorandum submitted to The Monckton Commission by The Scottish 
Council for African Questions,” January 1960, EULSC, MS. 2495: Scottish 
Council for African Questions. 
11 For the purposes of this article, propaganda is defined as “the transmission of 
ideas and values from one person, or groups of persons, to another, with the 
specific intention of influencing the recipients’ attitudes in such a way that the 
interests of its authors will be enhanced.”  For this definition see: John M. 
MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public 
Opinion, 1880-1960, Manchester: Manchester University Press 1984, 3. 
12 Handwritten notes, presumably of Sinclair Shaw, on the inside of an envelope 
addressed to him, n.d., EULSC, MS. 2495: Scottish Council for African 
Questions.  
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are Thinking Today” (Wednesday, 28 January 1959), Tom Colvin, the Church 
of Scotland missionary famously banned from the Federation for making 
disparaging remarks about its Federal Government, on “Nyasaland and its 
Future” (Wednesday, 11 February 1959), Julius Nyerere, President of the 
Tanganyika African National Union, on “Problems facing Central and East 
Africa Today” (Tuesday, 30 June 1959), Guy Clutton-Brock, a white founding 
member of the African National Congress in Southern Rhodesia, whose 
speech on Tuesday, 26 January 1960 was meant to counter propaganda 
emanating from Rhodesia House, George Shepperson, Reader in Imperial 
and American History at the University of Edinburgh, on “The Challenge of 
Pan-Africanism” (Monday, 25 February 1963), and Dr. Terence Ranger, who 
was exiled from Southern Rhodesia in 1963 (Friday, 11 October 1963).13  The 
speeches hosted by the SCAQ sometimes occurred as often as twice a month 
and proved to be a huge success. But these did not constitute the only 
lectures of importance for the SCAQ’s cause. 
Members of the SCAQ also presented lectures to branches of the Workers’ 
Educational Association (WEA) and Adult Education Councils in Scotland. Of 
the members, the two most active in adult lecturing were George Shepperson 
and Kenneth MacKenzie.14 These courses were meant, especially in the case 
                                                   
13 The dates and titles of the speeches are available in EULSC, MS. 2497: 
Scottish Council for African Questions.  The Edinburgh branch of the SCAQ 
actually wanted Guy Clutton-Brock to speak to every branch of the 
organization in Scotland to help counter the propaganda released by Rhodesia 
House under the auspices of Sir Gilbert Rennie, who would play an important 
role in the SSG in 1960.  For the internal correspondence about the 
significance of Clutton-Brock speaking throughout Scotland see: Kenneth 
MacKenzie to Sinclair Shaw, 27 October 1959, EULSC, MS. 2497: Scottish 
Council for African Questions.  
14 These men are forever connected in that George Shepperson arranged for 
Kenneth MacKenzie’s archives to be deposited in the Edinburgh University 
Library Special Collections following the latter’s sudden death from a coronary 
at the age of 50 in 1971.  See:  Handwritten letter from Margaret MacKenzie 
(Kenneth’s widow) to Sinclair Shaw, 5 April 1971, EULSC, MS. 2497: Scottish 
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of the WEA, “to support the educational needs of working men and women 
who could not afford to access further or higher education.” 15  George 
Shepperson began teaching courses for the South East Scotland District of 
the WEA during the 1951-52 academic year, just as the SCAQ was getting 
started.16  These courses were either weekend schools, such as the one 
Shepperson presented on 26 and 27 April 1952 entitled “Africa in the Modern 
World,” or one-day schools such as his 7 December 1952 class in Galashiels 
entitled “Africa Today.”  As the 1950s progressed, Shepperson changed the 
titles of his classes from these safe choices to the more informative and 
provocative “The Colour Bar” (Bathgate, 27 March 1955) and “The Rise of 
Nationalism in Nyasaland” (Edinburgh, 13 May 1962).  Although the syllabi 
for these courses are not available in the archives, his membership in the 
SCAQ leads to the assumption that these classes were sympathetic towards 
the plight of Africans in the Federation, especially in relation to the white 
settlers who dominated the government. 
The Reverend Kenneth MacKenzie, who was a driving force behind the 
SCAQ along with Sinclair Shaw, most certainly provided his students with a 
version of events that was sympathetic towards Africans.17  In the late 
                                                                                                                                   
Council for African Questions.    
15 This quote is available from the Workers Educational Association website at 
http://www.wea.org.uk/about.    
16 The South East Scotland District of the WEA catered to about 1000 students 
per year in 1958-59.  Annual Reports for South East Scotland District of the 
Workers’ Educational Association, National Library of Scotland (hereafter 
NLS), Acc. 11551/31.  
17 MacKenzie, who served as a Church of Scotland missionary from 1945 to 1956 
in both Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia (Nyasaland:  1945-1948 and 
Northern Rhodesia: 1948-1956) was described by the Rev. Neil C. Bernard as 
“the confidant of African leaders who were planning for independence.”  For 
Rev. Denis Duncan, MacKenzie’s “life interest was Africa and the Africans.  
No African ever had a greater worker and indeed warrior, for his cause than he 
had in Kenneth MacKenzie.”  “Kenneth MacKenzie, Minister of Restalrig 
Parish Church 1968-1971: In Tribute and to his Memory,” EULSC, Kenneth 
MacKenzie Collection, Gen. 1871/Folder 64.  
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1950s and early 1960s, MacKenzie served as the Secretary on the Church of 
Scotland’s Committee anent Central Africa, which was charged with 
investigating and reporting back on the troubles in the region.  The 
Committee was headed by the Rev. George MacLeod, following his stint as 
Moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in 1957-58.18 
According to someone who knew George MacLeod well, Kenneth MacKenzie 
was influential in convincing MacLeod to turn against the Central African 
Federation in 1959.19  This statement makes sense when it is considered 
that MacKenzie, “the Kirk’s foremost authority on African affairs” was 
responsible for briefing MacLeod on the situation in Central Africa.20   
MacKenzie taught his first course for the WEA, “Racial Policies in South 
Africa” in Alloa on the weekend of 5-6 October 1957, following his return from 
Northern Rhodesia.  It is evident from the title that this course was meant 
to inform the students about the colour bar and, given MacKenzie’s 
background, condemn the practice. Shortly following the declaration of a 
State of Emergency in Nyasaland in March 1959, MacKenzie gave a lecture 
in Edinburgh entitled “Political Effects of Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland” (14 June 1959).21 In early 1961, and fast on the heels of the 
formation of the SSG the previous October, MacKenzie delivered a one-day 
                                                   
18 For more on the Rev. George MacLeod and his views on the Central African 
Federation see: Bryan S. Glass,  “Protection from the British Empire? Central 
Africa and the Church of Scotland,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History 41: 3, 2013, 475-495.  At the 1958 General Assembly MacLeod 
successfully persuaded the Church to appoint the Committee and report 
annually until 1962. 
19 Informal conversation between author and Dr. Lesley Orr, Fall 2010.  To read 
George MacLeod’s speech to the General Assembly as Convenor of the 
Committee anent Central Africa in May 1959 see Appendix D of Glass, The 
Scottish Nation at Empire’s End. 
20 Ron Ferguson, George MacLeod: Founder of the Iona Community, Glasgow: 
Wild Goose Publications 2001, 299. 
21 Annual Reports for South East Scotland District of the Workers’ Educational 
Association, NLS, Acc. 11551/31. 
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lecture entitled “Nyasaland Grows Up” for the Linlithgow Adult Education 
Council, part of the Edinburgh University Extra-Mural Committee (2 March 
1961).22 His other courses for the WEA included “The Crisis in Central Africa” 
(Edinburgh, 7 April 1963), a two-part course “Continued Revolution in Africa 
I & II” (Edinburgh, 8 and 15 March 1964), and one-day schools on “Africa 
To-day” (Cowdenbeath, 18 October 1964) and “The New Nations of Africa” 
(Hawick, 7 March 1965).23  Combined, these lectures from a leading member 
of the SCAQ served to increase awareness of the British Empire in Central 
Africa amongst adult learners in Scotland. It is also highly likely that the 
lectures helped fulfill the SCAQ’s agenda of propagandizing against the 
Central African Federation.                 
In addition to the organization and presentation of lectures throughout 
Scotland, the SCAQ and its members wrote letters to Members of Parliament 
and to newspapers, crafted and signed petitions, and engaged in debates 
about the CAF. For instance, Kenneth MacKenzie wrote frequently to 
Cabinet Ministers and Members of Parliament pressing them to uphold 
Britain’s guarantees about the protectorate status of Nyasaland and 
Northern Rhodesia.24 He also called on all Scots to take an active role in 
protecting the peoples of Nyasaland by writing to their MPs. In “Our 
Brethren in Revolt,” written following the Nyasaland Emergency, MacKenzie 
                                                   
22 This class was part of “A Course of Ten Lectures on ‘Other Lands and Other 
Peoples’” given at the Linlithgow Academy.  EULSC, Kenneth MacKenzie 
Collection, Gen. 1871/Box 11.  
23 Annual Reports for South East Scotland District of the Workers’ Educational 
Association, NLS, Acc. 11551/31. 
24  One such letter elicited a very warm reply from James Callaghan MP.  
Callaghan, the future Prime Minister, stated that “You can be assured that we 
shall continue to press the Government to fulfill its responsibilities towards the 
Protectorates and to see that the undertakings given to the Protectorates in 
the Preamble to the Federal Constitution are firmly upheld.”  James 
Callaghan to Kenneth MacKenzie, 6 March 1959, EULSC, Kenneth MacKenzie 
Collection, Gen. 1871/Box 1. 
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asked his readers: 
 
Are you prepared to write to your M.P., to the Secretary of State for Colonies 
and the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, suggesting: 
 
(a) That the Africans in detention should be given a fair trial now: 
(b) That Nyasaland be given a Territorial Constitution permitting an 
absolute African majority in the Legislative Council: 
(c) That the 1960 Conference reviewing the Federation should be held in this 
country and not in Central Africa: 
(d) That at that Conference Nyasaland Africans get a chance to discuss 
secession: 
(e) That at that Conference some federal functions be returned to the 
Territorial Governments: 
(f) That there be no Dominion status for the Federation without the consent 
of the majority of the inhabitants of the races within the two Northern 
Territories.25 
 
In order to rouse his fellow Scots into action, MacKenzie indicated that 
MPs were saying the people of Scotland did not care nearly as much about 
the people of Nyasaland as the newspapers claimed. He was dedicated to 
overturning this perception. 
In addition to MacKenzie and Shaw, letters to newspapers appeared by 
numerous members of the SCAQ. On the debate about the formation of the 
SSG, for instance, SCAQ members Winifred Hardie, W. Calder, and Sir 
Gordon Lethem wrote in along with George MacLeod, whose sympathies with 
the organization made him, for all intents and purposes, an honorary 
member following the Nyasaland Emergency in March 1959.26 A petition 
                                                   
25 Kenneth MacKenzie, “Our Brethren in Revolt,” n.d., 3, EULSC, Kenneth 
MacKenzie Collection, Gen. 1871/Box 19. 
26 See the discussion below on the debate in the Scottish newspapers following 
the press conference announcing the formation of the SSG on 6 October 1960. 
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distributed by the branches of the SCAQ in 1959 called on Scots to join them 
in telling the British Government “that it would be wrong for Britain to 
concede [claims amongst Europeans in the Federation for Dominion status] 
unless they are acceptable to a majority of both Africans and Europeans in 
the Protectorates.”27         
Kenneth MacKenzie never shied away from the spotlight in his quest to 
inform the Scots about the Central African Federation. He even tried his 
hand at debating no less a figure than James Graham, the 7th Duke of 
Montrose, immediately following the declaration of a State of Emergency in 
Nyasaland. This debate, for the “In Perspective” program, was broadcast on 
Friday, 3 April 1959.28  The debate did not feature any fireworks with 
MacKenzie holding to an anti-Federation line and Montrose espousing the 
beliefs of the Dominion Party, the main opposition party in the Federation 
that would eventually morph into the Rhodesian Front and pass the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) for Southern Rhodesia in 
November 1965. They were in grave disagreement over the fitness of the 
Africans to run their own affairs in any of the Territories of the Federation, 
although Montrose was willing to let Nyasaland leave along with the portions 
of Northern Rhodesia that did not contain the copper mines that proved so 
important to the Federal economy. What is even more interesting about this 
debate is what the Duke of Montrose took away from it.  In a letter to Mr. 
Robert Hay, the man in charge of the Duke’s estates in Scotland, he claimed 
that: 
 
It is quite appalling the way the Church of Scotland have been behaving over 
the Nyasaland affair. As I realised from my private talk with the Rev. Kenneth 
                                                   
27 Petition of the Scottish Council for African Questions, 1959, EULSC, MS. 
2495: Scottish Council for African Questions.  
28 “Discussion between the Duke of Montrose and the Rev. Kenneth MacKenzie,” 
3 April 1959, EULSC, Kenneth MacKenzie Collection, Gen. 1871/Box 19. 
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McKenzie, both before and after our mutual broadcast discussion, he is aware 
of the true situation as much as I am, namely that it would be a disaster for 
Nyasaland to become independent, not only financially, but because they are 
quite unable to produce a fraction of the men required with education, 
technical or professional knowledge, to form a Government and an 
administration.29 
 
Given MacKenzie’s complete dedication to the Africans of the region and 
his disgust at the behavior of the white minority regime, Montrose’s 
testimony about what MacKenzie really thought rings hollow. MacKenzie 
was, after all, helping to formulate the Church of Scotland’s actions over 
Nyasaland after the Emergency. This appeared to be his own attempt at 
influencing a subordinate in the hopes that Mr. Hay would relate this 
propaganda to other Scots. 
A final, very important point is the influence that the founder of the SCAQ, 
Sinclair Shaw, had on George MacLeod’s famous speech to the 1959 General 
Assembly. The Deliverance that passed the General Assembly as a result of 
this speech stated: 
 
The General Assembly, recognising that the time has come for a radical 
revision of the Territorial Constitution for Nyasaland, earnestly recommend to 
Her Majesty’s Government that effective power be given to the African 
community in that land, which admits the possibility of an African majority in 
the Legislative Council.30 
 
This move to transfer effective power to Africans in Nyasaland was a major 
step in the process of dissolving the Central African Federation. MacLeod 
took inspiration in preparing his speech from an op-ed column written by 
                                                   
29 Duke of Montrose to Robert Hay, 18 June 1959, National Records of Scotland 
(hereafter NRS), GD220/7/4/176. 
30 “Supplementary Report of the General Assembly’s Committee anent Central 
Africa,” 6 May 1959, NRS, CH 1/8/95. 
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Sinclair Shaw. The column, entitled “Nyasaland Parallel with Cyprus: 
Africans unalterably opposed to Federation they distrust,” appeared in The 
Scotsman on 17 March 1959. In the article, Shaw described the manner in 
which the Federation was imposed on four million Africans in the 
protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland by 30,000 European 
voters of Southern Rhodesia in the 1953 referendum. Shaw continued that “it 
is surely impossible to deny that this was an act of racial discrimination of 
the first magnitude.  Nothing can hide the fact that Federation was imposed 
upon four million unwilling Africans.”31  Shaw went on to describe in detail 
the composition of the Executive and Legislative Councils of Northern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland and how these needed to be altered to properly 
consider African opinion before the 1960 constitutional review conference.  
Otherwise, Dominion status might be granted to the Federation and Britain’s 
pledge to protect the two northern Territories would be abandoned.   
This column made a powerful impact on MacLeod. In a letter to Shaw right 
after the 1959 General Assembly, MacLeod expressed his indebtedness. “If 
you heard my speech you would hear some interesting figures of the ‘muffling’ 
of African Representation.  You would recognise them as having been culled 
from you own article in the Scotsman in March: for which many thanks! That 
was a terrific indictment!”32 By waging their public battle to inform the Scots 
about the situation in the Central African Federation, Shaw had helped 
influence the writing of, perhaps, the most important speech ever made on 
behalf of Africans to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland. The 
SCAQ, through the labors of Sinclair Shaw and Kenneth MacKenzie, had 
played a major role in giving the Africans a voice, especially in Nyasaland. 
                                                   
31 Sinclair Shaw, “Nyasaland Parallel with Cyprus: Africans unalterably opposed 
to Federation they distrust,” The Scotsman, 17 March 1959, 8-9. 
32 George MacLeod to Sinclair Shaw, 29 May 1959, EULSC, MS. 2497: Scottish 
Council for African Questions. 
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This voice would reverberate throughout Britain and help destabilize the 
foundations of the white settler-dominated Federation.  
Overall, there is little doubt that the SCAQ helped build awareness of the 
events unfolding in the Central African Federation during the 1950s and 
early 1960s.  However, the mere existence of this propaganda organization is 
owed to the level of importance many Scots placed on the British Empire 
during the era of decolonization.  In fact, the SSG may never have developed 
if not for the effectiveness of the SCAQ in putting forward an anti-federation 
message through their propaganda. The SCAQ was doing its part to ensure 
that the Scots did not forget their duty to protect the indigenous peoples 
living in the Federation, even if it was from kith and kin. 
 
 
October 1960 
 
The announcement of the SSG’s formation brought out an immediate 
response from many within the SCAQ mainly because of what was stated and 
who was present at the press conference on 6 October 1960.33 First, the SSG 
chose Brigadier Bernard Fergusson to lead the press conference because of 
his interest in Central Africa and his supposed reputation for integrity and 
impartiality.34 Fergusson’s speech, however, appeared to be anything but 
impartial. According to The Scotsman, Fergusson stated that “The Church of 
                                                   
33 The press conference was held at the North British Station Hotel in Edinburgh.  
A total of 22 people attended including journalists from the following 
newspapers: Aberdeen Press and Journal, Dundee Courier, Evening Times, 
The Glasgow Herald, The Scotsman, and British Weekly.  Minutes of a 
Meeting of the Scottish Study Group for Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 6 October 
1960, York University Archives, Borthwick Institute of Historical Research 
(hereafter YUA), William Thyne Papers. 
34 William Thyne, “Study Group for Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Replies to Readers’ 
Questions,” The Scotsman, 12 October 1960, 8. 
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Scotland has been pronouncing hitherto on the subject of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland with a voice briefed from the anti-Federation lobby only.”35 This 
quote was verified in a similar article by The Glasgow Herald.36  Sir Gilbert 
Rennie, the High Commissioner for the Federation, also attended the press 
conference and spoke to the attendees. 37  Rennie, known for running 
propaganda campaigns for the Central African Federation in Britain, 
“welcomed the formation of the group as a means of counteracting inaccurate 
and prejudiced views and propaganda in Scotland.” 38  For his role as 
Chairman, William Thyne, a successful Edinburgh printer and paper 
manufacturer, claimed that the group’s aims were to disseminate factual 
information about Central Africa that would serve to enlighten public opinion 
in Scotland.39 The Letters to the Editor columns of The Scotsman lit up in 
response to the emergence of the SSG. 
                                                   
35 “Study Group on Rhodesia and Nyasaland Formed: Independent; non-political,” 
The Scotsman, 7 October 1960, 14. 
36 “Finding the Truth about Federation: Scottish Group’s Meeting,” The Glasgow 
Herald, 7 October 1960, YUA, William Thyne Papers. 
37 Sir Gilbert Rennie had been Governor of Northern Rhodesia and showed 
himself to be such an ardent supporter of Federation that he was made its first 
High Commissioner in London (1954).  According to A. J. Hanna, Rennie 
championed the Federation’s “fair name against its critics, notably in the 
Church of Scotland.”  A. J. Hanna, The Story of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland , 
London: Faber and Faber, 1960, 252-3. 
38 “Study Group on Rhodesia and Nyasaland Formed: Independent; non-political,” 
The Scotsman, 7 October 1960, 14.  For an attack by Sinclair Shaw on Rennie, 
“who was constantly making speeches in Scotland about the need to retain the 
Federation” see “Note by Sinclair Shaw on letter to Judith Hart M.P.,” 30 May 
1960, EULSC, MS. 2497: Scottish Council for African Questions.  Rennie was 
also attacked for “working Sir Roy Welensky’s propaganda machine in this 
country at full pressure. Newspapers continue to carry large expensive 
advertisements blaring the social and economic benefits of federation and 
giving not the slightest hint of the opposition of vast African populations and 
many local white Liberals to the very existence of the Federal Government.”  
See: John M. Kellet, “Information on Federation,” The Glasgow Herald, 10 
October 1960, YUA, William Thyne Papers.    
39 “Study Group on Rhodesia and Nyasaland Formed: Independent; non-political,” 
The Scotsman, 7 October 1960, 14.   
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The first person to respond was Rev. George MacLeod, the man responsible 
for leading the Church of Scotland to call for an end to white minority rule 
over the peoples of Nyasaland in the momentous General Assembly of 1959. 
MacLeod took Brigadier Fergusson’s attack against the Church personally. 
“Writing…as one who convened the committee which ‘briefed the Church of 
Scotland’ till last Assembly, am I unduly sensitive in resenting the obvious 
implication that we did not examine the evidence on both sides of the case?”40 
MacLeod also wanted a deeper probing into the source financing the SSG 
since the group planned “to address groups, especially Church bodies,…to 
present the Monckton Report in a balanced way” and to “disseminate 
information in the form of pamphlets, booklets and a weekly newsletter.”41 
MacLeod ended the letter by defending himself and the Committee anent 
Central Africa along the lines of Thyne: “we are completely independent, 
entirely non-political. Our only concern is to see that the true facts are 
disseminated throughout Scotland.”42  
Rev. Thomas Maxwell’s letter to The Scotsman appeared on the same page 
as MacLeod’s. Maxwell was perturbed that his name had been listed as a 
member of the newly formed SSG. He was also disillusioned by Fergusson’s 
attack on the Committee anent Central Africa: “Indeed the fact that I have 
been a member of the Assembly’s Special Committee…and in cordial 
                                                   
40 Rev. George MacLeod, “Central African Study Group: Some Questions and a 
Disclaimer,” The Scotsman, 8 October 1960, 6. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid.  Sir Gordon Lethem, Honorary President of the SCAQ and a member of 
the Church of Scotland’s Committee anent Central Africa, responded in a 
similar way to the accusation by Brigadier Fergusson that he was against the 
Federation:  “I write to express my deepest resentment of the insinuation that 
my colleagues and myself have been animated – in putting forward reports and 
recommendations to the General Assembly – by an anti-Federation bias and 
have been deliberately blind to arguments and facts put forward by the 
supporters of the Central African Federation in its present form.”  Sir Gordon 
Lethem, “An Insinuation Resented: Church Committee and Central Africa,” 
The Scotsman, 14 October 1960, YUA, William Thyne Papers. 
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agreement with its reports to the Assembly, would seem to make me an 
unhelpful member of a group, one of whose spokesmen…made an unjustified 
attack on the … committee.”43  This was just the beginning. The criticism 
would get much worse. 
The next letter was printed in The Scotsman on Monday, 10 October 1960. 
A truncated version of this letter appeared in The Glasgow Herald on the 
same day.44 In the letter, by John M. Kellet, William Thyne’s objectivity was 
attacked due to the fact that he owned a farm in Southern Rhodesia. “That 
such a person could be disinterested in the present political and emotional 
circumstances is surely asking too much of human nature.” He also 
condemned the SSG for the arrogant assumption that Scotland had been 
missing out on what was occurring in the Federation.   
 
A glance at the programmes during the last two winters of such 
organisations as the Royal Commonwealth Society, the United Nations 
Association, the Workers’ Education Association, the Universities’ Extra-Mural 
Department, the Foreign Mission Committee of the Church of Scotland…to 
mention only a few, will show how untrue and ridiculous this suggestion is.45 
 
The Scots, according to Mr. Kellet, were anything but apathetic towards 
the future of the Central African Federation. They wanted and received all 
the information they desired about the British Empire during the era of 
decolonization. 
A correspondent who went simply by the name Enquirer asked numerous 
questions regarding the formation of the SSG. But the most interesting and 
important part of the letter dealt with the assertion by William Thyne that 
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the SSG was non-political.  According to Enquirer, the future of the 
Federation was a purely political affair that was the source of bitter party 
strife both in Britain and the CAF. As a result, the SSG would have to be a 
political body if it planned to express views and distribute literature that 
might influence the Federation’s future.46 The Rev. L. David Levison poured 
additional skepticism onto this non-political assertion. He went so far as to 
state that the only men who have interests in a vital political problem and 
claim to be non-political “have always been on the extreme Right wing of 
political thought, and I refuse to be taken in.”47 Although Thyne would prove 
to be less right-wing than Levison assumed, the point about the group being 
political was one that Thyne would acknowledge in his attempt to answer the 
flood of letters appearing in the press. 
William Thyne responded to the criticisms leveled against the SSG in a 
letter printed on 12 October 1960. He began by restating the purpose of the 
group:   
 
Those of us who have close associations with the territories concerned 
have been aware, from personal contacts and through correspondence, that 
the facts of the situation are not always presented accurately, either in the 
Press or elsewhere.  Both African and European suffer from the 
publication of distorted facts.  A study group was therefore formed to work 
independently of any political party; and I, more than anyone else, was 
responsible for its formation.48 
       
He did accept that the Federation was a political affair, although he 
claimed that important matters such as these should be above party politics. 
The confusion, perhaps, arose from his belief that if political parties were not 
                                                   
46 Enquirer, “Non-political politics,” The Scotsman, 10 October 1960, 6. 
47 L. David Levison, “Sheer hypocrisy,” The Scotsman, 10 October 1960, 6. 
48 William Thyne, “Study Group for Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Replies to Readers’ 
Questions,” The Scotsman, 12 October 1960, 8. 
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involved the issue was no longer political.  But in the most interesting 
section of the letter he continued to try to convince readers of The Scotsman 
that the formation of the SSG was in their best interests and declared that no 
one associated with the group should feel any embarrassment about being 
involved. In Thyne’s opinion they were, after all, an informational 
organization and nothing more. 
On the same day that Thyne attempted to clear the air, a column by Miss 
Winifred Hardie, Honorary Secretary of the SCAQ, appeared in the Letters 
section. Hardie provided historical background to the SCAQ and outlined the 
organization’s aims. She also declared that while the members of the SCAQ 
came from all political parties, the Council never made a claim to be 
non-political. The SCAQ “is proud of the fact that, since its inception, it has 
consistently condemned the imposition of federation on the Rhodesias and 
Nyasaland in [line with] … the bitter opposition of the great majority of 
Africans in those territories.”49 The SCAQ was proud of its propaganda 
against the continuation of the Federation because, in their minds, they were 
upholding Britain’s obligation to protect the indigenous peoples of Central 
Africa, especially in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.  Such a political 
topic needed a political response. If this revelatory letter was, however, the 
SCAQ’s plea for the SSG to come clean as a pro-Federation propaganda 
organization, it fell on deaf ears. 
Margaret Gray found the formation of the SSG insulting to Scots and their 
knowledge of imperial issues. She believed that the Scots were intelligent 
enough to take the information presented by sources like the BBC and made 
available in the newspapers about the Central African Federation and arrive 
at their own conclusions. The inaugural meeting of the SSG for her was “an 
insult to our Scottish brains.” The Scots could get by just fine without the 
                                                   
49 Miss Winifred S. Hardie, “The Scottish Council for African Questions,” The 
Scotsman, 12 October 1960, 8. 
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interference of the SSG and its propaganda: “I suggest to this body, who are 
so anxious to educate, that they divert the money set aside for Federation 
propaganda to the building of schools and colleges for Africans who, if treated 
rightly, can become worthy partners of liberal-minded whites.”50 She would 
not be the only correspondent to feel offended by the SSG’s desire to educate 
the Scots about the empire: a topic they understood quite well.   
A final letter of importance condemning the formation of the SSG appeared 
in The Scotsman on 17 October 1960. The letter said that there was no need 
for another group to educate the Scots about the situation in Central Africa 
given the existence, since 1952, of the SCAQ. The author, W. Calder, believed 
that Thyne and his group obviously had an axe to grind against the 
perspective of the SCAQ.  He then wondered, “What kind of people do these 
gentlemen think Scots folk are? The imputation lies that we, a people usually 
credited with shrewd political insight, are a lot of suckers. There must be 
many like myself who resent an attempt to ‘educate’ us in the way some 
would like us to go.”51  This letter was an attempt by Calder to make plain 
the level of engagement of the Scots with political issues in general and 
Central Africa specifically. Also of interest, Calder’s letter was discussed with 
Kenneth MacKenzie in private correspondence before it appeared in The 
Scotsman. Although MacKenzie’s replies are unknown, given the tone of 
Calder’s correspondence MacKenzie provided him with material used to craft 
the letter. Calder promised MacKenzie at the end of the first letter that he 
would do what he could “to expose the hypocrisy of Rennie and the 
Groupers.”52 MacKenzie never involved himself in the debate that followed 
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the October 1960 press conference, but there should be little doubt that he 
stayed abreast of developments and, perhaps, even had a hand in what 
others published.  
The SSG generated a great deal of negative publicity in the correspondence 
columns of The Scotsman in the weeks following the press conference. But 
there was also a great deal of sympathy amongst the correspondents for the 
work of the new group. For instance, the Rev. John Gray, Convenor of the 
Church and Nation Committee of the Church of Scotland, believed that he 
would be able to gain additional insight through the information released by 
the SSG because it provided him with the point of view of, most likely, those 
supporting Federation in Central Africa. He did not feel that the information 
that was in circulation in Scotland shed proper light on this perspective 
before.53 The Rev. Dr. J. Kennedy Grant went further and ridiculed the 
correspondent (John M. Kellet) who called Thyne’s views about Southern 
Rhodesia into question simply because he owned a farm in Southern 
Rhodesia. This, for Grant, was the type of smear often used by self-claimed 
“liberals” against “white settlers.” Grant, who was a Rhodesian, felt that 
“nothing but good can come from the efforts of a group seeking to reach the 
truth and to put it before their fellow countrymen.”54 The SSG, to their 
minds, was offering valuable information that would only increase Scottish 
knowledge of the situation.  Despite the controversy, the SSG had arrived. 
But where did it begin and what was its focus? 
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The Formation and Functioning of the Scottish Study Group 
 
The inaugural meeting of what became the Scottish Study Group occurred 
on 8 April 1960 in Edinburgh. William Thyne, Councillor Melville Dinwiddie, 
former BBC Controller in Scotland, and Sir Gilbert Rennie, the High 
Commissioner for the Federation, attended.55 The beginnings of the Group 
can be traced back to almost a year before when William Thyne started 
corresponding with Lord Home, Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Relations. Thyne introduced himself as the owner of a farm near Bulawayo in 
Southern Rhodesia and claimed that other whites in the Territory asked him 
to lay certain points before Home. He requested a meeting with the Secretary 
of State to discuss the problems in the Federation from the perspective of the 
settlers.56  Following the meeting between the two men on 18 April 1959, 
Home sent a letter thanking Thyne for his analysis of the situation and his 
suggestion that the British Government needed to dispatch a Parliamentary 
or fact-finding mission to the Federation and not simply rely on the report of 
the Nyasaland Commission of Inquiry (the Devlin Report).57 Thyne, buoyed 
by Home’s reception to his approach, wrote back and offered to become an 
informational conduit between his white settler friends and the Secretary of 
State.58 It is obvious from this correspondence that Thyne was motivated to 
act by the Nyasaland Emergency because he felt it might harm the long-term 
solvency of the Federation. Home’s warm reception, in turn, encouraged 
Thyne to become more deeply involved in the quest to save the Federation. 
Thyne next appears, discussing the possible formation of an informational 
group, in early 1960.  In a letter to Home, re-opening their previous 
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correspondence, Thyne claimed that over the past few months a friend of his, 
a Member of the Federal Parliament named James Swan, had been home in 
Scotland on leave. During this time, Thyne helped Swan meet newspaper 
editors and arranged a discussion with the English-Speaking Union in 
Edinburgh. This activity meant that the two men saw a great deal of each 
other. According to Thyne, they used these meetings and the time together to 
discuss the opinions of Scots towards the Federation following the Emergency 
in Nyasaland. They came to the conclusion that public opinion of the 
Federation was at an all-time low in Scotland. With the approach of the 
constitutional review conference at the end of 1960, they believed that it was 
time to act in order to maintain the status quo in Central Africa. They agreed 
that “there should be a Scottish Committee, or small group of people in 
Scotland, recognised by the Federal Parliament, who could disseminate 
information on affairs in these Territories.” In the letter, Thyne provided the 
names of influential Scots who would be interested in helping this proposed 
propaganda organization “improve goodwill and understanding between this 
country and the Territories concerned.”59 Home responded that he thought 
this was a worthwhile endeavor to increase knowledge in Scotland about the 
Federation.60 
In a separate letter to the High Commissioner, Sir Gilbert Rennie, Thyne 
claimed that the desire to create the group emanated from the lack of proper 
Scottish knowledge about the situation in the Federation. Thyne argued that 
the people of Scotland knew very little about what was really happening in 
the Federation and yet, to his dismay, this did not stop them from voicing 
their anti-Federation opinions. The Scots, for Thyne, felt passionate about 
the situation in Central Africa but they had been misled by anti-Federation 
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propaganda. This was a situation that needed to be put right.61 
The SCAQ was not blindsided by the announcement of the existence of the 
SSG in October 1960.  They knew that this organization was brewing from 
June 1960. They were tipped off about its formation by Robin Barbour in a 
letter dated 25 June 1960.  Barbour received an invitation from Dr. Melville 
Dinwiddie dated 24 June asking him to join the SSG, most likely as a 
Correspondent and not a Member. Dinwiddie offered to send Barbour 
information to help him “form a balanced judgment on the vital issues that 
have to be discussed and decided during the next year [at the constitutional 
review conference].” 62  Barbour explained to Sinclair Shaw that he felt 
compelled to join the SSG “since it might be useful to have a liaison officer, or 
a spy, or something between the two, serving on both bodies.”63 It is unknown 
whether Barbour agreed to become a Correspondent of the SSG, but the 
information was out there and the SCAQ was able to prepare for the 
appearance of its propaganda rival.    
The SSG functioned as a propaganda organization with the full financial 
support of the Federation. Even though Thyne felt passionate about the need 
to re-educate a Scottish public tainted by anti-Federation propaganda, he 
was not willing to pay for it.  Much of the propaganda sent out to members 
of the SSG originated from Rhodesia House in London, the headquarters of 
the High Commissioner for the Federation. This alone undermines Thyne’s 
contention in the press that his group was non-political.  Even more 
importantly, however, Thyne expected Rhodesia House to pay for the postage 
used to disseminate the propaganda to the SSG’s members and 
correspondents.  Rhodesia House, the mouthpiece for Sir Roy Welensky and 
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the Federation Government, was paying all of the expenses related to the 
group including the printing or purchasing of the propaganda and its 
diffusion.64 George MacLeod wondered where the money was coming from to 
fund the SSG in his letter to The Scotsman in October 1960. He, most likely, 
had a suspicion that the Federation was funding the entire enterprise and he 
was right. 
So what, exactly, were the Terms of Reference for the SSG and did they 
match the wording used by William Thyne in private correspondence? The 
Terms were distributed to every potential Member of the SSG as the mandate 
of the organization. They were:  
  
1. To disseminate in Scotland, reliable information about Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland, with the express purpose of promoting a better understanding of, 
and a sympathetic outlook on, affairs in the Federation, and of countering 
inaccurate and prejudiced views and propaganda in Scotland. 
2. To arrange for Europeans and Africans with first-hand knowledge of the 
Federation to address groups and societies, especially Church bodies, in 
Scotland. 
3. To use every endeavour to make certain that the Monckton Report is 
presented in a balanced way by Press and Radio in Scotland and that Scottish 
Members of Parliament and Members of the House of Lords are made aware 
of all shades of opinion in Scotland on Federal affairs.
65
 
 
The Terms underscore that this was a propaganda organization through 
and through.  They wanted to influence the recipients’ attitudes in order to 
convert them to the SSG’s way of thinking. Creating a sympathetic outlook 
on affairs in the Federation, ensuring that the Monckton Report, crafted in 
preparation for the 1960 constitutional review conference, was presented in a 
balanced manner, and informing Scottish MPs and Lords about the opinion of 
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those in Scotland who favored the continuation of the Federation laid bare 
their intentions. 
William Thyne distributed propaganda from many sources to the Members 
and Correspondents of the SSG. The main, though by no means exclusive, 
source of this propaganda was Rhodesia House in London. Rhodesia House 
produced a Newsletter each Friday about the Federation that was trimmed 
down for the purposes of the SSG to take into consideration mainly political, 
constitutional, and some economic matters.  The Newsletter makes for 
rather dull reading but one constant was the extended coverage of the 
Federal Prime Minister’s speeches. The Newsletter also made a point of 
playing up everything done by the Federal Government to provide for 
indigenous Africans. The Newsletter from Friday, 26 April 1963 is instructive. 
It included an article on “More African Housing Planned for S.R.” and in “N. 
R. Mercy Flight to Katanga” discussed how the Federal Ministry of Health 
provided blood and drugs to the victims of violent rioting in the area within 
hours of receiving urgent requests for assistance from the Katangese 
authorities.66   
Additional propaganda included the dissemination of statements by 
leading Central African politicians. Thyne distributed one to the SSG on 5 
December 1960 that focused on Sir Edgar Whitehead’s comments about the 
need to gradually advance African interests in economics, politics, and land 
ownership.67 The key, however, was gradual advancement and never the 
rapid moves to self-government favored by the SCAQ and many within the 
Church of Scotland. According to Thyne, in a personal letter to the Southern 
Rhodesian settler A. J. L. Lewis, Africans could only advance at a slow rate.  
                                                   
66 “Newsletter: Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland,” 26 April 1963, 4-5, YUA, 
William Thyne Papers. 
67 “Statement by the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia in Regard to the 
National Convention,” distributed by William Thyne to the SSG on 5 December 
1960, YUA, William Thyne Papers. 
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“At every turn in this country – Church of Scotland, Government, most 
newspapers – it is represented that the Nationalist leaders are speaking for 
the majority: hence the demand, although they are not ready for it, for an 
African controlled Parliament, and one man one vote.”68 The propaganda 
disbursed by Thyne to the SSG never betrayed his sentiments. He was a 
staunch supporter of the Federation and although he never mentioned the 
SCAQ by name it is obvious that all of his work on behalf of the SSG aimed at 
undermining the propaganda generated by this anti-Federation rival 
organization. 
Overall, William Thyne wanted to see the continuation of the Central 
African Federation and he believed that sending pro-Federation propaganda 
to influential Scots might help turn the tide of public opinion in Scotland that 
had been moving in the opposite direction since the Nyasaland Emergency 
and the Church of Scotland’s subsequent calls for decolonization. Thyne 
asked the Members of the SSG to target Church groups in an attempt to 
change the opinion of the Kirk, that most important of Scottish civil society 
institutions, from within.69 The SSG occasionally helped sponsor lectures by 
pro-Federation speakers, such as the visit by Mr. Godwin Lewanika in 
January 1962, but for the most part they relied on their Members to spread 
the information culled from the propaganda chosen by Thyne.   
               
 
Thyne and Welensky 
 
Lord Home encouraged Thyne to take an active role in the politics of the 
                                                   
68 Thyne to Lewis, 26 April 1963, YUA, William Thyne Papers. 
69 See Bryan S. Glass, “Protection from the British Empire? Central Africa and 
the Church of Scotland,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 41:3 , 
2013, 475-495 for more information on the role of the Kirk as the surrogate 
Scottish parliament during the era of decolonization. 
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Central African Federation and James Swan channeled this energy into the 
formation of the SSG.  But the most important relationship sustaining 
Thyne and his work on behalf of the Federation was that with Sir Roy 
Welensky, the Federation Prime Minister between 1956 and 1963. 
On 3 March 1960, William Thyne composed his first letter to Welensky 
about the formation of the SSG. They would continue to correspond until 
Thyne’s sudden death on 24 August 1978. Thyne explained that Scotland 
needed to be enlightened about the true situation in the Territories that 
comprised the Federation. With the foundation of the group he wanted to 
inform the Scots about “the genuine desire of the Federal Government to 
further, in the proper way and in due course, the wellbeing of the African.”70 
This became a major focus of the propaganda distributed by the SSG over the 
ensuing years. Thyne attached an outline of the proposed group that ended 
by asking Welensky whether he found the organization acceptable. If 
Welensky was in agreement that the group should be started as an unofficial 
propaganda organization for the Federation in Scotland, he would appoint 
Thyne as the Convenor.71 Welensky’s response, written entirely by J. M. 
Greenfield, Minister for Law in the Federation, agreed with the formation of 
Thyne’s proposed group.72 The letter ended with an expression of thanks for 
taking up this very important work on behalf of the Federation.73 
This correspondence makes it clear that Welensky approved the formation 
of the SSG as a propaganda organization working on the Federation’s behalf. 
                                                   
70 Thyne to Welensky, 3 March 1960, YUA, William Thyne Papers. 
71  “FORMATION OF A SMALL COMMITTEE OR ASSOCIATION (suitable 
name yet to be found) FOR PROMOTION OF GOODWILL AND 
UNDERSTANDING OF RHODESIAN AFFAIRS IN SCOTLAND,” Bodleian 
Library of Commonwealth & African Studies at Rhodes House, Oxford 
(hereafter RH), MSS. Welensky 675/10. 
72 Memo from J. M. Greenfield to Welensky, 12 March 1960, RH, MSS. Welensky 
675/10. 
73 Welensky to Thyne, 21 March 1960, YUA, William Thyne Papers. 
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According to an article by Andrew Cohen, Welensky was never one to hide the 
Federation’s funding or support of public relations campaigns in Britain. 
Welensky had hired Voice and Vision, a London public relations firm, to try to 
improve the image of the Federation in Britain following the outcry over the 
handling of the Nyasaland Emergency.74 Cohen claims that a man named 
David Cole, head of a Salisbury-based public relations company and the 
person responsible for arranging Voice and Vision to run the campaign, told 
Welensky that the Federation should not be viewed as directly supporting 
this propaganda. An independent campaign would be more effective at 
winning over public opinion in Britain. At the same time that Welensky was 
agreeing to the creation of Thyne’s propaganda group (March 1960), he was 
rejecting the offer of a secret campaign by Voice and Vision because “the 
allegiance which would be shown by the consultants to the Federation would 
inevitably be linked to the Federal government [and] as such it would be 
better to openly employ them.”75 Cohen claims this would turn out to be a 
prophetic move by the Federation Prime Minister because of the damage 
done to South Africa by a tacit campaign in the 1970s. The experience of the 
SSG shows that Welensky was no prophet when it came to propaganda. 
Obviously he felt that the SSG could get away with a secret campaign on 
behalf of the Federation while Voice and Vision could not. And despite the 
cries of conspiracy by MacLeod and others, the SCAQ and their 
anti-Federation compatriots never produced any evidence directly linking the 
                                                   
74 According to Andrew Thompson, a Gallup Poll found that 80 per cent of the 
people in Britain knew about the Nyasaland Emergency.  More importantly 
for the image of the Federation, 30 per cent responded that their sympathies 
lay with the Africans while 18 per cent favored the settlers.  Andrew 
Thompson, The Empire Strikes Back? The Impact of Imperialism on Britain 
from the Mid-Nineteenth Century , London: Pearson Longman 2005, 212. 
75  Andrew Cohen, “‘Voice and Vision’ – The Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland’s Public Relations Campaign in Britain: 1960-1963,” Historia 54:2, 
November 2009, 116. 
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SSG to the Federation. Welensky and the Federation were never irreparably 
harmed by their tacit support of William Thyne and his Scottish Study 
Group. 
As Thyne and Welensky became better acquainted their letters were more 
direct.  One of the major topics of conversation was the African nationalists. 
The first letter attacking the nationalists was written by Thyne shortly after 
the public launch of the SSG at the October 1960 press conference. Thyne 
believed that the “undreamed of difficulties” faced by Welensky emanated 
from the extreme views of the nationalist leader in Nyasaland Dr. Hastings 
Banda.76 This struck a chord with Welensky, who would later admit to Thyne 
that the Federation was unraveling because of Nyasaland.  For Welensky 
this was even more tragic because neither he nor Malvern ever wanted 
Nyasaland included in the Federation.77 It had been forced on them by the 
British Government to make the creation of the Federation more palatable.78  
Thyne’s attacks on the nationalists became even more pronounced in 
mid-1961.  Interestingly enough, Thyne only aired these attacks in his 
letters to Welensky. The two men had met for the first time in Salisbury in 
January of 1961 and obviously hit it off because their correspondence picked 
up in its frequency and warmth during the year.  They were now feeling 
secure enough with each other to share their innermost, uncensored thoughts 
on the African nationalists. 
A letter from Thyne on 6 July 1961 claimed that even though Welensky had 
made reasonable proposals for the further advancement of Africans in 
                                                   
76 Thyne to Welensky, 28 November 1960, YUA, William Thyne Papers. 
77 Welensky to Thyne, 5 December 1962, YUA, William Thyne Papers.  Lord 
Malvern, also known as Godfrey Huggins, was the fourth Prime Minister of 
Southern Rhodesia (1933-1953) and he became the first Prime Minister of the 
Central African Federation (1953-1956) following its formation.  
78 For a discussion of why Nyasaland was included in the Federation see: Philip 
Murphy, Central Africa, Part I: Closer Association 1945-1958, London: TSO 
2005, xlix-li. 
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Northern Rhodesia, Kaunda and the other “extremists” would still create 
numerous difficulties. He hoped that moderate Africans would come into 
power in the Northern Rhodesian and Federal parliaments and this would 
allow them to “keep their more unruly brethren in order.” 79   But the 
problems for the Federation went well beyond its Central African borders.  
Thyne was having trouble controlling the negative propaganda against the 
Federation in Scotland: 
I regret to say that some of the publicity and some of the Press reports on 
events in the Federation are not what they ought to be.  Goodness knows, 
some of us here do all we can to put things right, but there seems to be an odd 
quirk in the minds of a lot of the editors on this whole question, and it still 
amazes me that they should listen to extreme African opinion – people like Dr. 
George McLeod and others – and ignore the sane council and advice of people 
like yourself and moderate Africans, and very many others.80 
 
This quote shows that Thyne and the SSG were losing the propaganda 
battle to the SCAQ and anti-Federation opinion leaders like the Rev. George 
MacLeod. MacLeod, by standing up for the rights of indigenous Africans to 
self-determination, was becoming a major target of Thyne’s hostility, at least 
in his letters to Welensky. In response, Welensky attacked the African 
nationalists, especially Kenneth Kaunda in Northern Rhodesia, for their 
violent nature. Welensky was quick to point out that although Kaunda 
claimed to be in favor of non-violent methods to achieve his aims, he was a 
hypocrite because the violence in the territory was being perpetrated almost 
exclusively by his party’s members.81 
The final attack on the nationalists to appear in this correspondence 
                                                   
79 Thyne to Welensky, 6 July 1961, YUA, William Thyne Papers. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Welensky to Thyne, 21 August 1961, YUA, William Thyne Papers. 
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occurred in a letter from Thyne to Welensky dated 8 January 1962. As public 
opinion in Scotland continued to be against the Federation, Thyne wished 
that the Scots were aware of the fact “that a large number of educated, 
civilised and decent Africans think quite differently from some of their 
extremist leaders.”82 According to Thyne, these nationalist leaders did not 
care for the interests of their fellow Africans.  They were concerned solely 
with seizing power for themselves, which Thyne believed would be infinitely 
worse for everyone in the Federation. Thyne and Welensky would lose this 
battle, but their exchanges on paper further solidify Thyne’s position as an 
all-out supporter of Federation even as he attempted to hide his true feelings 
from the Scottish public.83    
 
 
Endgame 
 
The SSG continued to disseminate its propaganda on behalf of the 
Federation through 1962 and into 1963. Following the Victoria Falls 
Conference of June and July 1963, which determined that the Federation 
should come to an end, Welensky was quick to write to Thyne and express his 
gratitude for the work that the SSG did on his behalf.84  In his response, 
Thyne admitted that the SSG was not able to make much headway against 
the entrenched anti-Federation opinion in Scotland. He singled out the 
                                                   
82 Thyne to Welensky, 8 January 1962, YUA, William Thyne Papers. 
83 Thyne was careful to avoid getting involved in public debates about the 
Federation because, as he explained to Welensky, he might accidentally reveal 
his political views and, thereby, harm the purported neutrality of the Scottish 
Study Group: “Naturally of course I have my own views – pretty strong ones – 
but I feel that an expression of these publicly would spoil the work we are doing 
in Scotland.”  Thyne to Welensky, 22 March 1961, YUA, William Thyne 
Papers. 
84 Welensky to Thyne, 30 July 1963, YUA, William Thyne Papers. 
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Church of Scotland and The Scotsman for their dedicated opposition to the 
CAF, which left him “exasperated and distressed.”85 In retrospect, there 
seems little that Thyne or the SSG could have done to change opinion in 
Scotland following the pronouncement by the Church of Scotland against the 
settlers’ handling of the Nyasaland Emergency in 1959. The very reactionary 
and condescending nature of the SSG also did not endear them or their 
efforts to a Scottish public that prided itself on its understanding of imperial 
affairs. The timing and the message were simply all wrong. 
On 4 August 1964, William Thyne sent a letter to Roy Welensky informing 
him that the SSG had suspended its activities and referred its members to a 
London organization called the “Friends of Rhodesia.” 86  Although he 
continued to take an active interest in the affairs of Southern Rhodesia, 
Nyasaland was now the independent Malawi, and Northern Rhodesian 
independence lay just around the corner on 24 October 1964. The 
maintenance of the Federation, which was the primary concern of the SSG 
from the very beginning, was no longer an issue following its dissolution on 
31 December 1963, making the group obsolete. The SSG had failed to alter 
Scottish public opinion on the Federation following the disastrous handling of 
the Nyasaland Emergency. George MacLeod, Kenneth MacKenzie, the SCAQ 
and the rest of the anti-Federation lobby controlled Scottish public opinion on 
this topic well before the appearance of the SSG.  This was a propaganda 
organization that was doomed to fail from the beginning. 
Overall, the high profile enjoyed by the SCAQ and the SSG reiterates the 
strong attachment of the Scots to the British Empire. Even after the SSG 
ceased operations, William Thyne turned his attention to opposing the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in Southern Rhodesia. Thyne, 
perhaps surprisingly for some, remained engaged with the empire as it 
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rapidly disintegrated. Although Thyne despised African nationalists, he also 
harbored great hostility for the far right wing Rhodesian Front, even going so 
far as to categorize their members as “stupid.”87 He believed that UDI was a 
“drastic step which would [mean]…ruination for the whole country, black and 
white alike.”88 For him, the British Empire brought stability to the region 
and that would be lost with UDI. The SCAQ, meanwhile, survived as an 
organization and continued to tackle issues in Africa even after the British 
Empire collapsed on the continent. Involvement with the British Empire had 
been engrained in the Scots and even following its demise many in Scottish 
society remained engaged with the consequences left in its wake. The 
Scottish nation maintained a powerful interest in the British Empire 
throughout the era of decolonization and beyond.    
 
 
 
 
                                                   
87 Thyne to Welensky, 22 March 1961, YUA, William Thyne Papers. 
88 Thyne to Welensky, 13 October 1965, RH, MSS. Welensky 775/4. 
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Abstract 
This paper aims at analyzing the official discourse of the Major Regime on 
asylum seekers and refugees. A comparative research is undertaken on the 
interactions among the main actors in British politics and several interest 
groups of the society with regard to the legislative processes of refugee acts. 
The trajectories of enactment with particular references to the Asylum and 
Immigration Appeals Act 1993 and Asylum and Immigration Act 1996 are 
explored through cross-examining newspaper and magazine articles, 
Hansard, various reports from the governmental organizations and refugee 
councils.  
The author finds out that the official statements of the Home Secretaries 
consistently placed emphasis on three issues: ‘number’ ‘bogus asylum’ ‘better 
racial relations’. These three critical elements also represent the perceptions 
of the Major regime on asylum, and illustrate the ways in which restriction 
system was placed to control the entry of people seeking asylum in Britain.  
Britain is one of the States who first proposed an international convention 
on refugee matters. However, the will to provide protection for those 
                                                   
* Lecturer, Department of History, Busan National University, Korea 
164 East Asian Journal of British History, Vol. 4 (2014) 
 
persecuted by their own country seemed to have almost faded away in the 
1990s, when the number of asylum seekers rapidly increased. This change of 
action is partly helped by the Convention itself, for interpreting the clauses of 
the Convention is entirely up to each signatory, and refugee is defined not to 
flee for economic reasons, but political. Thus, asylum seekers who failed to be 
officially recognized as refugee are regarded as ‘bogus’, that is, ‘economic’ 
asylum. This would give an inaccurate account of asylum seekers, while the 
boundaries between ‘economic’ migrants and ‘bogus’ asylum became blurred 
to the public perception.  
Thus, the increase in asylum requests was seen as a new form of 
‘immigration wave’. As a result, despite the fact that the number of asylum 
seekers who successfully secured the status of refugee dramatically 
decreased, their presence still made the mainstream British society 
uncomfortable. In addition to bogus claims, the Home Secretaries of the 
Major regime would be particularly concerned with the racial character of 
asylum seekers including their cultural background. They implicitly 
suggested that they would not meet the standards of the British society, thus 
incite or exacerbate racial tensions in some communities.  
The fear of the Major regime felt on the rapid increase in the number of 
people seeking asylum in Britain was genuine and to a certain extent 
justifiable due to the long struggle of controlling immigration in the country. 
However, what cannot be justified is that the regime misrepresented asylum 
seekers, and violated human rights for the purpose of establishing restriction 
system. It is obvious that refugee acts were built on various biases of the 
regime, and became one invisible border to most of asylum seekers.  
 
Key words: Asylum Seekers, Refugees, Refugee Act, John Major, Restrictions, 
Numbers Game, Bogus  
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Introduction 
 
The 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol specify the 
responsibilities of the signatories to protect refugees who are persecuted for 
reasons of religion, race, nationality, having particular political opinions and 
belonging to certain social groups. 1  Britain who first suggested the 
regulations of the 1951 Convention has emerged as one of the most 
significant recipients of refugees. The nationalities of refugees seeking 
asylum in Britain vary: Hungarians, Ugandans, Vietnamese, Iranians, Iraqis, 
Somalis, Eritreans etc.2 In general, these people are forced to flee from their 
own countries under various circumstances, and referred as ‘asylum seekers’ 
and ‘refugees’.  
Before undertaking further examinations on the subject, I should give a 
focus on the definitions of these terms. Peter Aspinall and Charles Watters at 
the University of Kent, funded by the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission, UK, analyze asylum seekers and refugees in Britain with the 
perspective of equality and human rights. They use the term, ‘asylum seekers’ 
for: firstly, those who have applied (and re-applied) for asylum; secondly, 
those who await decisions on their applications; thirdly, those whose 
applications are refused. ‘Refugee’ is someone: who is officially recognized as 
refugee; secondly, who is not accepted as refugee, yet receives the status of 
either ‘Exceptional Leave to Remain (ELR)’, or ‘Indefinite Leave to Remain’.3  
                                                   
1 The UN Refugee Agency, Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, Geneva: UNHCR Communications and Public Information Service 
2010, 14. 
2 Eritrea gains independence from Ethiopia in 1991. One of the main reasons of 
Eritreans fleeing from the country is religious persecution. Among various 
religious groups, Independent Non-Protestant Evangelicals and Wahabi 
Muslims are the main targets of the persecution. 
3 Peter Aspinall, and Charles Watters, “Refugees and asylum seekers: A review 
from an equality and human rights perspective” Equality and Human Rights 
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In the report to the Home Office, Jenny Carey-Wood articulates the 
differences between refugees and asylum seekers. According to her, refugees 
are officially granted the refugee status, while those who obtain ELR are not. 
She still admits the fact that both refugee and ELR experienced similar 
problems in their home countries, thus accepts the whole asylum seekers as 
refugees in the wider sense. 4  Differently from Aspinall, Watters, and 
Carey-Wood, Alice Bloch finds crucial to distinguish among refugees, asylum 
seekers, and ELR, because the British constitution differentiates the rights of 
the citizens on the basis of status distinctions.5 The Refugee Council use 
three categories of refugee, asylum seeker and refusal.6 
Unlike most academics in social and political sciences, psychiatrists work 
directly with asylum seekers and refugees to examine their mental (often 
including physical) health. They find meaningless to categorize these people 
for the fact that they all suffer from similar trauma, regardless their official 
statuses.7 After a deep consideration on the various ways of understanding 
these terms, it is decided to use the same categorization as the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission, because it is the most common way to 
definerefugees: asylum seeker and refugee. According to its distinction, 
                                                                                                                                   
Commission Research Report 52, Manchester: Equality and Human Rights 
Commission 2010, 2-5. People who obtain the status of ‘Indefinite Leave to 
Remain’ are given a ‘permanent residency’ without citizenship. 
4  Jenny Carey-Wood, Meeting Refugees’ Needs in Britain: The Role of 
Refugee-Specific Initiatives, Home Office Research and Statistics Directorate, 
Home Office, London: Home Office Publications Unit 1997, 3.  
5  Alice Bloch, 'Refugee settlement in Britain: The impact of policy on 
participation', Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 26, no. 1, Aug. 2010, 
75-88. 
6 www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/policy_research/the_truth_about_asylum/the_facts_
about_asylum. The Refugee Council, UK is one of the leading charities, 
established in 1951 in response to the 1951 Convention, and aims to support 
refugees to rebuild their lives in the UK. 
7 Helen McColl, Kwame McKenzie, and Bhui Kamaldeep, ‘Mental healthcare of 
asylum-seekers and refugees’, in Advances in Psychiatric Treatment 14, 2008, 
452–459 at 452–453. 
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asylum seekers are people who apply (and re-apply) to be recognized as a 
refugee.8 
Applying for refugee status is a difficult and complex process, and not all 
asylum seekers apply immediately after the plane reaches its destination. 
Most applicants first come to Britain as students, visitors, tourists, and then 
if/when the situations in their home countries become too volatile to return, 
they submit their applications.9  The British Home Office publishes the 
annual statistical reports on refugees, asylum seekers, and the rejected. 
However, these statistics hardly reflect the reality, because it is extremely 
difficult to obtain the figures of how many asylum seekers are waiting for the 
results of re-application, and the actual numbers of returnees and of people 
who postpone returning and eventually remain in hiding. Therefore, it seems 
to be almost impossible to grip on the precise numbers of refugees and 
asylum seekers.  
However, there are clear evidences mainly produced by individual 
researchers and the Refugee Councils that a great number of asylum seekers, 
especially those whose first applications were rejected, and thus who still 
await the official decisions on re-application, including those unable or 
unwilling to return home, are trapped in destitution.10 The media warn that 
unless some drastic measures are drawn to tackle the economic situations of 
                                                   
8  Asylum seekers including those rejected tend to stay on in Britain, like 
refugees. 
9 Peter Gordon, and Annie Newnham, Passport to Benefits? Racism in Social 
Security, London: Child Poverty Action Group & the Runnymede Trust 1985, 
6-7.  
10 Karen Wren, ‘Supporting Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Glasgow: The Role 
of Multi-agency Networks’, Journal of Refugee Studies 20, Scottish Centre for 
Research on Social Justice, University of Glasgow 2007, 391-413; Clare Daley, 
‘Exploring community connections: community cohesion and refugee 
integration at a local level’, Community Development Journal 44, 2009, 
158-171; The Children's Society, A Briefing from The Children's Society: 
Highlighting the gap between asylum support and mainstream benefits, 
London: The Children's Society 2012.  
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asylum seekers and refugees, a large number of them will become homeless.11 
‘Destitution’, often used to describe their situation, is defined as “not having 
adequate accommodation or support for themselves and their dependants for 
the next 14 days”12.  
In 2008 61 percent of the British opposed to compel refused asylum seekers 
to repatriate under the pretext of ‘destitution’13 However, many repliers on 
internet reject the idea of supporting the refused asylum seekers: they were 
already given opportunities under the British legal system, and thus it would 
rather be ‘unfair’ if they stay on in Britain illegally! British politicians, 
academics, and reporters often mention the ‘great’ British ‘tradition’ of 
accepting and protecting refugees.14 However, it is not certain how this ‘great 
tradition’ has been materialized in reality.  
The aim of this paper is to identify the various discourses on and the 
understandings of asylum seekers and refugees throughout the Major regime. 
The author will illustrate the ways in which debates on asylum seekers and 
refugees developed during the period concerned, while highlighting the key 
issues, especially the complex processes of legalizing restrictions on asylums. 
By exploring the process of enactment, I will endeavour to articulate the 
differences and similarities of the views on the subject among various social 
actors in Britain, such as political parties, refugee agencies, social activists, 
and so on.  
                                                   
11  Billy Briggs, ‘Failed asylum seekers in Scotland living below UN global 
poverty threshold’, The Guardian, 1 Oct. 2012; John Packer, ‘The UK is failing 
in its duty to protect vulnerable asylum seekers’, The Guardian, 4 Feb. 2013; 
Stef Lach, ‘Asylum seekers are “trapped in poverty”’, Evening Times, 14 April 
2013, etc.  
12 Aspinall, and Watters, ‘Refugees and asylum seekers’, vii.  
13  House of Commons Hansard (2008b) Written Answers. 20/2/2008, Col. 
785W[185087], quoted in Aspinall, and Watters, ‘Refugees and asylum seekers’, 
62-63. 
14 Randall Hansen, and Desmond King, ‘Illiberalism and the New Politics of 
Asylum: Liberalism's Dark Side’, Political Quarterly 71, 2000, 396-403 at 397. 
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There are numerous academic works on asylum seekers and refugees, 
which deal with a variety of aspects of asylums, including social policy, 
education, health care, asylum children without parents etc. However, it is 
rather unfortunate that historians have not paid much attention to asylum 
seekers in the contemporary period. Due to this lack of secondary materials 
in History, several primary sources, particularly newspaper articles, 
parliamentary debates, governmental reports, and documents from the 
Refugee Councils have been widely explored. ‘Britain’, ‘Asylum’, ’Refugee’, 
‘Asylum Seekers’ are used as keywords to search relevant research materials 
in the national as well as regional newspapers between 1989 and 1997. 
Several newspaper articles produced in France, Canada, USA, etc., all 
written in English, also have provided different perspectives on the subject.  
 
 
Asylum Seekers and Refugees, Problematized 
 
Asylum seekers have not always been represented as ‘a problem’ in Britain. 
In the 19th century the British seemed to be relatively generous towards 
refugees, until the Eastern Europeans came to Britain at the end of the 
century. The first modern law, aiming at the restriction of immigration, is the 
Aliens Act of 1905. The 1905 Act and other series of Acts related to 
immigration, such as the Aliens Restriction Act of 1919 and Aliens Order 
1920, attempted to ensure that the immigrants were capable of supporting 
themselves and their dependents. Therefore, poor aliens except for ‘genuine’ 
refugees were not allowed to reside by law in Britain.15 
In consequence of the Nationality Act of 1948, labour-immigrants from the 
British Commonwealth countries were freely accepted to make up for the 
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shortage of labour after the end of the Second World War. However, the 
concept of a common Commonwealth citizenship, the core of the Act was 
virtually eroded from 1962 onwards by legislation, and restrictions on 
immigration began.16 However, refugee was a different matter. The British 
governments were obliged to provide protection for asylum seekers, and thus 
established various refugee programmes to support the victims of, for 
instance, the 1968 reform movement in Czechoslovakia, military dictatorship 
of Chile, Vietnam War, etc.  
From 1981 to 1988 the average number of asylum applications in the UK 
was no more than 4000 per annum. Until 1988, Britain provided relatively 
generous welfare service for asylum seekers whose applications were still on 
the process of deliberation. They were recognized as the subjects of 
Supplementary Benefit, and after the abolishment of the Benefit, still 
entitled to receive Urgent Needs Payments which were designed to assist the 
British who were not regular employees, and whose income was found low 
after means-tested.17  
Towards the end of the 1980s, the number of asylum seekers began to 
increase. Between 1980 and 1989, there were around 46.000 applicants on 
the individual base, but from 1990 to 2001 the number rapidly increased to 
around 55.900. At the end of the 1980s, almost 50 nationalities applied for 
the status of refugee in Britain, and the list includes the major 
                                                   
16 The system of work voucher was introduced in 1962. The 1968 Immigration 
Act targeting East African Indians only permitted people whose parents and/or 
grandparents were born in the UK, and who were adopted into British homes 
and naturalized as British citizens. 
17 Gordon and Newnham, Racism in Social Security, 15-17; Amendment to 
Supplementary Benefits Regulation Affecting persons From Abroad: 
submission to Social Advisory Committee from CPAG, 1984, quoted in Gordon 
and Newnham, Racism in Social Security, 17. Child Poverty Action Group 
suggested the Welfare Consulting Committee, Home Office, to ensure that 
asylum seekers no longer suffered from financial difficulties after having been 
through all traumatic experiences.  
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refugee-producing countries, such as Iran, Iraq, Turkey, India, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka, Afghanistan, Ghana, Uganda, Ethiopia, South Africa, Somalia, 
Nigeria, and Democratic Republic of the Congo.18 Therefore, accommodating 
the applicants until the final decisions were made on their application was 
becoming a big ‘problem’ for the governments. The circumstances that forced 
people to leave their home countries on the road of exile hardly allowed any 
means of living. As a result, the provision of welfare services for asylum 
seekers became one of the significant political issues in the government.  
With the rapid growth of people seeking asylum, various derogatory terms, 
been used to address the Commonwealth immigrants and the decedents, 
seemed to have found their new targets. Asylum seekers have been 
illustrated as ‘criminals’, ‘malingers’, ‘carriers of disease’19,  ‘scroungers’,  
‘heath tourists’20, ‘the undeserving’21, ‘non-belongers’ who ‘swamp’ed Britain 
like ‘tidal waves’, and ‘floods’. It has also been argued that due to this 
‘national disaster’, Britain has been under ‘invasion’ and the land 
‘overcrowded’ in which Britain and the citizens are the victims. 22 
Surprisingly enough, these derogatory expressions were frequently used by 
politicians and the media. Under the circumstances, the rights of asylum 
seekers specified by the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol were being 
gradually forgotten in people’s mind. Instead, people were afraid that the 
                                                   
18 Institute for Public Policy Research, Asylum in the UK: an ippr fact file, 
London: Institute for Public Policy Research 2003, 7-8. 
19 James Hampshire, Citizenship and Belonging: Immigration and the Politics of 
Demographic Governance in Postwar Britain, Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire, and New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2005, 184.  
20 In 2003 the Conservatives’ Shadow Health Secretary, Liam Fox, cynically 
addressed asylum seekers as ‘health tourists’, and Britain as the ‘health 
equivalent of Disney World’, The Economist, 9 Aug. 2003, quoted in Hampshire, 
Citizenship and Belonging, 197. 
21  Rosemary Sales, ‘The deserving and the undeserving? Refugees, asylum 
seekers and welfare in Britain’, Critical Social Policy 22, 2002, 456-477.  
22 Hampshire, Citizenship and Belonging, 110-111, 184-185, 188 and footnote. 2, 
203. 
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presence of asylum seekers would generate huge economic and social 
consequences in Britain.  
Then, what are their rights? Some of the clauses of the Convention 
articulate the unity of family as ‘an essential right of the refugee’. There are 
also other relevant clauses in terms of employment and education. All 
signatories to the Convention have the responsibilities to treat refugees as 
the same as their own nationals in terms of elementary education. Moreover, 
no restrictive measures which ultimately aimed at protecting the national 
labour market, be imposed on the employment of refugees.23  
 
 
Asylum Appeals Act of 1993 and the ‘Numbers Game’ 
 
In the general election manifesto of 1992, the Conservative leader, John 
Major promised to make Britain respected, and safer and more prosperous. 
Differently from Neil Kinnock, the labour candidate whose election manifesto 
not at all mentioned immigration and refugee matters, Major categorized 
seven issues under the title of ‘Immigration and Refugees’. It is summarized 
as: further restrictions on the entry of asylum seekers to distinguish ‘bogus’, 
while protecting ‘genuine’ refugees; the reintroduction of the Asylum Bill 
which was delayed due to the election; to create a faster and more effective 
system of deliberating applications; to introduce finger-printing system so as 
to prevent multiple applications and fraudulent benefit claims.24 The refugee 
policy of the Major regime was kept along similar lines until his resignation 
in 1997.  
                                                   
23 The UN Refugee Agency, Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, Geneva: UNHCR Communications and Public Information Service 
2010, 3-4, 10, 11, 13-16, 22, 24-25, 29-30. 
24 http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/1992/1992-labour-manifesto.shtml;  
http://www.johnmajor.co.uk/page86.html 
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However, this policy line was not the Major regime’s own, but heavily 
reflected that of the previous Tory governments. For instance, under 
Thatcher a series of immigration and nationality laws were enacted through 
which the restrictions of immigration became further controlled and legalized. 
Among them, the most important of all was the Immigration [Carriers’ 
Liability] Act of 1987, established by Home Secretary Douglas 
Hurd(1985-1989). This Act imposes a fine of 2000 pounds per person to an 
airplane company who carries an asylum seeker without proper visa. 
However, the problem is that no one could obtain a visa for the reason of 
seeking asylum. Furthermore, the persecuting state would not issue a visa 
for the persecuted. Nevertheless, these circumstances were not taken into 
account, whether intentionally or unintentionally. The purpose of the 1987 
Act was to reduce the number of people seeking asylum in Britain from the 
very own place where they are produced.25 The last Home Secretary of the 
Thatcher regime, David Waddington who succeeded Hurd worked only one 
year before Thatcher’s resignation. Yet, his attitudes towards asylum seekers 
and refugees can be seen through his statements during the Parliamentary 
debates. He seems to have tremendous pride in the British tradition of 
protecting refugees, and at the same time the obsession to restrict their 
entries, and to remove those who are found to have made false claims.26 
After all, it would not be completely wrong to suggest that these 
understandings on asylum seekers and refugees of the Thatcher government 
were carried out by the Major government.   
Under the leadership of John Major, three Home Secretaries were 
appointed: Kenneth Baker (1990.11.28―1992.4.10), Kenneth Clarke 
                                                   
25 HL Deb 03 March 1987 vol 485 cc537-538; HC Deb 04 March 1987 vol 111 
c872.  
26 HC Deb 05 March 1987 vol 111 cc1016; HC Deb 12 April 2000 vol 348 
cc438-439. 
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(1992.4.10―1993.5.27), and Michael Howard (1993.5.27―1997.5.2). As soon 
as Kenneth Baker took his job, he began to argue for tighter controls on 
asylum seekers, emphasizing the rapid growth of applications which reached 
almost a thousand per week. His answer to the increasing applications was 
the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Bill with an aim of restricting the 
entry of asylum seekers, sifting out ‘bogus’ applicants, and strictly limiting 
the rights of asylum seekers to appeal.27 After its first formal reading, the 
Bill passed the House of Commons by the votes of 116 to 73, and expected to 
receive Royal Assent by the end of the year.28 However, the whole processes 
of deliberation of the Bill in the House of Commons and House of Lords met 
strong resistances not only from the opposition parties, but from the various 
sections of the society, such as the leading churchmen including the 
Archbishop of Canterbury, lawyers, asylum rights campaign groups, 
humanitarian organizations and refugee agencies etc.  
However, the fierce criticism of the Labour party did not mean a total 
objection to the basic concept of the Bill. The Labour agreed on the necessity 
of controlling the entry, changes in the application procedures, and fast 
repatriation of those whose applications were rejected as unfounded. Several 
politicians from the opposition party were concerned with the obsession of the 
Government to keep out ‘bogus’ asylum seekers, because that might affect the 
entry of those ‘genuine’, and abuse human rights in the process rather than 
rejecting the whole concept of choosing ‘genuine’ from ‘bogus’. The church 
leaders, refugee agencies and associations, and human rights campaigners 
were particularly uneasy with the inclusion of the Carriers’ Liability clause, 
the denial of access to free legal advice from the solicitors of their choice, and 
                                                   
27  Stephen Goodwin, ‘MPs attack tighter asylum rules’, The Independent 
(London), 3 July 1991. 
28 John Carvel, ‘Wounded Kurds denied refugee status’, The Guardian (London), 
27 April 1991; Peter Mulligan, ‘“Racist taunt” anger MPs’, The Times, 9 May 
1991.  
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fast track.29 The purpose of free legal advice was to assist British citizens 
with financial difficulties. Most of asylum seekers were not able to afford 
their own legal representation, unless the advisory service was given on the 
free base. The principle of ‘fast track’ was to repatriate the applicants whose 
claims were found to have no substance, without an oral interview.30   
While the Bill was deliberated in the both Houses, the principles of the Bill 
were heavily criticized by the opposition parties. ‘Black’ parliamentary 
members (MPs) of the Labour party and the refugee agencies called the 
regime as ‘racist’, and Baker, as a ‘Minister for xenophobia’.31 In particular, 
Bernie Grant, the Labour MP for Tottenham pointed out that the 
government restricted the entry of asylum seekers, only because most of 
them were ‘blacks or Asians’ from Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and 
China. Ron Moodley, the Director of the independent Refugee Forum also 
made a similar, but more sarcastic remark that if they had been the White 
Europeans, the British government would definitely have welcomed them 
without any pre-condition at all.32  
Faced with these severe criticisms from the politicians and various sections 
of the society, Baker confronted these objections with the ever-repeated story 
of the rapid increase of applications and of ‘bogus’ applicants. It is not clear 
                                                   
29 Nick Cohen, and Stephen Goodwin, ‘Curbs announced on refugees seeking 
asylum’, The Independent (London), 3 July 1991; — ‘Britain accused of racism 
over anti-immigration laws’, Agence France Presse-English, 3 July 1991; Sarah 
Helm, ‘There’s no room at the EC’, The Independent (London), 1 Oct. 1991; 
Alexander MacLeod, ‘Britain Moves Towards Reversing Long Tradition of 
Welcome for Refugees’, Christian Science Monitor (Boston, MA), 22 Nov. 1991.  
30  Stephen Goodwin, ‘MPs attack tighter asylum rules’, The Independent 
(London), 3 July 1991; — ‘Britain accused of racism over anti-immigration 
laws’, Agence France Presse-English, 3 July 1991. 
31  Melanie Phillips, ‘Commentary: Mr Baker's bogus bogy’, The Guardian 
(London), 5 July 1991.  
32  Stephen Goodwin, ‘MPs attack tighter asylum rules’, The Independent 
(London), 3 July 1991; — ‘Britain accused of racism over anti-immigration 
laws’, Agence France Presse-English, 3 July 1991. 
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who started the story of ‘bogus’ and when. However, the story was (and is) 
familiar with the British public over the past few decades. A British 
Journalist, called Melanie Phillips, makes a significant point to Baker’s 
refugee policy. She explains that around 95 percent of refugees of the world 
would seek refuge within their own region, while only 5 percent go to Europe. 
Britain receives only a small segment of the whole refugees, that is, around 5 
percent of the 5 percent who choose the continental European countries. 
Therefore, she argues that the government plays nothing, but the ‘numbers 
game’.33 If that was true, the game never seemed to stop during the Major 
years! 
Then, let’s find out the numbers of applications for asylum in Britain that 
were submitted during the 1990s? In 1990, the total applicants excluding 
their dependents were 26,205 and 44,840 in 1991. In 1992, there were 24,605 
applications. As above, it is true that the numbers of applications in the 
1990s rapidly rose in comparison to the 1980s. However, this number seems 
to be meager, for instance, if compared with Germany: from 1990 to 1992, 
193,000, 236,000, and 438,000 applications respectively. However, if we want 
to figure out accurately how much the presence of asylum seekers and 
refugees affects the countries concerned, these numbers should be analyzed 
in relation to the total population of the country, the size of the land, and, if 
possible, the Gross Domestic Product. It is unfortunate that there is no such 
analytical work available both in the Office of National Statistics, UK, and 
Hansard, and in the newspapers.  
Thus, it is rather questionable whether this would mean that the Major 
regime was not much interested in finding out the impacts of the 
socio-economic and demographic pressures on the country from the presence 
                                                   
33 Nick Cohen, ‘Immigration adviser is bailed on fraud charge’, The Independent 
(London), 24 July 1991; Melanie Phillips, ‘Commentary: Mr Baker's bogus 
bogy’, The Guardian (London), 5 July 1991. 
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of asylum seekers. Would it also be possible to suggest that what was 
important to them was something of rhetoric rather than the actual reality? 
Regardless the truth, neither precision nor accuracy seemed to have 
mattered, because no one in the regime asked for more analytical work on the 
subject. It might have been much more convenient for them to use the 
already familiarized story of ‘tidal wave’ of immigrants ‘swamping’ the 
country just to convince the public of their policy. In accordance with the UK 
Census 1991, the minorities occupied 5.5 percent of the total population of 
54.8 million. South Asians and the Caribbeans altogether were over 2 
million.34 Under the circumstances, the Major government never overlooked 
the fact that most applicants were, so called, ‘black’s, though never admitted 
this charge. 
Then let’s discuss about the term, ‘bogus’, another significant theme 
consistently used for the enactment of restriction. Here, I am not concerned 
about finding out the actual number of ‘bogus’ applicants, or their situations. 
I am more interested in analyzing the perceptions of the Major regime on 
‘bogus’ applicants, and illustrating whether it is appropriate to treat the 
applicants whose claims were found not to have substantive, as ‘bogus’. Table 
1 shows the result of the decisions made on asylum applications between 
1990 and 1997.35  
There are three different categories of asylum seekers: ‘Refugee’, ‘ELR’ and 
‘Refusal’. As explained before, people who are granted ELR are those who are 
not given official refugee status, but recognized the circumstances that forced 
them to seek asylum, and who will face the death penalty, murder, torture, 
punishment, if/when returned. That is, ELRs are not recognized as refugees, 
                                                   
34  “Immigration Bill Published Facts on File”, World News Digest, 31Dec. 1992. 
35 This table is created by the author, based on the statistics of the Refugee 
Council, 1998 and Chart 1(Applications for Asylum in the UK excluding 
dependents) of the ICAR Statistics Paper 1: Key Statistics about Asylum 
Seeker Applications in the UK 2009, 6.   
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but their causes of seeking refuge. Thus, they are given the right to stay in 
Britain ‘temporarily’ on humanitarian grounds whether for the purpose of 
heath treatment or until their safety is ensured after the return. However, 
the problem arises from the fact that the status of ELR is often than not 
subject to interpretation. 
 
Table 1)  Decisions on Asylum Applications 1990-1997 
Year 
Refugee ELR Refusal 
Processed 
Applications 
Number of 
Total 
Applicants 
% Number % Number % Number Total Number 
Total number 
(excluding 
dependents) 
1990 23 920 60 2400 17 705 4025 26205 
1991 10 505 44 2190 46 2325 4570 44840 
1992 6 1115 80 15325 14 2675 19115 24605 
1993 9 1590 64 11125 27 4705 17420 22370 
1994 5 825 21 3660 74 12655 17140 32830 
1995 5 1295 19 4419 76 17705 23419 43965 
1996 6 2240 14 5055 80 28040 35335 29640 
1997 12 3985 11 3115 76 22780 29880 32500 
  
On the contrary, people who oppose the restriction system of the 
government argue that ELR are the same victims as ‘Refugee’, and thus 
given the right to remain. In addition, some of ELRs can renew their stay, 
and even apply for permanent residency. However, the problem is that the 
British government only acknowledges ‘Refugee’ as ‘genuine’, while the 
others, ‘bogus’. This different interpretation of the status of ELR leads to an 
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interesting, yet significant result: the government argues that there were 
only 23 percent to 6 percent of ‘genuine’ refugees between 1990 and 1992, 
while the opposition, 83 to 86 percent.  
Then who are the ELRs? Let’s bring out an example here. With the 
outbreak of the Yugoslavian war, the Major government immediately 
operated the governmental refugee programme, and sent airplanes to Bosnia 
to bring some of the war victims to Britain. There would be no question that 
these people were the victims of genocide and systematic sexual assaults in 
addition to all kinds of violence involved in the war. However, these war 
victims were granted the status of ELR. And as mentioned above, ELR was 
treated as ‘bogus’ in accordance with the official criteria used to determine 
the applications. To the critics’ eyes, the refugee policy of the government was 
rather confusing: while the policy aimed at restricting the entry, the Asylum 
Division of the Home Office in charge of deliberation was granting almost 80 
to 90 percent of applicants the permission to stay (and social services 
accordingly) in Britain.36   
In the meantime, the Appeals Bill that had passed the examinations in the 
House of Commons in May, 1991, was expected to receive the Royal Assent 
around November. However, the whole process of deliberation of the Bill 
came to a halt due to the general election in April 1992. In the next chapter, I 
will explore the refugee crisis in Europe, the changes occurred to the refugee 
policy with the appointment of Kenneth Clarke, and the ways in which these 
whole situations were reflected on the process of enactment. 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
36  Melanie Phillips, ‘Commentary: Mr Baker’s bogus bogy’, The Guardian 
(London), 5 July 1991.  
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Strengthened Refugee Acts, Improved Racial Relations? 
 
After John Major won the 1992 general election, Kenneth Clarke was 
appointed to work as the Home Secretary. Immediately after his 
appointment, Clarke did an interview with a BBC radio programme, The 
World at One. During the interview, Clarke explains the government’s 
refugee policy and his own thoughts about asylum seekers. He states that an 
‘appropriate’ number of refugees would be accepted in order not to disturb 
British economy and public services. He also emphasizes on having clear 
rules on asylum, which should be applied with force, if necessary. He repeats 
himself by saying that unless the number is controlled, Britain would be 
under great pressure in terms of house supply, welfare service, health service, 
education, and employment market. Unless controlled, he adds, the biggest 
victims of all would be the British homeless and poor city dwellers.37 
Around the time when Clarke was appointed as the Home Secretary, the 
refugee situation was changing not only domestically, but also throughout 
Europe. There were relatively new incidents that were hardly witnessed 
before. Some racially motivated violence began to take asylum seekers and 
refugees as the targets. While Clarke was further strengthening the existing 
refugee policy of playing the ‘Numbers Game’ and ‘weeding out bogus’, the 
critics from the various sections of the British society, especially politicians, 
lawyers, human right activists, social movement organizations, and even the 
Commission of Racial Equality expressed concerns with this newly emerging 
phenomenon. They insisted on renewing Racial Relations Act, instead of 
further controlling the restrictions on asylum. By then, about a third of 
racially motivated violence in the eastern part of London was towards asylum 
                                                   
37 Nikki Knewstub, ‘Clarke Stresses Need for Stricter Laws on Asylum’, The 
Guardian (London), 3 Nov. 1992; Heather Mills, ‘Protest at secrecy over EC’s 
policy on refugees’, The Independent (London), 28 Nov. 1992. 
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seekers and refugees.38 This was also happening in the most of European 
countries including Germany, France, Austria, Greece, and Italy. As a matter 
of course, racial violence was not particularly new to Germany. However, it 
was relatively new that the hostels where asylum seekers and refugees 
stayed were frequently attacked by neo-Nazis. It was becoming much clear 
that refugees were now the victims of racial violence in the country.39 
In the meantime, the British media broadcast racial violence in Europe, 
using familiar expressions with a negative tone: for examples, ‘a flood of 
bogus’40, ‘under siege from a tidal wave of bogus refugees’, ‘a massive wave 
of ... will swamp the rich countries’ 41, etc. The UK Refugee Council urged to 
be more cautious with the language that the media used to describe asylum 
seekers and refugees. The Council argued that after having shown the 
documentary film on the increase of racial discrimination and crimes in 
Germany, copy-cat crimes were on the increase in Britain, though 
temporarily. The Council also insisted that even publishing the statements of 
some Conservative politicians with a negative tone could encourage racial 
discrimination and cause fear among the British public.42 
                                                   
38 Heather Mills, ‘Knock on the door brings growing fear of racial abuse and 
attack’, The Independent (London), 9 Nov. 1992. 
39 Sarah Helm, ‘There's no room at the EC’, The Independent (London), 26 March 
1992; Anthony Bevins, ‘Hurd’s racism fears’, The Independent (London), 26 
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abuse and attack’, The Independent (London), 9 Nov. 1992; Sue Leeman, 
‘European Community Agrees To Speed Up Expulsion of Asylum Seekers’, The 
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(PARIS), John Hooper (SPAIN), and Duncan Campbel, ‘Refugee Tide 
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Presse-English, 3 July 1991. 
41  Melanie Phillips, ‘Commentary: Mr Baker's bogus bogy’, The Guardian 
(London), 5 July 1991. 
42 Heather Mills, ‘Knock on the door brings growing fear of racial abuse and 
attack’, The Independent (London), Nov. 9, 1992; Christopher Bell, ‘Help for 
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Due to the Yugoslavian war, the issues of asylum seekers and refugees 
were in the centre of political discourses around the end of 1992. The war was 
forcing people to find refuge. Thus, refugee problems were a common concern 
among the European countries, and Britain was not an exception. Almost 2 
million Yogoslavians already fled the country to search for refuge. Thus, the 
events were broadcast in Britain in great details, and it would only be normal 
for the British public to be fearful when told by the media that the Serb 
President, Slobodan Milošević, was preparing for the attack of Kosovo, and if 
so, no one would be sure how many, if not several more millions, would ‘flood’ 
into Europe.43  
On the 17th of November, 1992, Clarke announces further restrictions on 
issuing visa for refugees from ex-Yugoslavia in order to control the 
procedures of seeking asylum in Britain. This measure has almost similar 
intention as in 1985 when Britain limited visa-issuing for Sri Lankans who 
were the victims of the civil war, re-occurring in the country, producing 
massive refugees. With the outbreak of the Yugoslavian war Clarke 
announces in the Parliament that the British government would accept 150 
refugees, and maybe more after a discussion with the United Nations and 
Red Cross. He also pleads not to compare with the case of Germany which 
already accepted around 220,000 refugees, because there are numerous 
Yugoslavian communities well-established in that country.44 After a few 
days, Clarke rejects outright the request from the German government to 
allow more refugees. Instead, he promises to take around 600 per month, but 
                                                                                                                                   
Peter Thompson, ‘LETTER: An Island and a Rising Tide of Racism’, The 
Guardian (London), 10 March, 1993. 
43 ECON, ‘Concerted policy eludes Europeans REFUGEES’, The Globe and Mail 
(Canada), 5 Dec. 1992. 
44 HC Deb 17 November 1992 vol 214 cc141-50.  
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no more than 4000 in total.45 Therefore, despite the war in ex-Yugoslavia the 
top three refugee-producing countries in Britain were still Sri Lanka, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Pakistan.  
On the 26th of July 1993, the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act came 
into effect for the first time in the British legal history. This Act comprises 
various articles from the previous Nationality Acts and Immigration Acts, all 
related to asylum seekers and refugees. In the part of the Introduction, the 
Appeals Act clarifies the main purpose of the Act as making provisions for 
asylum seekers and their dependents. It is also specified that the rights of 
appeal under the Immigration Act 1971 are subject to amendment, and the 
provisions of the Immigration Carriers’ Liability Act 1987 are extended to 
transit passengers. Finger-printing system is introduced to prevent multiple 
applications on welfare service under false names. In addition, refused 
asylums and those without proper documents are also given the right to an 
oral appeal.46 However, even before the Appeal Act came into effect, some of 
the Conservative politicians requested for new and further strengthened 
refugee act. As the Yugoslavian war intensified in mid-1993, Winston 
Churchill, the Conservative MP stated that the flow of ‘new’ immigrants 
(meaning asylum seekers) was directly causing social uneasiness in Britain, 
and thus should be imminently stopped to preserve the British way of life. 
This statement was received as courageous.47  
                                                   
45 Sue Leeman, ‘European Community Agrees To Speed Up Expulsion of Asylum 
Seekers’, The Associated Press, 30 Nov. 1992.  
46 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1993/23/introduction; Richard Ford, 
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47 Mail on Sunday, 30 May 1993, quoted in John Gabriel, Whitewash: Racialized 
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In April 1992, the Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd praises the 
Conservatives’ refugee policy as ‘firm but fair’. He finds that the far-right 
political party, the National Front, is “virtually extinct” and the communities 
are in better terms than a decade ago thanks to the refugee policy which acts 
against racial discrimination. The Home Secretary, Baker articulates a 
similar story that Britain could prevent the emergence of the neo-Fascists, 
and resist from creating conditions for racism, when/if the entry of asylum 
seekers was further limited.48 Kenneth Clarke who succeeded Baker also 
uses the issue of controlling the entry of asylum seekers not to repeat racial 
violence occurred in Germany. He insinuates ‘strengthened refugee acts, 
better racial relations’ by stating that the rising number of refugees in 
Germany is responsible for the increasing racist attacks.49 In 1994 Michael 
Howard, the last Home Secretary of the Major regime argues that “firm 
control of immigration and good race relations go hand-in-hand”, pointing out 
that most of new applications are from Nigeria, Ghana, Turkey, Sri Lanka, 
and Ghana.50  
As above, it is amazing to see such a consistency in the statements of the 
Home Secretaries under Major. They all seem to see asylum seekers at the 
core of racial problems in Britain. Their solutions to the problems were to 
speed up the process of examining applications, and quickly repatriate the 
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refused applicants. It seems to have never occurred to their political minds 
that educating the British public to rid of racism would be more effective 
than the restrictive policies. However, Andrew Lansley, the Director of 
Research at Conservative Central Office speaks for the party that it was 
simply playing ‘race card’ in the elections rather than having a firm 
discriminatory policy on refugee. He says that the Conservative party used 
the issues of race and immigration to win the elections in 1992 and 1997, and 
the 1994 Euro-elections.51   
 
Table 2)  Top Ten Sending Countries to Britain 
Year Top Ten Sending Countries to Britain 
- The No. of  Applications 
- Rate 
1980-1984 
Iran, Ghana, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Poland, 
Uganda, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and 
South Africa (including dependents) 
- 14,791 
- 86% of the total 
applications of 17,165  
1985-1989 
Sri Lanka, Iran, Turkey, Somalia, Uganda, 
India, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Iraq and Ghana 
(excluding dependents) 
- 23,519 
- 86% of 28,549  
1990-2001 
Somalia, Sri Lanka, FRY, Turkey, Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, India, Nigeria, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly 
Zaire) 
- 272,895 
- 49% of 558,755  
 
Thus, it is important to find the racial character of asylum seekers and the 
ways in which it was perceived by the Conservative politicians. Table 2 
clearly shows that most asylum applicants except people from former 
Yugoslavia were, so called, ‘black’ from Africa, the Middle East, and South 
Asia.52 The politicians repeatedly emphasized this. They also argued that 
                                                   
51 Lansley stated this after his retirement. He insisted that the Tories could still 
win, if the issues were played particularly well in the tabloids. Nick Cohen, 
“Fortress Britain; Only a fifth of those seeking asylum succeed”, The 
Independent (London), 29 Oct. 1995.  
52 The author has created this table on the basis of the statistics, in Institute for 
Public Policy Research, Asylum in the UK: an ippr fact file, 5-15. 
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seeking political asylum was the only way to enter Britain, and people from 
‘backward’ countries attempted to explore the opportunities at any given time. 
Therefore, it was far from convincing when Baker said that every single 
applicant was provided with ‘equal treatment’ and the Conservatives’ asylum 
policy was “colour blind”.53  
In addition, Table 1 illustrates the ways in which the Conservative’s 
political strategy was played at the decisions made on the asylum 
applications. As mentioned above, it was repeatedly argued that imposing 
tighter restrictions on asylum seekers would improve racial relations among 
the communities in Britain. Lansley’s contention that the Conservatives were 
playing a ‘race card’ may not be totally wrong. However, there are statistical 
evidences that prove the fact that the Major government had a certain 
strategy to reduce the rate of ELR. In 1992, the rate of ELR was 80 percent, 
but rapidly decreased to 21 percent in 1994. More surprisingly, the rate of the 
refused applications among the processed in 1990 and 1992 were 20 and 14 
percent each, but rose to 80 percent 1994 onwards. By mid 1990s, the 
Conservative politicians could proudly present the percentage of ‘genuine’ 
refugees as mere 5 to 6.  
Therefore, the outcome of deliberation on asylum applications shown on 
Table 1 proves that the whole process of deliberation could be manipulated in 
accordance with the manual of the governmental policy. Otherwise, it is 
simply not possible to explain the sudden increase of ELR and the refused, 
1994 onwards. The 1951 Geneva Convention symbolizes the passion for 
humanitarian work of the signatories to protect the victims of political 
                                                   
53 John Carvel, ‘Baker Denies Plans To Play Race Card’, The Guardian (London), 
15 Feb. 1992. The enactment with regard to immigration including asylum is: 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962, 1968, 1971, British Nationality Act of 
1981, Immigration (Carrier's Liability) Act of 1987, Immigration Act of 1988, 
The Appeals Act of 1993, Asylum and Immigration Act of 1996, and 
Immigration and Asylum Act of 1999 etc.  
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persecution. The refusal of and the suspension of deportation of asylum 
seekers would work against the spirit of the Convention.  
Having said that, however, it would be equally significant to understand 
the position of the Major government on refugee issues. Table 3 shows the 
total numbers of asylum from 1991 to 1997.54 Examining the table would 
help understand the ‘genuine fear’ that the Major regime must have felt. The 
workload imposed on them hardly decreased due to the ‘backlog’. For 
instance, in 1991 there were around 45,000 new applicants, and almost 
60,000 unprocessed applications carried over from the year before. Moreover, 
several tens of thousands of asylum seekers were wandering streets of the 
cities of Britain, waiting for deliberation of the Asylum Division of the Home 
Office. Therefore, issues related to the ‘backlog’ were frequently discussed 
among politicians.  
 
Table 3)  The Total Numbers of Unprocessed Applications and Applications of the Year 
Year/UK 
Unprocessed Asylum 
Applications / 
Numbers of Applicants 
(including Dependents) = 
Approx. Total 
Year/UK 
Unprocessed Asylum 
Applications / 
Number of Applicants 
(including Dependents) = 
Approx. Total 
22 Nov. 1991 60,000 / 44,840 = 104,840 1994 55,255 / 42,200 = 97,455 
7 May 1992  60,000 / 24,605 = 84,605 1995 69,650 / 55,000 = 124,650 
1993  45,805 / 28,000 = 73,805 
1996 57,450 / 37,000 = 94,450 
1997 51,795 / 41,500 = 93,295 
 
Therefore, one of the first things, if not the first, that Baker did to tackle the 
backlog and new applications was to increase the staff of the Division, and so 
did Howard. Howard recruited 150 more officers in addition to 500 existing 
staff in the Division in charge of examining asylum cases, and so did more to 
                                                   
54 The author has created this table based on the information in some newspaper 
articles, Table 1, Institute for Public Policy Research, Asylum in the UK: an 
ippr fact file, 42.  
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handle appeal adjudications in the Department of Lord Chancellor. Despite 
this grand scale of investment, the expected effect was reviewing 7,000 more 
application forms only. Moreover, there was an even bigger backlog in the 
following year of 1995 due to rapid increase of new applications. Irritated by 
this increase, Howard introduces an enforcement policy designed to curtail 
the stay of asylum seekers whose applications have been rejected, and who 
lost their appeals.55 However, even this measure seemed to be insufficient to 
cut off the increasing backlogs. Under the circumstances, the only remedy to 
the problem seemed to actively operate three elements of refugee acts: 
restrictive entry, fast review and swift repatriation.  
At the beginning of 1995, Howard announced that there would be new 
Asylum Bill. The ultimate goal of this Bill would be making Britain less 
attractive destination to asylum seekers. The Act would reduce the number of 
‘bogus’ applications; prevent immigration fraud; quicken the process of 
appeal; cut back social benefits. Howard explained the new Bill in the 
Parliament, arguing that only 5 percent of the applicants were ‘genuine’.56 
He diligently pursued his job, and at the end of 1996, successfully reduced not 
only the number of asylum applications, but also of unprocessed forms. At the 
time severe complaints were heard from all sections of the society that the 
word ‘bogus’ would always follow whenever asylum seekers were mentioned. 
However, it was obvious by then asylum seekers and refugees were at all 
times portrayed in a distorted, unfair way.57  
                                                   
55 Alan Travis, ‘Howard acts on Refugees’, The Guardian (London), 16 Feb. 1995. 
56  Julian Samboma, ‘BRITAIN-REFUGEES: NEW IMMIGRATION LAWS 
DEEMED RACIST’, IPS-Inter Press Service, 24 March 1995; Alan Travis, 
‘Howard Acts On Refugees’, The Guardian (London), 16 Feb. 1995; HC Deb 11 
December 1995 vol 268 cc699.  
57 Nick Cohen, ‘Fortress Britain; Only a fifth of those seeking asylum succeed’, 
The Independent (London), 29 Oct. 1995; IPS-Inter press Service, 20 Nov. 
1996. 
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This Bill was quickly reviewed despite strong resistance from the 
opposition parties, and received Royal Assent. On the 27th of January 1997 
the Bill was officially recognized as the Asylum and Immigration Act of 1996. 
In accordance with the Act, asylum seekers awaiting the result of their 
applications would receive food voucher instead of cash, and were dispersed 
to reception centres throughout the country. Moreover, those whose passage 
of entry was not clear could not appeal, and refused applicants were 
automatically removed from social security services.58 The 1996 Act, the last 
enactment on asylum under Major, further restricted the rights of asylum 
seekers than ever before, and began to tread the new path that was quite 
different than before.  
 
 
Concluding Remark 
 
A single refugee is a heroic figure, welcome to asylum.  
A thousand are a problem. A million are a threat.59 
 
The writing of William Wallace, the international affairs specialist at St. 
Antony’s College, Oxford, represents the Tory’s understandings on asylum 
seekers and refugees better than any other statements. If Douglas Hurd felt 
necessary to enact the Carriers’ Liability Act of 1987 when the number of 
applications was far less (around 4,000 annually) than the level of ‘threat’ in 
Wallace’s term, it would not be difficult to understand how urgent refugee 
issues were to the successive governments. In the 1990s, asylum applications 
increased 10 times more than the Thatcher years, and each year almost 
                                                   
58 Sales, ‘The deserving and the undeserving?’, 456-477.  
59 Alexander MacLeod, ‘Britain Moves Toward Reversing Long Tradition Of 
Welcome for Refugees’, Christian Science Monitor (Boston, MA), 22 Nov. 1991.  
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60,000 backlogs were present. The Major regime was determined to stop ‘new’ 
immigration: if ‘new’ immigrants who were mainly ‘black’ were not properly 
controlled, it would bring disastrous consequences to the white-dominated 
society. Britain already had too many of them! They thought.  
The Appeals Act of 1993 and the Asylum and Immigration Act of 1996 were 
established under such circumstances. Despite the active roles played by the 
opposition parties and various social actors to avoid legalization of further 
strengthened restrictions on asylum, their objection was marked conditional 
commitment. The Labour party empathized with the Conservative 
government, accepting the core principles of the Acts. Even worse, the Labour 
politicians agreed that there were too many asylum seekers and ‘bogus’ 
applicants in Britain.  
After examining the process of enactment, I realize that the Major regime 
saw asylum seekers and refugees through their skin colour and culture 
rather than as the victims of political persecution who needed protection. 
Moreover, they saw through the eyeglasses of racial prejudice, and never 
‘colour blind’. Asylum seekers and refugees were another ‘black immigrants’ 
who disturb racial relations and exhaust welfare services of the country, and 
thus their entry was strictly controlled.  
Refugee under the 1951 Convention is confined to those who suffered from 
‘political’ persecution, which means that other forms of suffering, for example, 
destitution, are not officially recognized as the cause for seeking refuge. Thus 
it was largely ignored that most of the citizens in a country under 
dictatorship severely suffered from tragic economic conditions. Due to the 
criticism on economic asylum, the boundaries between 
economically-motivated asylum seekers and immigrants became rather 
blurred. As a matter of fact, asylum seekers and immigrants have different 
motivations and backgrounds to leave home countries. Some of the 
immigrants may be encouraged to go abroad for marriage and employment, 
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while some others are due to poverty. And one cannot just disregard the 
influences of the relatives in the process of making a final decision on 
immigration. Under Howard, only 5 percent of asylum applications were 
given refugee status, while the others were treated like opportunists who 
came to Britain for better economic conditions. Thus, the presence of asylum 
seekers and refugees still made the white British uncomfortable, though the 
number of refugees was dramatically decreased.  
As seen above, the Major government actively operated three principles of 
refugee acts: playing the ‘Numbers Game’, ‘weeding out bogus refugees’ and 
‘restricting asylum seekers for better racial relations’. In terms of relations 
with the European countries regarding refugee matters, the British 
government would cooperate with them, but most of times attempt to free 
itself from interference of their cooperators. The 1951 Geneva Convention 
suggests the signatories to abide the regulations. However, it was up to the 
signatories whether to follow the regulations specified in the Convention. 
Thus, the ways with which the states observed asylum seekers and refugees 
heavily influenced their own refugee policy.  
In this article, I have not attempted to answer whether the enactment of 
the Major government contributed to the prevention of the rise of far-right 
political party. I have also not tried to find whether the government was able 
to establish better racial relations, while their refugee policy was working 
against racism, as Major's Home Secretaries consistently argued, or the 
enactment resulted in neglecting and even exacerbating racism already 
existed in the society. Probably, analyzing the general effects of the Major 
government’s refugee policy in terms of racism and racial relations would be 
one of my next research subjects in the future.  
The Major regime established refugee acts for the first time in the British 
legal history. Then, to what extent did this enactment influence the 
successive governments? I am going to conclude this article by quoting from 
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1997 Labour election manifesto rather than going through the passage of 
making the 1999 Asylum Act, which would be beyond my concern:  
 
Every country must have firm control over immigration ... All applications, .., 
should be dealt with speedily and fairly. .. The system for dealing with asylum 
seekers is expensive and slow — there are many undecided cases dating back 
beyond 1993. We will ensure swift and fair decisions on whether someone can 
stay or go, control unscrupulous immigration advisors and crack down on the 
fraudulent use of birth certificates.60  
 
Refugees seeking asylum in Britain had to face refugee acts, which were 
another un-crossable border, fortified with wrong pre-conceptions about 
refugees. And this grand existence often disheartened their hopes for new 
home
                                                   
60 http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/1997/1997-labour-manifesto.shtml 
  
 
[Book Review] 
 
David Brown, Palmerston: A Biography. 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010) 
 
Rebecca Spann* 
 
Palmerston: A Biography is an immensely detailed account of Henry John 
Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston’s life and politics. From his lineage, 
education, and his political career in its immense entirety, David Brown 
attempted to reveal the man and politician Lord Palmerston was in a more 
complete portrait than other Palmerston historians had yet achieved. In his 
own words, Brown wanted “to ‘make sense’ of Palmerston” (4) as a man of his 
times, as a “prism through which to view (Whig-Liberal) nineteenth- century 
Britain,” (4) and to assert the existence of and the consistencies of the 
“Palmerston mindset” (4). The development of this mindset created a 
politician who fully asserted a “belief in liberal progress, conceived within the 
carefully prescribed limits of moderate concession to responsible opinion” (6). 
Of Irish decent, Palmerston was not immediately within the social peerage 
that would allow for easy entry into the political sphere.  These beginnings 
developed a stronger tie to the people than most of his contemporaries. 
Though he was a “flamboyant politician” (6), garnering him significant 
opposition within the British Government, he was “acutely aware of the need 
to carry popular support with him” (6). Brown’s study on Lord Palmerston 
fully delves into the intricacies of mid-Victorian politics and foreign policy 
through the man himself and how they evolved with his influence. 
In his introduction, Brown discusses Palmerston's gunboat diplomacy 
toward China and Greece as exceptions to his foreign policy rather than the 
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rule. He goes into great depth in issues involving Portugal, Spain, Syria, 
Egypt, and Belgium, yet in his chapter that covers 1835-1841, and the 
subsequent chapter covering 1841-1846 there is scant mention of China.  
When China is discussed at greater lengths, Brown ties it into Peelite and 
protectionist disapproval of Palmerston's more colorful politics they feared 
would keep them in "perpetual hot water," . This aspect of the political power 
struggle contributes to many historians’ criticisms of Palmerston as a 
gunboat diplomat and an international bully. It was Palmerston's long 
history of working with the press to encourage public support for his 
Whig-Liberal agenda that justified his actions against China. Brown uses 
The Times, the Morning Post, and other newspaper sources to describe this 
justification as a part of a mission to "'teach to it's partner [China] better 
mercantile manners” (401), to ensure "'liberty and security'" (401) for British 
commerce. Newspapers, particularly far-reaching and influential ones like 
The Times worked to create a public opinion that remained pro-Palmerston 
and also insured a successful Whig majority in the general election of 1857 
even though there was much controversy over the war being fought in China. 
The papers treated China as a nation of barbaric peoples who needed to be 
brought into the civilized world, and Britain should be the nation to do so. 
This hostile view toward China justified “Britain’s robust response” (401) in 
the outbreak and continuation of war. This generated a popularity for 
Palmerston (not only in regards to China) that kept his public popularity “red 
hot” (404), though there were many who opposed him in the British 
Government. 
Palmerston did not carry any exceptional interest in empire or imperial 
affairs except where free trade was concerned. China was purely of an 
economic interest and trade regulation. In terms of imperial policy, 
Palmerston “lacked… ‘an intellectually robust philosophy on empire and its 
responsibilities’” (405), so long as Britain remained influential as a great 
world power. Even in the "crown jewel" colonial holding of India, Palmerston 
paid no major attention in imperial matters until an economic crisis 
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originating in America threatened to collapse banks across the whole of India. 
An uprising against imperial rule was sparked from a controversy over 
whether or not the British were greasing guns supplied to Indian troops with 
pork and beef fat, a major slight against Indian Muslim and Hindu 
populations. Violence erupted in India in which no British man, woman, or 
child escaped. The result was the transfer of jurisdiction of India from the 
British East India Company to the Crown, fundamentally altering “the way 
power was exercised” (407). This shift in imperial control was not without its 
own controversy: it was not popular to shift control from the middle class to 
the aristocracy, but for Palmerston, the need for Britain to maintain control 
and order was a matter of international concern – Palmerston feared any 
sign of weakness in British international opinion, particularly Russian 
opinion. The main concern he had in Colonial India was to insure British 
prowess and protect economic interests. 
Palmerston’s response to international occurrences in places of interest like 
Belgium, Afghanistan, India, and many other places is, in Brown’s account, 
driven by asserting Britain’s standing as a world power and her economic 
interests. He argues that Palmerston did not concern himself too greatly with 
imperial policy unless Britain’s superiority or trade interests were 
compromised. Brown discusses in great detail the various countries and 
colonial holdings Britain from the beginning of his role as Foreign Secretary 
in 1830 through his role as Prime Minister up to his death in 1965.  China, 
however is not discussed at great length until Palmerston became Prime 
Minister in 1855, though conflict with China began toward the end of the 
1830s. Brown’s assessment of Palmerston’s foreign policy ties the conflict in 
China not only to a power struggle among opposing Whig and Liberal forces 
in parliament, but also to Palmerston's view on empire and foreign policy in 
regards to free trade. Above all, Palmerston's chief concern was protecting 
British economic interests in China, even if that trade flooded Chinese 
markets with a highly addictive drug–opium. Unlike his response in India 
that had a moral agenda after the massacre of innocent men, women, and 
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children, there was no moral justification for military action in a country that 
stood outside of the British Empire. 
Brown's discussion on Palmerston's foreign policy and his position on 
imperialism is enlightening and thorough, affirming his argument that 
Palmerston's gunboat diplomacy was more the exception rather than the rule. 
The continual emphasis on the impact of Palmerston's classical liberal 
education at Edinburgh University under the guidance of Dugald Stewart 
throughout the book as a deep root for the "Palmerston mindset" creates a 
cohesive and consistent politician that, in part, responded to and informed 
nineteenth-century British politics. His "brutish" approach in China in the 
1850s was certainly not overlooked, however, Palmerston's role in the initial 
conflict with China in the late 1830s and early 1840s (with the exception of a 
few vague references) was missing. Further explanation of the First Opium 
War would not discredit Brown's thesis. A deeper understanding of why 
China embarked in a conflagration with Britain as more than just a 
resistance to the free trade Britain had achieved in 1842 (see page 396-398) 
would inform readers more on the exception China really was in Palmerston's 
foreign policy. A more complete perspective on Palmerstonian Anglo-Chinese 
relations would also stand as an example of nineteenth- century British 
policy on free trade better than it currently does. 
Palmerston: A Biography is a valuable and immense account not only of the 
life of an extraordinarily long-lasting British politician, but of the 
complexities of British Politics during the nineteenth-century. Brown 
successfully redeems Lord Palmerston's popular criticism as an international 
bully by explaining his policies toward many other nations as an encourager 
of liberalism over violent revolution without skipping over his bullying 
against China and also against Greece in the 1830s. If China is to stand as a 
major example of the exception to Palmerston’s approach to foreign policy, it 
is important to fully denote his role in the conflict with China from the 
beginning of that conflict.
  
 
[Book Review] 
 
Evgeny Sergeev, The Great Game 1856-1907: 
Russo-British Relations in Central and East Asia  
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2013) 
 
Frank Jacob* 
 
Evgeny Sergeev is correct when he states that the Great Game between 
Russia and Great Britain “must be re-examined by historians from temporal, 
geographical, sociopolitical, economic, and cultural perspectives” (p.1). 
Furthermore, he is providing such a re-examination by his new book, which is 
analyzing the history of the Great Game from 1856 until 1907. In actuality, 
this reviewed book provides an extensive study of the reasons – economic, 
geostrategic, personal, and political – for the Great Game, also known as the 
“competition between different models of early globalization”, “complex, 
multilevel decision-making and decision-implementing activity,” and “crucial 
period in the development of the Russo-British relationship in Asia” (p.13). 
Beginning in the late 1850s as a consequence of the end of the Caucasus War 
(1859), the Sepoy Mutiny (1857/58), the Second Opium War (1856-1860), the 
Anglo-Persian struggle for Herat (1856/57), the British economic expansion in 
Asia as well as the start of Russian industrialization and the American Civil 
War (1861-1865) (p.14), the Great Game took place in the geographical sphere 
bordered between 50-20 degree northern latitude and 50-130 degree eastern 
longitude (p.18). There it was responsible for the development of large ancient 
states such as China, Persia or Afghanistan, old khanates and emirates like 
Bokhara, Khiva, Kokand, the Punjab or Kashmir and territories which were 
inhabited by proto-state tribes (p.19). Despite the fact that Sergeev is going to 
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describe a part of European diplomatic history, he is eager and successful in 
providing the reader with the global perspective of the Great Game which had 
a tremendous effect on Asia as well.  
In the first chapter (pp.23-63), he begins with a description of the prologue 
of the Great Game by analyzing the reasons leading up to the diplomatic 
struggle of Russia and Great Britain in this sphere. In addition to this, he is 
tracing the players or supporters of the Game by analyzing the influence of 1) 
monarchs and bureaucrats, 2) military or diplomatic agents, and 3) 
journalists, explorers and freelancers. With regard to the origin of the Great 
Game, Sergeev also takes a look at the Asian regions and states, to find out, 
how far they were involved in the struggle as well. Due to this, he is able to 
find out that there was not only the wish for natural and “scientific borders” 
or strongholds in Asia, but also a need for economic markets which should 
become part of the sphere of influence (pp.24-27). Despite the weight of these 
reasons, Sergeev is able to determine “personal ambitions as a main driving 
force of the Great Game” (p.46), which were traceable not only in Russia and 
Britain but especially on the frontiers, where lower military ranks hoped for 
promotion, and in the Asian countries, where spies and scouts were recruited 
(p.49). 
In the following chapter (pp.65-104), the author analyzes the role of India 
for the Great Game (pp.65-80). The Anglo-Persian War, the Sepoy Mutiny, the 
Taiping Rebellion and the Second Opium War had weakened Great Britain in 
Asia, causing the Russian military to discuss a possible invasion of India, an 
act that would trigger the Great Game itself (p.76). These Russian plans of 
the late 1850s and early 1860s finally provided the starting point when a 
“spirit of adventure” and a “thirst for decorations and higher ranks” (p.94) of 
the Russian military was responsible for the antagonism of the two European 
Great Powers in Asia where Russian diplomatic missions visited Khiva, 
Bokhara, Kabul and Peking in the following years.  
The assault on Kokand, the Russian conquest of the khanates, and the 
formation of the governor-generalship in Turkestan are the main topics of 
chapter 3 (pp.105-148), which also describes the British popular view on the 
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events in Asia. This focuses particularly on the events in Turkestan 
(pp.133-142) and a British diplomatic interference which led to an 
aggravation of the relations between the two powers. Meanwhile, the fall of 
Khiva the khanate, which had prevented a Russian control of the lower Oxus 
and provided an anti-Russian ally in Asia, led to the climax of the Great 
Game. This is analyzed in further detail in the following chapter (pp.149-210).  
Despite the Gorchakov-Granville compromise of 1873, the diplomatic 
struggle proceeded during the following decades, regardless of the 
insecurities of the people in both countries concerning a possible victory in the 
dispute. In the following years, the Afghan knot determined the 
Anglo-Russian relationship. When on 22 August 1878 a Russian delegation 
entered Kabul and received a warm welcome, the British government had 
every reason to become nervous. The Treaty of Gandamak at the end of the 
first phase of the Second Anglo-Afghan War granted the needed concessions 
for Great Britain to feel safe with regard to Russian approaches in 
Afghanistan (p.189). Due to this, Turkmenia remained the only independent 
region on the chess board of the Great Game. Until 1884, the Turkmen 
problem (pp.189-201) was unresolved when the powers decided to establish a 
commission which would deal with the border issue. As a consequence of the 
several treaties and developments, Britain and Russia reached a “fragile 
equilibrium” or a “strategic stalemate” (p.209) during the following decades.  
Chapter 5 (pp.211-274) provides a survey of the consequences of this 
strategic stalemate which led to a scramble for new territories in the Far East 
and a diplomatic struggle with regard to India. The Pamirs (pp.212-228) 
became an interesting target for new direct actions in addition to Tibet 
(pp.249-274), where Britain wanted to establish a connection between its 
Indian and Chinese territories. India, which was of elementary importance 
for Britain, and its self-concept of the great power status had to be secured 
with every possible step. However, the possibilities of both powers were 
limited in these regions. Because of this, the end of the game, which is 
analyzed in the last chapter (pp.275-335), took place in the Far East where 
Russia and Britain found new places for their expansionist ambitions. 
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In Korea, Manchuria and China, the two powers found sufficient 
perspectives and opportunities to continue their struggle; however, the 
Russian government and its agents were finally forced to acknowledge that 
the Great Game had to come to an end in order to prevent too much pressure 
on the system of autocratic rule (p.275). The Russo-Japanese War and the 
Japanese victory set an end to the Russian ambitions in the Far East, and the 
Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 finally ended the diplomatic struggle of 
the two countries. While this was a first step to the creation of the alliance, it 
was also an expression of Western chauvinism in later years, due to the fact 
that the rights of the people, especially those living in Persia and Afghanistan, 
were of no interest for the signing great powers (p.320). Despite this neglect of 
their existence, the Great Game itself had a tremendous effect on the people 
living in Asia.  
In conclusion, by adding an epilogue (pp.337-345) Sergeev underlines this 
“multifaceted impact” (p.347) on Asia; furthermore, he concludes that the 
motivations for the Great Game varied in the same way as its geographical 
scenes were varying during the several decades (p.346). In addition, he makes 
the points that the game had come to the end, that neither Britain nor Russia 
had won or lost the game, and that the game, in and of itself, had not been a 
kind of “Victorian cold war” (p.347).  
The work of Sergeev must be highly valued as a detailed description of the 
Great Game, for which it will become a type of standard reading due, in part, 
to his providing a dual perspective on the topic, which is so decisive for 
Russian and British history of the 19th and early 20th century. Next to this, 
Sergeev was successful in providing a global perspective on the diplomatic 
struggle of two European great powers and its impact on the people who were 
living in Asia. Due to this, the reviewed book is a must-read for all those who 
are interested in Russian or British history, diplomatic history and global or 
transnational history. The years of Sergeev's research culminated in a very 
well-researched and highly recommended account of history and will, 
hopefully, be recognized as such. 
  
 
[Book Review] 
 
Kiyotaka Sato, Life Story of Mr Terry Harrison, MBE: His 
Identity as a Person of Mixed Heritage 
(Research Centre for the History of Religious and Cultural 
Diversity, Tokyo: Meiji University, 2013) 
 
                                  Yumiko Hamai* 
 
Life Story of Mr Terry Harrison, MBE: His Identity as a Person of Mixed 
Heritage is the sixth in the series which Prof. Kiyotaka Sato, Meiji University, 
Tokyo has been publishing since 2010, Memory and Narrative. (The series 
can be purchased through Tousui Shobou, Publishers & Co., Tokyo.) It is also 
part of the fruit born from a joint research project between Meiji University’s 
Research Centre for the History of Religious and Cultural Diversity and the 
East Midlands Oral History Archive. 
Since 2001, Sato has been conducting detailed research on the history of 
multiculturalism and ethnic communities in Britain, especially in Leicester, 
which is reputed to be one of the most ‘multicultural’ cities in the U.K. The 
2011 census data show that only 45.1 per cent of those residing in Leicester 
identify themselves as ‘majority’ White British. Its largest ethnic ‘minority’ 
group is the Indian community, which consists of 28.3 per cent of the 
population, and within this multicultural city a wide range of ethnic 
communities live side by side with each other. Sato’s works have tried to 
demonstrate how people of these disparate communities over the different 
generations have settled and lived in the city.  
The approach he has adopted to document these people’s lives is to 
interview hundreds of the members from various ethnic communities. 
                                                   
* Associate Professor, Graduate School of International Media, Communication 
and Tourism Studies, Hokkaido University, Japan 
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According to Colin Hyde who reviewed the first five books in the series1, Sato, 
as of March 2013, had conducted around 700 interviews with about 400 
people. For example, the preceding five instalments respectively present life 
stories of Mrs Elvy Morton (an African Caribbean woman who was the first 
chair of the Leicester Caribbean Carnival), Mrs Claire Wintram (a Jewish 
woman), Mrs Jasvir Kaur Chohan (a Sikh woman), Mr Sarup Singh, MBE 
and Mrs Gurmit Kaur (a Sikh artist and his wife), and Mr Jaffer Kapasi, 
OBE (a Muslim businessperson who was expelled from Uganda by Idi Amin 
in 1972). In total, Sato plans to publish 15 books on completion of the series. 
He states on the cover pages of the series that the purpose of his oral history 
project is ‘to enable the UK’s many and various ethnic minority communities 
and indigenous groups to record and preserve their memories, life 
experiences and traditions, and to ensure access to this rich inheritance for 
present and future generations’. 
The sixth book, as its title indicates, presents the life story of Terry 
Harrison, a person of mixed heritage. He was born in 1944 in a small village 
in Leicestershire, to a Welsh woman and a Black American GI who was 
stationed there during the Second World War. Since his father had died 
before he and his twin sister were born, Terry was brought up in a white 
family, and went to school in Leicestershire. After leaving school, he joined 
the Royal Marines, and then the Police Force in the 1960s and 1970s. In 1980 
he became a Leisure Services Officer in the Leicester City Council, where he 
would go on to play major parts in such events as the 1989 Special Olympics. 
Today he remains a proactive community leader, and has been chairing the 
African Caribbean Citizens Forum, an umbrella organisation representing 63 
African Heritage community organisations in Leicestershire, as well as 
Highfield Rangers, a multiethnic football club. He has also been a magistrate 
since 1991. 
                                                   
1 Colin Hyde, ‘Kiyotaka SATO, Memories and Narrative Series 1~5, Research 
Centre for the History of Religious and Cultural Diversity, Meiji University, 
Tokyo, 2010-2012’, SUNDAI SHIGAKU (Sundai Historical Review), No. 148, 
March 2013. 
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Thus Harrison’s personal and career background, through the telling of his 
life story, provides us a small, yet fascinating facet of the ‘multicultural’ 
history of Leicestershire and Britain. His existence as a mixed heritage 
person in itself resulted from an intriguing episode of history—the American 
Black GI’s stationing in a Leicestershire village in the 1940s. He frankly 
admits difficulties of living in rural Leicestershire as one of few ‘black’ kids in 
the 1950s, and tells his experiences of racial prejudice at the military and 
police forces through the 1960s and 1970s. His eyewitness accounts document 
some of the changes Leicester has experienced in the past decades, which 
have transformed it into a ‘multicultural hotspot’. 
As a young black boy brought up in a white family, he lacked any role 
models he could aspire to be like (he admits, ‘I struggled with my identity’, pp. 
18-19). His recent experience as a magistrate has stimulated his enthusiasm 
in supporting disadvantaged young people including those with ethnic 
minority backgrounds. As a result, he has established an organisation 
supporting troubled youngsters, 4Sure, and now expresses his desire to be a 
role model for black youngsters, just like one he craved for as a boy. 
Like the preceding five books in the series, this instalment contains a 
helpful introduction by Sato, the editor and author, which helps the readers 
in locating Harrison’s story in the broader historical background. It also 
contains a large number of photographs, maps, and extracts from local 
newspaper articles which covered some of the relevant topics and events (GIs 
stationed in Leicestershire, Highfield Rangers, royal visit to Leicester in 2012, 
etc.) as appendices. 
We could regard this book and the rest of the series as part of an innovative 
approach to the history of immigration into Britain. Panikos Paniyi suggests, 
in his comprehensive book on immigration history into Britain over the last 
two centuries, that there has been a shift in emphasis from what he calls the 
‘ethnic block’ approach to a more individual-based ‘oral history’ approach2. 
The former tends to flatten and ignore differences within ethnic groups, often 
                                                   
2 Panikos Panayi, An Immigration History of Britain, Pearson, 2010. . 
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based on a range of factors such as class, gender, places of birth, etc., whereas 
the latter can show us the experiences of migrants and their descendants in 
more complex ways. Oral histories of people from ethnic communities give us 
a more complex picture of how ‘multicultural’ Britain has become what it is 
now, and can suggest clues as to how it should be in the future. Cynthia 
Brown suggests in her 2006 article in Oral History that the joint project Sato 
has been engaging provided the opportunity to test if ‘oral evidence [could 
provide] an essential record of the hidden history of migration’ and by 
‘explor[ing] institutional and individual responses to what Trevor Phillips 
recently described as “the difficulties of different kinds of people learning to 
live together”’, it could add to the current (and hot) debate on British 
multiculturalism3. 
This new approach might be particularly effective in exploring the 
experiences of people who possesses ‘mixed heritage’ identities, just like Terry 
Harrison. According to the 2011 census, some 2 per cent of the total 
population (1,250,229) in the UK identify themselves as members of 
‘mixed/multiple ethnic groups’ and this almost equates with two thirds of 
those who identified as ‘Black or Black British’ (1,904,684). With more and 
more people marrying and forming relationships outside of their own ethnic 
groups (and much more people accept it as a norm compared with 1980s4, the 
number of people with these complex identities will continue to increase. Life 
stories such as Harrison’s would certainly give us opportunities to look into 
how people with mixed heritage struggle to establish his/her identity, and 
more generally how ‘identity’ itself works. 
  
                                                   
3  Cynthia Brown, ‘Moving On: Reflections on oral history and migrant 
communities in Britain’, Oral History, Spring 2006. 
4 British Future’s report The Melting Pot Generation: How Britain became more 
relaxed on race, shows that only 15 per cent of the respondents expressed 
concerns about mixed marriages in 2012, compared with 50 per cent in the 
1980s.  
http://www.britishfuture.org/articles/reports/new-report-the-melting-pot-gener
ation/  
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